Arms Control & Disarmament

A QUARTERLY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
WITH ABSTRACTS
AND ANNOTATIONS



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A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS

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ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT BIBLIOGRAPHY SECTION
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PREFACE

Arms Control & Disarmament attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature in an important subject area. It is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section of the Library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, German, and Russian languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. Titles in the Cyrillic alphabet are transliterated according to the Library of Congress system, but with ligatures omitted. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, call numbers are given for all cataloged and classified materials. Uncataloged and unclassified materials are designated by symbols indicating the custodial divisions of the Library in which they can be found. A list of these symbols appears on the next page.

Matters of fact and opinion presented in *Arms Control & Disarmament* are solely the responsibility of the authors of the items abstracted, and their inclusion does not constitute endorsement by either the Library of Congress or the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Information about the periodicals cited can in most instances be obtained readily from standard reference works.

The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,700 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has usually been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to press. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines.

The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate may be used verbatim or in a modified form; they are designated "author's abstract," "author's summary," etc.

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I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

A. BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

1
Brackman, Arnold C. SOUTHEAST ASIA'S SECOND FRONT. New York, F. A. Praeger [1966] 341 p.
DS518. B68

Partial contents. --Singapore: a starting point. --Independence through merger. --The Sarawak equation. --The Sabah equation. --Borneo inquiry. --The Irian fuse. --Sukarno at the Rubicon. --The Brunei revolt. --The Philippine awakening. --North Borneo interlude. --Maphilindo: dream or reality? --Borneo ascertainment. --Sukarno crosses the Rubicon. --Confrontation: on Borneo. --Diplomatic initiatives. --The Pacific powers. --Confrontation: in Malaya. --The PKI proclaims Merdeka. --Djakarta and Peking. --Moscow, Vietnam, and the Strait of Malacca. --Index.

Studies the strategic importance of the Malay Barrier--the islands, seas, and narrow straits (the most important being the Strait of Malacca) rimming the Southeast Asian mainland. Brackman believes that every U.S. involvement in Asia since the end of the 19th century has reflected a policy of preserving and maintaining the integrity of these islands. Should the Communists take over the Southeast Asian mainland the next logical stage of the "Communist enterprise" will center on this barrier.

2
Carrighar, Sally. WAR IS NOT IN OUR GENES. New York times magazine, Sept. 10, 1967: 74-75, 77, 80, 82, 87-88, 90, 92, 94. illus.
AP2. N6575, 1967

The concept of evolution of physical structures gained general acceptance but grudgingly; now the concept of evolution of behavior is "inspiring one of biology's hottest debates." In 1950 a group of scientists terming themselves ethologists began observing the behavior of animals in their natural habitats with a view to establishing relationships between animal and human behavior. Lately animal aggression and its implications for the study of human warmaking have become the focus of the controversy. Both Konrad Lorenz in On Aggression and Robert Ardrey in The Territorial Imperative have put forth the claim that the urge toward intraspecific fighting (as opposed to predatory attacks) is inherent in all the higher animals and thus inherent in man. Unfortunately a belief in the inevitability of war tends to fulfill itself simply because it is widely believed; therefore the conclusions of these two ethologists warrant closer examination. If any of the higher animals escape the compulsion toward aggression and territoriality then perhaps hope exists for man. Such animals do indeed exist, with many animals, in fact, living in colonies. Whales, sea otters, and lemmings are examples of nonterritorial animals. Lorenz, a noted biologist, finds much evidence of intraspecific fighting, but it must be noted that he has dealt to a large degree with semidomesticated animals. Anyone who has lived in the wilderness has seen far more evidence of animals associating amicably with their fellows. Aggression among rats exemplified for Lorenz the inherent nature of fighting, but experiments other than those from which he drew his conclusions were conducted under conditions that may have been more favorable for the rats and produced results quite different from those described by Lorenz. The fact is that wild animals have little time left over from the desperate business of keeping their stomachs full to fight among themselves. Human aggressiveness is probably learned behavior, and sadism is psychosis. Aggression is not in our genes--and unfounded beliefs to the contrary can only stifle any human incentives to find peace.

3
Chapin, William. THE ASIAN BALANCE OF POWER: AN AMERICAN VIEW. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967. 12 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 35)
P&GP RR

Steps could be taken toward the creation of a limited regional balance of power in Asia based on greater political and economic cohesion in that area and more confidence among Asian states in their ability to cope with their security problems, particularly the Chinese threat. As long as China emphasizes ideological and revolutionary objectives in its foreign policy, it is a menace to the security of the non-Communist Asian states. If China were to give less priority to immediate revolutionary goals, prospects would improve for the relaxation of trade restrictions by the West and for the normalization of Chinese relations with the other Asian states. Although formal cooperation among all non-Communist Asian states would be difficult at this time, the possibility of regional political groupings should be examined. Under the leadership of the stronger Asian powers regional groupings would provide a countervailing force against China. Initially Japan will probably assert its leadership in a regional grouping organized on an economic basis which might in time take on political substance and which will enable Japan to allay the suspicions of southern Asian states by contributing to their economic development. Both India and Australia maintain good relations with most of the Asian states and have sufficient resources to contribute to an Asian balance of power by assuming modest regional defense responsibilities. Indonesia will find it difficult to assume regional leadership due to internal instability although its size makes it a consideration in examining the power role of Asian states. Thailand enjoys a greater degree of unity than its Asian neighbors and with its expanding economy is in a position to assert leadership in Southeast Asia. To date, Asian regional organizations such as the Asian Development Bank and the Asian and Pacific Council have been based primarily on economic cooperation, but they might evolve into more useful institutions with political authority. Aid programs sponsored by Europe and the Soviet Union could contribute to the Asian balance of power by helping to stabilize the shaky economies of Asian nations and by decreasing Asian

dependence on U.S. economic help. If the Chinese threat were to lose most of its force by the failure of Communist subversion in South Vietnam, Asian nations might acquire the increased confidence necessary to cope with their own security problems. This in turn would permit reduction of American military power in that area. However, the United States will probably continue for an indefinite time to provide for the strategic protection of Asia against Chinese nuclear power. If it develops at all, the balance of power in Asia will come about gradually, from the consolidation of political arrangements, acquisition of strength and confidence, and greater agreement about the use of political and military power by Asian states.

4
Coffey, Joseph I. STABILITY AND THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Proceedings, v. 93, June 1967: 40-47.
VI.U8, v. 93

In examining the implications for international stability of a change which would diminish the superiority of U.S. strategic forces over those of the Soviet Union, one should consider the nature and limits of the change and the capability and willingness of the Soviets to employ military force to achieve national objectives. Although it would be nearly impossible for the Soviets to achieve sufficient nuclear strategic superiority to reduce retaliatory damage from the United States to an acceptable level, they could undoubtedly reach a "strategic parity" with the United States which might tempt Soviet leaders to engage in local aggression. However, the Soviet Union would encounter difficulties in employing armed forces for the pursuit of policy objectives from barriers imposed by its location and rugged border terrain which are often reinforced by capable indigenous troops or strong alliances, or both, in possible Soviet target areas. Also, tactical nuclear weapons could destroy the men and supplies amassed for battle and the enemy's tactical nuclear arsenal as well as provoke escalation into general nuclear war. Since Soviet policymakers have carefully avoided direct military confrontation with the West during a time of rapid growth in Soviet military capabilities, it is possible that concern for the consequences would govern their actions even during a period of strategic parity or strategic superiority. Military achievements alone have not been responsible for Russia's postwar rise to power; and the withdrawal of European colonial powers from vast areas in Asia and Africa plus the increased influence of Communist countries in world affairs have generated confidence among Soviet leaders that communism is "the wave of the future." Military force as a factor in Soviet foreign policy is conditioned by fear of nuclear war and by the dubious value to the military power base of territory acquired by force. Actual disruption of the stability of the international environment is more likely to be precipitated by political moves of Soviet leaders emboldened by the realization of strategic parity than by shifts in the strategic balance of power.

5
COLD WAR--TO FLARE ANEW OR FADE? U.S. news & world report, v. 63, July 10, 1967: 23-26.
JK1.U65, v. 63

Johnson's and Kosygin's talks at Glassboro made no substantial change in the world situation; the cold war will not vanish without further easing of tensions. In London, policymakers see no diminution of the cold war and fear most the renewal of the arms race in the guise of antiballistic missile deployment. Britons also continue to worry about the Middle East. Leaders in Saigon naturally find their speculation on the international scene confined to the Vietnam War. They do not feel that Moscow, unable to control even Nasser, can force Ho Chi Minh to the conference table. They see little hope of an immediate end to the war. Beirut provides a vantage point for assessing current Arab feelings. U.S. prestige in the Arab world is at a low ebb, and, again, the cold war is expected to intensify in this area. French President de Gaulle, viewing symmetry as the prime world stabilizer, fears that growing U.S. power will increase the likelihood of war. De Gaulle sees no cessation of small-war activity nor a lessening of the chances of major war. In Vienna, experts see the only major world change as acknowledgment on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union that they can "no longer control or prevent small wars in the world." Bonn officials likewise view the Glassboro summit as changing little and merely confirming that when an extremely important crisis arises only Russia and America should "get into the act." These two nations, say the West Germans, have a great responsibility for things that happen all over the world. The view from Geneva--that Washington and Moscow are moving toward better understanding--is somewhat more optimistic. Officials and experts point to a trend of diminishing influence by the superpowers that may enable them to concentrate on solving their own external and internal problems.

6
Collier, David S., and Kurt Glaser, eds. WESTERN POLICY AND EASTERN EUROPE. Chicago, H. Regnery Co. [1966] 245 p. (Foundation for Foreign Affairs series, no. 10)
DR48.5.C62

Based on papers presented at a conference held in Chicago, Mar. 25-28, 1965, and sponsored by the Foundation for Foreign Affairs, Chicago, and the Studiengesellschaft für Fragen Mittel- und Osteuropäischer Partnerschaft of Wiesbaden.
Bibliographical footnotes.

Examines developments in Eastern Europe and analyzes the attitude of East European peoples and governments toward a future united Germany and a united Europe in which Germany plays an important role. Part one, "Eastern Europe today: what kind of evolution?" discusses current social and intellectual changes behind the Iron Curtain and how the West can take advantage of these trends. The essays in part two, "The German problem and Eastern Europe," consider the problem of "image," particularly the German image in the East. Part three, "Eastern Europe and world policy," examines the political implications of economic policy and trade and the limitations of an economic approach to East-West relations.

7
D'Amato, Anthony A. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTS IN FOREIGN POLICY PREDICTION. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 11, Sept. 1967: 294-311.
JX1901.J6, v. 11

The paper presents a set of four hypothetical attitude-clusters attributable to foreign policy decision-makers, designed to aid in the analysis and prediction of this kind of decisional behavior. The level of generalization is somewhat different from that of either the

Morgenthau-Osgood or the Snyder-Bruck-Sapin school. The clusters or "constructs" are treated in polar form: (1) Systemic-Personalist--how the decision-maker perceives the mechanism of the environment of his decisions; (2) Hawk-Dove--willingness to use power and force; (3) Incremental-Avulsive--degree of change between present and former decisions; (4) Flexible-Rigid--the degree of flexibility in the preceding constructs. Each construct is discussed with examples suggesting how it was generated, both from current history and from lists of "opinion statements" used as tests with students. A paradigm is proposed which related the four constructs to one another as an ordered field in which one might locate both decisional alternatives and the proclivities of specific decision-makers. Refinement is needed, but the present paradigm can be used impressionistically. (Abstract supplied)

8

Eckhardt, William, and Ralph K. White. A TEST OF THE MIRROR-IMAGE HYPOTHESIS: KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 11, Sept. 1967: 325-332. JX1901.J6, v. 11

The avowed goals and values of the Soviet leaders have been described in various ways. There is the conception based on Khrushchev's famous statement, "We will bury you," and then there is Bronfenbrenner's (1961) "mirror-image" conception according to which the verbal statements of both the Soviet leaders and the Soviet public are similar to the American in their stress on values such as peace and national sovereignty. An application of White's (1951) value-analysis technique to speeches by Kennedy and Khrushchev strongly supports the mirror-image conception. Their expressed values are positively correlated (r^4. 56, significant at the .01 level of confidence), and on five indices believed to represent "conflictmindedness" there are no significant differences between them. (Abstract supplied)

9

Findley, Paul. NEITHER WAR NOR PEACE. Central Europe journal, v. 15, June/July 1967: 183-194. DB200.7.S74, v. 15

Paul Findley, Congressman from the state of Illinois, assesses--on its 20th anniversary--the Truman policy of containment. He postulates three myths that befog Western thinking respective to the Soviet Union: 1. That Communist China and not the Soviet Union is the greatest security threat; 2. That the Soviet Union is less threatening because Russian nationalism has replaced Communist ideology as a dominant factor in Soviet foreign policy; 3. That the managerial class in the Soviet Union is winning political control at the expense of the ideologically-oriented Communist hierarchy. Describing the Soviet Union as a cause in World War II, the struggle between the status quo and imperialism based on ideology, President Truman's correct estimate of the Soviet Union's imperialistic policy and his successful policy of containment. Representative Findley warns of those who criticize the containment policy, arguing for treatment of the Soviet Union as if it were a non-Communist state with natural national interests. Either containment, Rep. Findley argues, helped to preserve freedom and keep the peace, which in turn strengthened the legal and moral foundations of international society and thus served the West's cause by halting Soviet aggression; or, so far as it influenced events and may have been the basis for mutual misunderstandings, it contributed to the tension and instabilities of the world, to the onset of a kind of never-ending crisis. He feels the real verdict is between these two appraisals. Our job now, he concludes, is to seek to convince the Soviets that subversion will not work in the 1960's and 1970's any more than nuclear blackmail and threats of war worked during the two decades just passed. (Abstract supplied)

10

FISTS ACROSS THE SEA? RETHINKING "ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP." Common market, v. 7, May 1967: 112-116. P&GP RR

The Atlantic partnership's success in achieving its original goals is responsible for its apparent dissociation over the past few years. The alliance's initial cohesion had depended largely on the hegemony of the United States and the fear of Soviet aggression. Western Europe did a remarkable job of restoring its war-shattered economy and ensuring its military security with American economic and military aid, made available through the Organization of European Economic Cooperation and NATO. But in 1962 more permanent means than hegemony and fear were envisioned by President Kennedy and Jean Monet for the consolidation of the Atlantic partnership; they spoke of "the cohesion of equality and hope." This hope soon found expression in such initiatives as the U.S. Trade Expansion Act, the British bid for Common Market membership, prospects for the Kennedy Round, and the proposal for a Multilateral Nuclear Force--all with the final objective of a permanent peace to be achieved through East-West accommodation. Of course Western unity was essential for this goal. But subsequent events (abandonment of the MLF project; French policy with regard to the Common Market; France's withdrawal from NATO, etc.) pointed to a dissociative process not only within the Atlantic community, but in the Communist bloc as well--a process sometimes labeled polycentrism. However, polycentrism has its limits, as is evident from NATO's sustained "cohesion" and the "still important links tying the European countries together and tying them all to the United States." The remedy for "polycentrism," "domination," etc.--for everything that weakens Atlantic cooperation--lies primarily "in the hands of the Europeans themselves." Western unity is needed now as much as ever for achieving an East-West détente.

11

Franck, Thomas M. SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL THIRD-PARTY DECISION-MAKING. Stanford law review, v. 19, June 1967: 1217-1247. LL

Discusses various aspects of third-party settlement of disputes. Franck discusses the problem of bias as a barrier to impartial decisions, the internal and external pressures on an individual, and the degree to which each can be controlled to achieve objectivity. He notes various procedures that might be used to eliminate biased parties from international service and valid bases for disqualification. Although third-party decisionmakers are products of and owe their loyalty to the local, national, socioethnic, and economic communities to which they are conditioned, Franck feels they can be inculcated with international values. For this the international community must develop a positive system of values--"an ethos of international service"--which can command men's loyalty.

12
Larson, Arthur. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: FANCIES VS. FACTS. Foreign Service journal, v. 44, Sept. 1967: 18-19, 49.
JX1.A53, v. 44

A rational approach to international relations requires accurate and up-to-date information, but for the most part international relations today are conducted on the basis of facts that are between 18 and 300 years out of date, particularly in the area of peace and war. One widely held misconception is that diplomacy is the only valid method of settling international disputes. Old-fashioned power politics is indeed obsolete and nuclear war is unusable as an instrument of public policy, but policymakers have failed to adjust their methods to these circumstances. Military and diplomatic deadlocks thus remain, but without the recourse of war to dispel tensions and settle issues. A second persisting misconception is that military power is the decisive factor in international situations. The only advantage of power is to preserve a stalemate. That nations will not accept arbitration and adjudication is another widely held misconception. Actually, during the 19th century 177 major disputes were resolved by arbitration between nations. It is also untrue that because there is no world government with overwhelming military power to enforce the law, nations will not abide by judicial and arbitral decisions. Some nations claim that United Nations peacekeeping activities are limited to situations in which there is unanimity among the Great Powers. Yet the record shows that every major U.N. peacekeeping action was taken despite the opposition of a major power. Outdated ideas also exist concerning the Soviet Union, communism, and the cold war, such as the fallacy that all conflicts in the world can be explained as communism vs. anticommunism. The basis for almost every major U.S. foreign policy --that Germany will be reunited, that Chiang will return to power in China, etc. --is fiction rather than fact. Nations must recognize that contributions from research and science can assist in solving international problems.

13
Mahler, Oldřich. A CZECH VIEW OF THE ARMS RACE. Survival, v. 9, Apr. 1967: 122-127.
U162.S9, v. 9

Translation of extracts from The Power Relationship and Western Strategy (Poměr sil a strategie Západu) published in the Czech newspaper Naše vojsko [Our Army]. Prague, 1966.
U4.N35

Today superpower relationships are characterized by an equilibrium based on the indefeasible ability of both powers to destroy one another in a nuclear attack. In order to shift the nuclear balance and eliminate this vulnerability the superpowers have begun to minimize the chief risk inherent in today's strategic balance by constructing antiballistic missile systems. The creation of these systems will enhance military instability and increase the scope for the use of force. Although "massive retaliation" and the missile "gap" are strategic anachronisms, U.S. imperialist policies, as in Vietnam, are rationalized by superior massive offensive capabilities and are helped by the disparate policies of the Socialist countries (e.g., the Sino-Soviet dispute). The imperialists have also refused to acknowledge the evolutionary processes of socialism, which are going against them. The aim of socialism is to replace aggression, which up to now has been acting as an international arbiter, with an equally effective, peaceful principle. Until then the use of force in international relations presages an ominous future for superpower relationships.

14
Mosely, Philip E. EASTERN EUROPE IN WORLD POLITICS. Modern age, v. 11, spring 1967: 119-130.
AP2.N628, v. 11

At the time of Stalin's death the fate of Eastern Europe seemed irrevocably joined to that of the Soviet Union, yet today only one "true" satellite remains--"the abjectly subservient Ulbricht regime." The other former satellites have, within limits, acquired both a national identity and the right to defend their national interests. They are limited in terms of strategic power, where they must recognize Soviet hegemony, and politically, where they must continue to assert loyalty to the basic Communist doctrine. To ensure the continuity of their rule, many leaders feel safer relying on Moscow than on popular support at home and prefer not to stretch their opportunities for autonomy to the limit. Nonetheless, a number of world events have encouraged the definition and shaping of independent policies in Eastern Europe. The most important of these is the ever-spreading effect of de-Stalinization, even more profound in Eastern Europe than within the Soviet Union itself. The Sino-Soviet dispute has also had an impact on Eastern Europe by forcing the Soviet Union to compete for the support of its fellow Communists. Another factor basic to the new situation in Eastern Europe is the belief in prolonged or permanent nuclear stalemate that has emerged since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The former satellites felt protected by Soviet nuclear power against military or political pressure from the West and safeguarded against undue Soviet pressure by Western strategic might. The economic and cultural vitality of Western Europe has also prompted the Eastern nations in the past decade to try to expand commercial dealings with Western Europe and emulate the West's more effective organization and use of capital and labor resources. Finally, Eastern Europe has experienced a revival of national pride and has rejected continued subservience to Soviet policy. Local Communist leaders must assert their autonomy from Moscow, but cannot escape their need for military protection against Western "aggression" and against their own citizenry. This fluctuating situation in Eastern Europe creates both problems and opportunities for the West.

15
Nixon, Richard M. ASIA AFTER VIET NAM. Foreign affairs, v. 46, Oct. 1967: 111-125.
D410.F6, v. 46

The emergence of Asian regionalism has begun to blur the anticolonial nationalistic focus of the various Asian states. Now they recognize the West as their protector and Communist China as their common enemy. The Chinese threat should prompt them to develop a strong military alliance to guarantee their own security without relying on U.S. intervention. Realizing that military security depends ultimately on economic and political stability, the Asian governments are slowly advancing toward the Western ideals of "greater liberty, greater abundance, broader choice and increased popular involvement in the processes of government." As the world's most populous democracy, India is a significant test case in this struggle for progress. Japan, which is

expected soon to rank as the world's third strongest economic power, will probably assume a leadership role in building a mutual security arrangement for Southeast Asia. A militarily, economically, and politically strong non-Communist Asia "backed by the ultimate power of the United States" can persuade the leaders in Peking that China's "own national interest requires a turning away from foreign adventuring and a turning inward toward the solution of its own domestic problems." Once Chinese imperialist ambitions are contained, China can be accepted into the world community. The United States should not play a heavy-handed role in Asian affairs but should subtly encourage Asian initiatives toward building a strong non-Communist Asia.

16
Osipov, V. NEW TRENDS ON THE CONTINENT. International affairs (Moscow) no. 7, July 1967: 13-19.
D839.I465, 1967

Politics in Europe today has changed from that of the 1940's, 1950's, or even the early 1960's to an extent that not many people would have thought possible. France's withdrawal from the NATO military organization, Britain's application to enter the Common Market, the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee discussions at Geneva on nuclear nonproliferation, the Bucharest Declaration, etc., demonstrate that Europe has largely regained its material strength and is seeking release from dependence on the U.S. From the military standpoint, the U.S. atomic umbrella over Western Europe has been losing its meaning, because the legend of the "Red menace" belongs to the past. Furthermore West European leaders believe that their earlier commitments to the United States could involve them in a Vietnam type war; West Germany with its 460,000-strong army and territorial claims also causes suspicion. Western Europe, formerly dependent on the Marshall Plan, has recovered economically; its gold reserves are $22 billion as against the $14 billion at Fort Knox. West European exporters compete on the world markets with American exporters who have dominated the markets since World War II. Although the industry of Western Europe is very highly developed, Europe is not able to rid itself of pressures caused by U.S. economic superiority and therefore has to look for new marketing outlets in the East. Western Europe's economic interests require the broadest economic, scientific, and technical cooperation with Eastern Europe. A climate without tension is required for negotiations on 10- or 15-year credits, on East-West exchanges and stable boundaries. The main obstacle to overcoming the barriers between East and West and to establishing new trends on the European Continent is the United States. The U.S. is interested in a bloc-to-bloc approach to the East because it realizes that normalization of relations between European states would leave it odd man out. In order to maintain its influence the United States has over 300,000 officers and men and 7,000 nuclear warheads in Europe and keeps the U.S. 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. U.S. capital invested in Western Europe totals more than $17 billion, and is expected to increase this year to $20 billion. Today the automobile industry, the electronics equipment market, the manufacturing of electronic computers, etc., are controlled by American concerns. However if Britain enters the Common Market, the Common Market would have a population of more than 300 million, double America's. Wilson also wants to establish a European scientific and technical community in order to eliminate the technological gap between the United States and Western Europe. But before the British application for entry into the Common Market, Edward Heath, leader of the Conservatives, resurrected the proposal for a European nuclear force, which has been nursed by Franz Josef Strauss in Germany. Bonn's long-term policy aims have not changed; West Germany's resistance to any nonproliferation treaty indicates its nuclear ambitions, although they are skillfully veiled under concern for the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

17
Robertson, Charles L. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS SINCE WORLD WAR II: A SHORT HISTORY. New York, Wiley [1966] 385 p.
D843.R63
Bibliography: p. 353-364.

Partial contents. --The breakdown of the balance of power. --World War II and the map of the post-war world. --1945-1947: the attempt to rebuild the old world. --1947-1950: the cold war, bipolarization, and containment. --1950-1955: Hot war and cold war. --1955 and 1956: coexistence and conflict--a new world balance. --1957-1964 (I): the new states and competitive coexistence. --1957-1964 (II): the old blocs and competitive coexistence. --Cuba, the United States and Latin America, and the great confrontation of 1962.

Chronicles the changes in international politics since World War II with emphasis on the newly emerged pattern of the world balance of power.

18
Rostow, Eugene V. THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY. Daedalus, v. 96, summer 1967: 922-926. Q11.B7, v. 96

Two important facts distinguish the post-World War II world from the world organized by the Congress of Vienna--the disappearance of world empires and the resultant balkanization of the Third World, and the rise of the Communist movement. The United States has played the role of chief policeman in the free world for the last 20 years, but it has become increasingly restless and reluctant to continue, particularly when unilateral military efforts are required. The European nations and Japan, now fully recovered from the war, are torn between the prestige of world power and responsibility and the ease that comes with lack of responsibility. The Third World has begun to realize that the Communist movement is not the wave of the future militarily, economically, or otherwise. While the slowdown of Communist expansion in Asia is not as obvious as it is in Europe, it is difficult to imagine China waging an expansionist war when it still depends on the West for food. Three distinct possibilities present themselves for future American foreign policy. The United States could organize a strong coalition of industrialized free nations to protect the Third World, pursue peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union and China, and generally promote world stability. Washington could also provide peace and stability through nuclear bipolarity and dual hegemony with the Soviet Union. Finally, the United States could withdraw from Asia, leaving Japan to seek accommodation with China and making the two "the masters of Asia, and a new world power of the most formidable kind." In any case the pooling of Chinese and Japanese resources is probable in the next generation. The likelihood of war will hinge on the safeguards and political conditions under which coalition takes place.

19
Steel, Ronald. MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, AND THE TWO EUROPES. Interplay of European/American affairs, v. 1, June/July 1967: 15-18.
P&GP RR

Western and Eastern Europe are gradually "reuniting" as a result of increasing economic, cultural, and political contacts. East Europeans are looking west for high quality capital goods, while West Europeans are exploring potentially lucrative markets in the East. However, the lack of hard currency in the Communist nations is hampering trade relations. The United States is following suit by lowering export quotas on nonstrategic goods and by seeking congressional approval of a most-favored-nation tariff treatment of Eastern Europe. Economic interaction is causing greater cultural cooperation. In everything from color television sets to the tourist trade, West Europeans are competing with the Americans. Although the two Europes are not going to achieve fusion overnight, the desire, especially among the youth, to emerge from the old feelings of hopelessness and seek new ways of reconciliation is great. Russia may find it more opportune in building up its industries and modernizing its agriculture to have a united Europe with which it can trade, while Western Europe, in order to deal with America as an equal, will need the raw materials and manpower of the Soviet Union. The demise of the NATO and Warsaw military pacts seems more probable now that nuclear missiles have reduced the strategic importance of the cordon sanitaire (Iron Curtain states); the elimination of the military pacts would be a significant step toward a new European confederation. The dream of a united Western Europe linked to the United States in an Atlantic community is passing, and many fear that a powerful and unified Europe will upset the present balance of power. Yet an Atlantic alliance could be equally dangerous since Europe might not be content to remain under an American protectorship and might eventually try to recapture the states of Eastern Europe by force. The best alternative is a united Europe under Russian-American tutelage, but whether Europeans will accept this once they have the power to choose otherwise remains to be seen.

20
Swinth, Robert L. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 11, Sept. 1967: 335-344. tables.
JX1901.J6, v. 11

Considerable work has been done with Prisoner's Dilemma games to determine the conditions under which trust will be found, but much less is known about the process involved in the establishment of trust. In this study it was observed that two people were able to signal their mutual expectation of trust in the following manner: first one person exposes himself to risk of personal loss and then the other, confronted with this choice, forgoes personal gain and causes no loss to the first. Five times as many people responded to the initiative of another to establish trust as attempted to initiate trust themselves. (Abstract supplied)

21
Wilhelm, Donald. THE WEST CAN WIN: A STUDY IN SCIENCE AND WORLD POWER. New York, F. A. Praeger [1966] 208 p. Q125.W68, 1966

Contends that the West has been waging the cold war incorrectly and that the Western powers have wrongly assumed the death and unimportance of ideology, which is, in fact, the major selling point and success factor of communism. Science, which at this moment is revolutionizing philosophy, can render theory practical and has "thoroughly outmoded Marxism-Leninism." Scientific idealism, asserting the power of man to act purposefully and to alter his environment creatively, has been articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which can serve as the basis for the struggle to achieve these rights throughout the world. Science and scientists have a moral obligation to contribute to the peace and well-being of mankind. The West can win if only it evolves the necessary ideology.

22
Wood, David. THE H-BOMB AND THE BALANCE. Far Eastern economic review, v. 56, June 29, 1967: 705-707. illus. HC411.F18, v. 56

The chief significance of China's successful hydrogen bomb explosion is the speed, efficiency, and technological skill that it indicates on the part of China. It will be some time before the bomb affects the balance of power in Asia, partly because of the confused internal situation in China. Furthermore the term military balance generally refers to the relative power of the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact; it is doubtful whether such a sharp division exists in other parts of the world. One cannot divide Asian countries into two opposing camps, and even if one could, it would be difficult to define the strategic interests at stake between the two parties as neither side poses a major threat to the independence or territorial integrity of the other. The increasing ideological rift between Moscow and Peking has lessened the Communist threat in the Far East. Not only do the two governments now compete for influence rather than coordinate an anti-imperialist effort, but China must protect its Russian border. The conflict in Vietnam, essentially a struggle for power in South Vietnam among various factions of Indochinese peoples, is largely irrelevant in terms of the overall strategic situation in Asia. Significantly, China has made very little direct military contribution to North Vietnam. The Chinese cultural revolution and the domestic power struggle are absorbing leading Chinese officials, giving them substantially less time for developing a coherent diplomatic and strategic policy. Communist cell leaders and lower party officials do not know to which group of party leaders they owe allegiance. A concerted Chinese effort to acquire new territory, form military alliances, or engineer Communist takeovers is unlikely in the next 2 to 3 years, and only a threat of that nature is capable of dividing the Far East into two blocs.

B. FOREIGN POLICIES

23
ALONE AT LAST. Far Eastern Economic review, v. 57, Aug. 24, 1967: 359. HC411.F18, v. 57

Peking's renewed appeals to end China's internal upheaval indicate that its rulers have had enough of irresponsible revolutionary fervor on the domestic front. In contrast, no effort at all has been made to improve relations with the rest of the world. In fact China seems to view its international unpopularity with pride rather than alarm. An "anti-China current" stemming from the cultural revolution's excesses has swept through the rest of Asia, producing a new unity: the five nations in the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] were brought together by what they conceive to be the menace from China. Peking's disregard

of diplomatic privileges and assaults on the crews of foreign vessels in Chinese ports hurt China politically and economically, upsetting its international trade relations and thus its huge task of feeding its people.

24
Barrett, Drew J. SHOW OF FORCE IN FOREIGN POLICY. In U. S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 47, Aug. 1967: 3-8. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 47

Study of various examples of the use of a show of force reveals two basic requirements for success: a clearly defined political purpose or objective for the operation and credibility. To establish credibility a nation must have an adequate and properly positioned force in relation to the strength that the intended adversary can command and must convince the adversary of its willingness to employ that force. U.S. intervention in Panama in 1903 and in Lebanon in 1958 are examples of situations in which actual troop deployment was necessary to illustrate the Nation's will. The force involved was adequate and was believable due to the speed, scope, and decisiveness with which it was deployed. To be credible an operation must also be consistent with national character, for it is far more likely that a nation with a pattern of forceful action in its foreign policy will fulfill its threat than one whose behavior has been timid. Timing will assume increasing importance in future shows of force, as illustrated by the Cuban missile crisis, in which U.S. actions had to succeed before Soviet missiles became operational. Considerations of the possible consequences of show of force actions should the adversary choose to resist rather than accede to pressure are vital during the preliminary deliberations. Such considerations are basically political, but must be tempered by evaluation of military capabilities and possible military consequences. They must take account of world opinion to some degree. Coordination between political and military officials at all levels from decision through planning and execution to ensure understanding of the political nature of the undertaking is critical to the operation's success.

25
Blake, Alex. PEKING'S AFRICAN ADVENTURES. Current scene, v. 5, Sept. 15, 1967: 1-9.
P&GP RR

Analyzes Chinese Communist policy in Africa and suggests that Chinese initiatives to improve its position with African leaders may be thwarted by the latter's preference for nonalinement. China's image in Africa has suffered in the past few years. The leaders of the independent African countries are interested in political stability and therefore resent Chinese interference in their internal affairs and condemn Chinese subversive activities in support of Socialist revolutions. Also the $200 million that Peking expended for economic aid to Africa up to 1966 contrasts unfavorably with the $950 million promised by that time. Trade between China and African states never reached promised levels either and resulted in a flooding of the African market with unwanted, cheap Chinese consumer goods. The nature of future Sino-African relations will depend upon the continued willingness of Chinese foreign-policymakers to advocate relations with non-Communist governments and suppression of any manifestations of the Chinese feeling of racial superiority over the black Africans.

26
Brandt, Willy. WILLY BRANDT ON GERMAN AND INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS. News from Germany, v. 22, July/Aug. 1967: 1-6.
DD257.N518, v. 22

An interview with the West German Vice Chancellor and chairman of the Social Democratic Party. Brandt discusses the new coalition's efforts to establish cordial relations with East European states and a European settlement.

27
Coste, Brutus, and Hal Lehrman. WEST GERMANY'S EASTWARD MOVES. In American Security Council. Washington report, July 24, 1967: 1-4.
P&GP RR

An impressive Soviet maneuver is shaping up to eliminate West Germany as a reliable Western military partner in NATO and as a bulwark of free-world ideological defenses against communism. West Germany's overtures toward the East are hailed in Washington as evidence of détente and East-West conciliation, although in truth they are part of a Soviet plan to disengage Germany from the West. It is not certain that Bonn favors this courtship, but it is forced to seek accommodation by Washington's threats to withdraw its support. The Communist response to West German overtures was the usual "short-range denunciation cloaking long-range approval". The Soviet strategy is plain: in return for economic links to the East, withdrawal from NATO, and elimination of American troops in Europe, West Germany will be reunified with its eastern territories. Rumania's recognition of West Germany was hailed as bold defiance of the Soviet Union, and appeasers of the East are determined to interpret such events as evidence of satellite autonomy and Soviet benevolence. But closer inspection of the Bucharest Declaration reveals that it advocates "normal relations" between European states as part of a plan to eliminate U.S. influence in Europe. The Communist program for Europe has met with some success already--NATO's decision to encourage its members to pursue independent relations with East Europe, the declining risk of an uprising in Eastern Europe thanks to its sense of abandonment by the West, the boost to European solidarity without U.S. interference implicit in Kosygin's visits to England and France, Communist entry into the Finnish Government, and most recently Bonn's flirtation with East Berlin. The well-substantiated and very real fear that Soviet cooperation in the reunification of Germany would result in the loss of freedom for all Germans is in danger of waning.

28
[DE GAULLE AND GERMANY] Intelligence digest, no. 347, Oct. 1967: 1-4. D410.R47, 1967

Contents.--Germany and De Gaulle's détente.--Washington and De Gaulle's remarks.--An overture from Bonn.

General de Gaulle's recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary on his recent trip to Poland could have a decisive impact on West Germany's world outlook and on the whole power alinement in Europe. The West German Government has been cautious about De Gaulle's statements but has reaffirmed its position that the boundary is temporary and has protested to France through appropriate channels. De Gaulle

offered Poland the Oder-Neisse line and a denuclearized central Europe, which would include Poland, Czechoslovakia, and a reunified Germany, but Poland rejected the proposal. It refuses to separate from Soviet protection and opposes a strong Germany that could threaten its security. Reconciliation with the East has been encouraged by Washington and accepted by many German leaders, but opposition to this policy is growing within the Bonn Government. Appeasement was once a dirty word in international politics, but today groveling before riffraff Communist regimes is considered realistic diplomacy. Not to be outdone by De Gaulle, Washington, or London, Kiesinger recently offered to discuss the whole range of Russo-German relations with Soviet leaders, but the latter are unlikely to give Bonn much more than the opportunity to extend more cheap long-term credits to the Soviet Union. Although Washington and London may privately support what De Gaulle said, his pronouncements were out of place. However Kiesinger is too shrewd to rebuff De Gaulle openly and create additional tensions.

29
Dupree, Louis. THE CHINESE TOUCH BASE AND STRIKE OUT. New York, American Universities Field Staff, 1966. 30 p. (American Universities Field Staff. Reports service. South Asia series, v. 10, no. 11) DS335.A6, v. 10

Observations on recent Sino-Pakistan and Sino-Afghanistan relations together with texts of the Pakistan-China Communique, March 7, 1967; the Pakistan-China Communique, March 31, 1966; the United States-India Communique, March 30, 1966; and the Afghan-Chinese Communique, April 6, 1966. In spite of the grand ceremonial welcome received in Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1966 by the Chinese Communist entourage headed by Liu Shao-chi, neither country could be persuaded to commit itself to the Chinese camp. Trade agreements were concluded with both countries for exchanges of commodities, but no arrangements were made for any spectacular amounts of economic aid from China. While Pakistan expressed its gratitude to the visitors for the gifts of Chinese arms, the Government sponsored a special press conference to convince the West that "normalization" of relations with Communist China was not intended to antagonize the United States. Although courteous to the Chinese delegation, the Afghans maintained their neutrality as well as their preference for West German, American, and Russian economic aid. Thus China may be learning that emerging nations prefer to develop within their own cultures, respected by all and subservient to no one.

30
Eitner, Hans-Jürgen. [A MISSING DIALOG. CHINA, THE INACCESSIBLE PLANET?] Der fehlende Dialog. Unerreichbarer Planet China? Aussenpolitik, v. 18, July 1967: 434-438. D839.A885, v. 18

China's foreign and domestic policies are influenced by its traditions as well as by the Communist revolution. The contemporary situation determines China's short-range policies, but her long-range policies are shaped by an "axiomatic metaphysic of polity" within the framework of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. This metaphysic is a traditional Chinese way of thinking based on what appears exclusively to them to be axioms. A nonegalitarian world order with China occupying the supreme and central position is part of this metaphysic, which has set China apart from the rest of the world for 2 millenia. The Chinese Communists inherited this tradition, although they do not admit it. With such different sets of axioms, China and the West are bound to remain mutually incommunicado for a long time yet. Red China's strife with both superpowers, even though it demands many sacrifices, is thoroughly popular in the whole nation, regardless of the people's attitude toward the regime. Thus a meaningful dialog between Peking and Washington is unlikely, and a durable Sino-American détente and normalization of relations improbable. The class struggle is predominant in international relations in Peking's view; relations between states are of secondary importance. However, looking into the distant future--and this is the only way to formulate a policy towards China--the West should not exclude the possibility of a Sino-Western dialog.

31
[EUROPE AND THE WAR THAT'S COMING] L'Europe et la guerre qui vient [editorial] L'Europe en formation, no. 87, June 1967: 1.
P&GP RR

The East-West modus vivendi generated by the Cuban missile crisis is disintegrating. The Vietnamese War and Middle East tensions point up the strained relations between Moscow and Washington. The Middle East is the world's most inflammatory area, and repercussions from political and military events there could precipitate world war III. Europeans, who up to now have been indifferent to the "inconveniences of the world situation," must play a vital role in the implementation of peace in the Middle East. Europe must undertake new responsibilities for world order if Common Market prosperity and plans for political unity are to continue.

32
Gaulle, Charles de, Pres. France. DE GAULLE: IMPLACABLE ALLY [edited by] Roy C. Macridis. New York, Harper & Row [1966] 248 p.
DC373.G3A25
"Foreword by Maurice Duverger."

Partial contents.--The conditions of independence.--The institutions.--The economy.--The empire.--The margin of independence.--The claims of France.--The game of balance.--The French Army and the nuclear sword.--French independence.--The European vocation.--The Atlantic community.--Germany--the perennial problem.--"No" to England.--Europe's daughter--the United States.--The "so-called" United Nations.--France has interests everywhere.

Excerpts from De Gaulle's speeches, addresses, and books, which summarize his political philosophy, opinions of other countries, and evaluations of history. De Gaulle believes that the state is an instrument for the implementation of national values. Its role in international relations is to preserve its independence and integrity against other nations. To De Gaulle, France is more than a country, it is a superior way of life. It is the protector of Western values and civilization. De Gaulle feels that in the United States "liberalism" is a mask "that hides the face of a powerful and industrial nation, determined to establish its hegemony over the world." The book also contains discussion of the French economy and Constitution.

33
Grigor'iants, A. THE SEAMY SIDE OF BONN'S NEW POLICY. International affairs (Moscow) no. 8, Aug. 1967: 79-80. D839.I465, 1967

A critical appraisal of Bonn's "new Ost policy." The revanchists have stepped up their activities in West Germany: the Expellees' League is itensifying its influence on the political and social life of the country. Rallies organized by the league were held at Dortmund and Munich recently with ministers of the Kiesinger regime as speakers. At these rallies the league formulated its territorial claims on Poland, the Soviet Union, and other Socialist countries, and Bonn supports these claims. The West Germans are taking advantage of the aggravated international situation caused by the escalation of the Vietnam War and Israel's piratical attacks on the Arab countries "in order to secure support for their revenge-seeking plans and aspirations," despite their much-vaunted desire to adjust relations with the East.

34
Gromyko, Anatolii. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND AFRICA. International affairs (Moscow) no. 9, Sept. 1967: 23-28. HXl. P75, 1967

Analyzes the impact of Soviet foreign policy on the destiny of Africa. The young Soviet Government after the October Revolution was against imperialist wars, colonialism, seizure of foreign territories, and oppression of other peoples, and acknowledged the right of these people to conduct revolutionary wars for liberation. These new principles inspired oppressed peoples to fight against their exploiters, and the Soviet Union has always helped them politically in and outside the United Nations. However, since 1956 a new era of closer cooperation between the Soviet Union and the peoples of Africa has begun. In addition to political support the Soviet Union has given Africa economic and technical assistance, based on mutual profit and equality. Today there are 39 independent African states, 32 of which maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and 17 of which have concluded agreements on economic and technical cooperation. The Soviet Union also helps the African peoples to build up their armed forces and strengthen their defenses against neocolonialism and imperialism. This Soviet-African cooperation has affected the balance of power in the U. N. General Assembly and other bodies where before the imperialists had obedient supporters.

35
Harrigan, Anthony. THE PANAMA CANAL: STRATEGIC KEY TO THE AMERICAS. In American Security Council. Washington report, July 17, 1967: 1-4. P&GP RR

The new draft treaties covering the Panama Canal and a possible new sea level interoceanic canal have not yet been made public, but informed sources fear they may involve a massive giveaway of U. S. security interests and sovereign rights. The Soviet Union still harbors political and military aspirations in Latin America and supports the Panamanian extremists who are marshaling forces for a confrontation with the United States over the canal. If Panama were Switzerland there might be a valid argument for sharing authority over the canal, but Panama is "notoriously unstable." In trying to maintain good will there the United States has followed a policy of appeasing Panamanian extremists, only to have their demands increase and violence spread. The United States has invested nearly $5 billion in the Canal Zone, and Panama is in no position to compensate for any losses if the United States relinquishs its sovereignty. Furthermore the canal is essential to many Latin American nations, and Panama lacks the technical skill to operate it efficiently. But the basic question is one of hemispheric security, and the United States must never forget that the Panama Canal is a vital control point for barring Soviet penetration into Latin America.

36
JAPAN AND ASIA. Asia, no. 8, summer 1967: 1-121. DSl. A4712, 1967

Contents. --Introduction, by Kenneth T. Young. --New options for Japan: 1946-1966, by James W. Morley. --Japan and the world today, by Eiji Wajima. --Marxism in Japan's history, by George M. Beckmann. --Japan and the development of Asia, by William W. Lockwood. --Japan and Asia: a Japanese viewpoint, by Ryuji Takeuchi. --Japan and Asia: an American viewpoint, by Lawrence Olson. --The future of Japan in Asia, by Robert E. Ward.

Series of articles on Japan's ambivalence in world politics between Asia and the West. Morley examines the foreign policy that has helped to make the revival of Japanese influence possible, the internal criticism and problems that Japan currently faces, and the steps that the United States must take to avert a crisis in Japanese-American relations. Wajima discusses the three most important issues facing Japan: relations with the United States, particularly with regard to the "new security formula"; relations with Communist China; and relations with Asian neighbors. The political economy of Japan's present relations with Asia--their place in Japan's economic life and how they will change in the next few years--is the subject of Lockwood's analysis. Takeuchi's essay is devoted to three problems facing Japan: relations with Communist China, decisions on Japan's security, and the problem of Asia as seen by Japan. Olson reviews Japan's activities in Asia from an American point of view, noting that Japan has much to contribute in both technical and economic assistance and in basic values and culture. Finally, Ward foresees an increasingly important role for Japan in Southeast Asia, but predicts that this development will be slow and cautious, and that its focus will be economic and technological rather than political.

37
Katzenbach, Nicholas. UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. In U. S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 56, May 15, 1967: 753-756. JX232. A33, v. 56

In its relations with the Soviet Union the United States should recognize the limits of the current trend toward détente but should take progressive steps toward U. S. -Soviet cooperation. Although East-West tensions have declined somewhat, the basic issues remain--Russian aid to Hanoi in the Vietnamese War, the ambitious ideology of the Soviet Union, and the division of Europe and Germany. However, the United States should avoid a consistently belligerent policy in the cold war and should recognize areas of common interest with the Soviet Union. They both want to avoid a nuclear confrontation and need to pay greater attention to domestic problems. They have complementary interests such as the Soviet-U. S. Consular Convention and stability on the Asian subcontinent and compatible interests that could be fostered by East-West trade and scientific and cultural agreements. In addition to striving for an arms-race reduction, a nonproliferation treaty, improved East-West relations in Europe, and settle-

ment of international disputes, the United States can increase world security by seeking out immediate areas of cooperation with the Soviet Union that reflect the interests of both sides.

38
McLane, Charles B. SOVIET STRATEGIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1966. 563 p. DS518.7.M24

Partial contents.--The evolution of Soviet Eastern policy.--Early Soviet policies in practice: Southeast Asia in the 1920's.--Eastern strategies in abeyance: 1930-1935.--United front in Southeast Asia: 1935-1941.--Southeast Asian communism in suspension: 1941-1947.--Engagement and disengagement in Southeast Asia: 1948-1954.--Epilogue.--Short biographies.--Chronology.--Bibliography.--Index.

Surveys Soviet relations with Southeast Asia from the early Stalinist era until 1954. McLane notes that Moscow turned from the Zhdanovist line in Southeast Asia as a result of a general shift in Stalin's foreign policy in late 1948. The West had frustrated Zhdanovism in Europe by rendering the Berlin blockade ineffective and establishing the Marshall plan, which weaned many marginal supporters from the Communist cause. Since the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union was sharpest in Europe, Stalin's "moderation" was first evident in the West. The yield from Zhdanovism in East Asia came in 1950, when the Korean War broke out. The Korean War, from the standpoint of militant Communit expansion in Asia, was a failure. It alienated many neutralists and thoroughly alarmed and mobilized the United States forces in Asia. Another reason for the moderation of Soviet policy in the Far East is the official Soviet view that when the Soviet economy becomes superior to that of capitalism underdeveloped countries will enter into a closer association with the Soviet Union.

39
Meyerhoff, Arthur E. THE STRATEGY OF PERSUASION. New York, Coward-McCann [1965] 191 p. E744.5.M45

Argues that the American colossus, despite its vast armaments and sweeping foreign aid programs, has failed in its foreign policy because it has not developed a sensitivity to the most subtle and elusive aspect of international politics--persuasion. The skill of the Nation's advertising industry has made it the most prosperous democracy in history, but it has been unable to apply these techniques effectively to selling itself and its ideas to other nations. While America has been reluctant to engage in an effective and comprehensive propaganda effort, the Soviet Union has steadily advanced (often using methods developed in the United States). This country, Meyerhoff maintains, must give the job of selling America to advertising people who are trained to do it.

40
Mosely, Philip E. THE KREMLIN AND THE THIRD WORLD. Foreign affairs, v. 46, Oct. 1967: 64-77. D410.F6, v. 46

Humiliated by the defeat of the Soviet-backed Arab coalition in the recent Arab-Israeli War, the Russians are undoubtedly reappraising their policy toward the "Third World" of the underdeveloped nations. The Russians have courted the anti-imperialist but non-Communist governments of these countries in the belief that they would aline themselves with Russia and eventually follow the Russian pattern of socialism. Nowhere has Moscow's strategy for this evolution of Communist regimes worked out as predicted. Many countries were eager to accept Russian aid but were not anxious to ally themselves with the Soviet Union. Soviet policy and tactics relating to the Third World have been challenged from within the Soviet Union and from without by other Communist regimes. One line of questioning involves the effectiveness of economic assistance in underdeveloped nations. A further cause for doubt is the poor prospect for repayment of Soviet credits by debtor countries. Soviet experts also warn against premature nationalization, which could discredit socialism by identifying it with inefficiency. They also question the value of committing Soviet prestige to the support of individual leaders in developing countries. Finally, they wonder whether the Soviet Union has made any significant policy gains or has merely enlarged its commitments. Russia's commitment to Castro led to the first nuclear confrontation in history and resulted in a serious blow to Russia's prestige. Russia's Arab policy has resulted in increased costs and risks to the Soviet Union. The conflicting approaches toward the developing countries by the various brands of communism have further complicated Soviet relations with the Third World. Like Tito, the Western Communist parties follow the line that communism in a national form is bound to triumph gradually in every state. On the other hand, the Maoists are urging "continuous revolution." Castro, too, opposes Moscow's orderly path to power and advocates violent revolution in Latin America. The intra-Communist rivalries over the Third World should encourage the Western industrial nations to increase their support of these countries.

41
Naumov, Pavel. [BONN--ITS STRENGTH AND WEAKNESSES] Bonn--sila i bessilie. 2d ed., rev. and enl. Moskva, Mysl', 1967. 396 p. illus. DD259.4.N39, 1967

Reveals the "secrets" of the economic, military, and political rise of the German Federal Republic and describes important events in world politics connected with Germany. Naumov argues that the strength of German imperialism is limited and that despite the hostility of agressive German circles toward the Soviet Union, the new postwar generation does not believe in official propaganda. It grew up with the word "Sputnik" and it makes efforts to communicate with the youth of the Socialist countries. The two German states of today will reappear on the map of Europe as one Germany, a Germany of peace and progress.

42
THE NEW EUROPE: MEANING TO U.S. U.S. news & world report, v. 63, Oct. 2, 1967: 45-46. JK1.U65, v. 63

Once American leaders hoped Europe would unite politically or that it would become a third world force to bargain on an equal basis with both the United States and the Soviet Union. Now it appears that with increasing prosperity Europe's nations have become more heavily absorbed in their own affairs, almost to the point of isolationism. No longer do they dream big dreams; nevertheless they are asserting their independence of both superpowers. Great Britain has

turned over most of its world policeman role to the United States, and all Western Europe seems content to let the Americans worry about world defense. European unity will depend on the Common Market, which could play an important role in bringing Eastern Europe back into the Continent's affairs if De Gaulle ceases his obstructionism. Despite his anti-American zeal, most European leaders see no reason for throwing U.S. troops out of Europe or attempting to rid the Continent of an American economic influence that is already there as a fait accompli.

43
Osgood, Robert E. JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES IN ASIA. SAIS review, v. 11, spring 1967: 3-21.
JX1295.J6A3, v. 11

Japan's long period of introversion since World War II may be ending, largely owing to increased tensions in Asia and the unlikelihood that a nation of Japan's prosperity and potential power can insulate itself. While the need for American military power in the Asian-Pacific area and Japan's stake in the security and order it represents are apparent, the Japanese fear that the United States may overreact to China's militant postures in "the naive crusading anti-Communist spirit of the Dulles period." Many factors inhibit a more active Japanese foreign policy--pacifistic inhibitions and revulsion against World War II, constitutional prohibitions against all military activities beyond self-defense, and internal political divisions that preclude domestic consensus. Japan has the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, but few are willing to advocate such a program. In the future Japan is likely to be a major participant in a multipolar Asian balance of power, within which it would hope to restrain both China and Russia and foster Asian economic cooperation. Expansion of Japanese economic relations has already begun and should lead to more communication on general political matters. Its alliance with the United States will continue, largely because it provides a base of military security from which Japan can pursue an independent political course. An enlarged political role by Japan could lead to differences over U.S. policy in Asia and an interest in expanded military power. The current U.S. policy to contain China is important, but it is not enough; the United States must formulate a long-term policy for order and stability in Asia, and Japan's participation in Asian politics is clearly critical to this goal. The United States will probably seek increased Japanese responsibility for and contributions to a regional security framework, in which the United States can then take less responsibility. On the other hand Americans cannot help but view Japan's resurgence with some of the same fears with which they view that of West Germany. Sharp policy dilemmas could arise should Japan's acquisition of nuclear weapons become a real possibility. Japan may contribute to Asian stability without a strong military force, but the lessons of history indicate that this is very unlikely.

44
Packard, George R. LIVING WITH THE REAL JAPAN. Foreign affairs, v. 46, Oct. 1967: 193-204.
D410.F6, v. 46

An inadequate exchange of information between Japan and the United States has contributed to the false belief that Japan will soon play a larger political and military role in Asia in line with the U.S. strategy of containing communism and that it is mainly the political left that stands in its way. While the United States has urged Japan to strengthen its conventional military forces in order to complement American power in the Pacific, the Japanese are becoming increasingly absorbed with their own domestic problems, created by rapid social and economic changes. Also the political environment, which is characterized by party factionalism and shifting party strengths and coalitions, does not favor new undertakings abroad. Although Japan has pledged foreign aid to Asian countries, supported the Asian and Pacific Council [ASPAC] and the Asian Development Bank, sponsored a conference on Asian agricultural development, and normalized relations with South Korea, it is not likely to assume political leadership in Asia in the near future. It revealed its reluctance to become involved in joint Asian security arrangements when it joined ASPAC "only after the Koreans and Thais agreed not to give it a strong anti-communist coloration." There are, however, three major changes in Japanese thinking that may lead to a more assertive foreign policy. Self-confidence and national pride are growing with the new generations; the Japanese seem eager to escape the overwhelming influence of U.S. economic, military, and cultural ties; and there is widespread public disillusionment with Communist China. These new attitudes have prompted debates among the Japanese over the merits of increasing military power and possibly even acquiring nuclear weapons. While most politicians recognize the many obstacles to Japan's membership in the nuclear club, they want to keep the options open and so have hesitated to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Actually, "assuming that Communist China continues to be contained by our nuclear deterrent and the Seventh Fleet, a stable, wealthy and independent Japan could be more valuable to us than a closely allied and more heavily armed Japan." Its lack of offensive military power might make it a trusted source of economic aid to other Asian countries, and its success as Asia's first open society to achieve rapid modernization could add to its influence.

45
Passin, Herbert. THE FUTURE. In American Assembly. The United States and Japan. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall [1966] p. 141-161.
E183.8.J3A64

Considers Japan's potential role in a world setting in which the United States and Communist China will have dominant influence. Among other things, Passin discusses Japan's military security vis-à-vis Mainland China, future developments in Japanese-American relations, Japanese public opinion on the national security, which is threatened by China's growing nuclear armaments, and the armament, or disarmament, policy to be adopted by Japan.

46
Pfaff, William. A CASE AGAINST INTERVENTIONISM. Dissent, v. 14, Sept./Oct. 1967: 546-556.
HX1.D58, v. 14

"The intervention of nations into the affairs of others is one of history's inevitabilities." The great controversy in American foreign policy today in such areas as Latin America and Vietnam is not whether to intervene, but the scale and character of the interventions. The objections to U.S. policy in Vietnam are to its excesses, the failure of political judgment involved, and the use of methods disproportionate to what can reasonably be achieved. The evolution of the Nation's

foreign policy from isolation to intervention has not been deliberate but rather a series of improvised reactions to what were thought to be major crises. Intervention in Vietnam on the assumption that the political fate of a weak and remote nation is vital to the United States is understandable only as part of an American feeling of moral superiority and a messianic impulse to make the world better for mankind. In Vietnam this preoccupation with the freedom and well-being of other men has merged with an exaggerated fear of communism. Thus the serious intention of containing Soviet power and a decent concern for mankind have degenerated into a policy "that is messianic, intolerant, and intellectually unserious." The Vietnamese War could escalate to include Communist China or the Soviet Union and end in major or even nuclear war, but it is more likely that increased U. S. frustration and domestic controversy will culminate in compromise under a Republican administration. American sentiments will probably return to the isolationism always close to the surface and toward profound disillusionment not with intervention, but with the possibilities of national action itself, thus obstructing domestic reform and creating social stagnation. Current U. S. foreign policy is under attack from many sides, but the public will probably support President Johnson until someone presents a convincing alternative. The purpose of foreign policy is defensive--the protection of national interest and the security of domestic society--and not the reform or revolution of foreign societies. American values are relevant to the world but cannot be promulgated by propaganda, military action, or foreign aid. The impulse for reform must come from within a nation.

47
Rachkov, A. [BONN'S ORIENTATION TOWARD PEKING] Bonnskoe napravlenie Pekina. Aziia i Afrika segodnia, no. 7, July 1967: 35-37. illus.
DS1.S7, 1967

The revival of Bonn-Peking trade relations is not only of economic significance, it also suggests special military and political cooperation. Certain West German firms, according to the foreign press, have provided China with a variety of products from factory equipment to arms and torpedo boats, ignoring Bonn's refusal to issue export licenses for armaments to China. A group of West German specialists have gone to China to help manufacture 400-mile-range ballistic missiles in accordance with the aims of the German militarists, who are forbidden to produce rockets in Germany. Peking is conducting a propaganda campaign against the Socialist bloc and the Communist parties of other countries from the territory of the German Federal Republic. Books, brochures, periodicals, and other Chinese propaganda materials in foreign languages are widely distributed all over the world. Peking favors the return to Germany of its lost eastern territories; during the secret trade negotiations Peking concurred in including West Berlin in the agreement as a part of the German Federal Republic and was willing to accept the Hallstein Doctrine, thus betraying the Socialist bloc. Bonn's revanchists reap political profit from these secret trade negotiations, but they are very cautious in order not to antagonize the U. S. Government. Mao Tse-tung himself has called the Oder-Neisse frontier "illegal." The Chinese who are collaborating with the most aggressive of imperialist circles, the militarists and revanchists of the German Federal Republic, are harming the Socialist bloc.

48
REPORT ON MAINLAND CHINA. Current history, v. 53, Sept. 1967: 129-166, 175-180.
D410.C82, v. 53

Contents.--China in Asia, by C. P. FitzGerald.--China's cautious American policy, by Ishwer C. Ojha.--Moscow and the current Chinese crisis, by Franz Michael.--The cultural revolution and China's economy, by Chu-yuan Cheng.--China's military posture, by S. M. Chiu.--The continuing Chinese revolution, by Harold M. Vinacke.

Evaluates internal developments in China and analyzes its foreign policies and its role in Asia. FitzGerald sees the historical suzerain-tributary relationship as the root of modern Chinese foreign policy in Asia, in addition to the stated aim of promoting Communist revolution. While Chinese leaders do not totally rule out the possibility of war with the United States, Ojha feels the Mao-Lin-Chou strategy is essentially cautious. Michael examines the Sino-Soviet conflict, concluding that its final outcome is as much in doubt as the outcome of the leadership struggle within China itself. Cheng evaluates China's current economic problems and discusses the impact that the cultural revolution is likely to have on the Chinese economy. Peking's military posture will remain defensive, according to Chiu, until its nuclear weapons system is operational; the level of China's technology clearly determines its doctrine, and "its current doctrine reflects the current stage of its weapons development." Vinacke speculates on possible outcomes of the Chinese cultural revolution.

49
Rostow, Eugene V. THE ROAD BEFORE US. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 5, summer 1967: 161-172.
D839.A85, v. 5
"Summary of remarks made at the American Chamber of Commerce in Brussels, April 14, 1967."

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene V. Rostow underlines the importance of the Atlantic relationship as the keystone of foreign policies on both sides of our ocean. Showing the impracticality of recent American and European yearnings for isolation, he reviews the principal military, political and economic problems facing us and recent steps toward meeting them. As we become more and more interdependent, our common interests and purposes require that we act together. (Abstract supplied)

50
Sato, Eisaku. JAPAN'S ROLE IN ASIA. Contemporary Japan, v. 28, May 1967: 691-698.
D5801.J6, v. 28

Japan feels a strong responsibility for the achievement of peace and prosperity in Asia. It has made efforts to improve Chinese-Asian relations through the promotion of trade and cultural exchanges with Peking, and it has contributed to economic growth and political stability through aid to developing Asian countries. In 1966 Japan hosted the first meeting of the Ministerial Conference for Economic Development in Southeast Asia, which examined a system for economic cooperation based on a spirit of regional solidarity. The Conference for Agricultural Development in Southeast Asia convened in Tokyo the same year to plan a fishery development center and a special fund to supply loans on liberal terms for

agricultural development. Japan is also a strong supporter of the Asian Development Bank. Politically, Japan is striving to win the confidence of its Asian neighbors and to improve the relations between the countries of that region.

51

Stillman, Edmund. THE SHORT WAR AND THE LONG WAR. New York times magazine, v. 72, June 18, 1967: 7, 38, 42, 47. AP2.N6575, v. 72

"Outwardly, American responses [to conflict] in the Middle East and Southeast Asia have been very different, yet there is a common denominator: an inability to comprehend the scope of violence in the world and an unwillingness to see a local balance of force emerge without U.S. intervention." Although the United States expresses a great anxiety about change by intervening in almost all world crises, it deplores the use of force by others. Often U.S. foreign policy is more concerned with overseeing the transient internal politics of a state than with strengthening the more permanent economic, political, and geographical interests of the state. In intervening to overthrow Ngo Dinh Diem in Vietnam, the United States committed a moral wrong by killing a "quasi-authentic voice of Vietnamese nationalism" and substituting a government which serves as a facade for American military intervention. It would be unrealistic for the United States to pressure for a return to the prewar situation in the Middle East, for this would make the United States, in effect, a military guarantor of the settlement. With little U.S. effort the events in that area may have already hastened the day when the Soviet Union will abandon its ambitions to oversee world revolution. The United States is mistakenly motivated by Western ideals of "reason" in promoting economic progress and settling political disputes in Afro-Asian areas, which are resentful of subjugation to the alien Western technological civilization. In view of the failure of billions of dollars of U.S. aid to stabilize Afro-Asian countries and the increasing loss of Communist prestige without U.S. intervention, it might be wise for Americans to follow a more aloof foreign policy and to not underrate the power of nationalism.

52

Thomson, James C. DRAGON UNDER GLASS: TIME FOR A NEW CHINA POLICY. Atlantic, v. 220, Oct. 1967: 55-61. AP2.A8, v. 220

A reappraisal of the U.S. policy toward Communist China is long past due, a reappraisal of both its objectives and underlying assumptions in light of the history of Sino-American relations. Since 1951 U.S. policy has had several major components: nonrecognition of the Communist regime; opposition to its membership in the United Nations; its military containment; its systematic isolation through a total embargo on trade and travel; and military, economic, and political support for the Nationalist government on Taiwan. Somehow Americans believed that the Communist regime could not last and that Chiang Kai-shek would eventually return victorious to the mainland. While the U.S. China policy has achieved some of its objectives, it has not achieved the collapse of the Communist regime and has often been maintained at the expense of U.S. relations with other nations. Perhaps it is less pertinent to inquire whether U.S. policy has accomplished its aims than whether these aims are still relevant. There is no viable alternative to a new U.S. policy dedicated to the moderation of Communist China and its assimilation into the world community. A measure of containment is still necessary to deter any real threat of Communist aggression, but the Nation must ignore China's bellicose words and refrain from provocative actions. The United States should remove all restrictions on travel of Americans to China and on Chinese travel in this country. It should end the embargo on trade in nonstrategic goods, encourage Peking's participation in the United Nations and other international associations, and persistently attempt to develop formal and informal mechanisms of bilateral governmental contact between itself and Communist China. At first Peking will undoubtedly reject U.S. overtures, but the United States must convince its allies of its commonsense on the China question and demonstrate to the Chinese leaders its willingness to live and let live. A fear of public reaction to apparent "appeasement" of China, the inclination of officials here to embrace Moscow's view of China, and most importantly the outlook of the Secretary of State, pragmatic on most issues but extremely narrow on China, have all hindered these approaches to date. Nonetheless the U.S. attitude is gradually changing, aided by official acceptance of Chinese participation in a world disarmament conference, lifting of travel restrictions, and congressional hearings.

53

Windsor, Philip. NATO AND EUROPEAN DÉTENTE. World today, v. 23, Sept. 1967: 361-369. D410.W63, v. 23

Before NATO can determine its functions in view of the political changes brought about by the détente in Europe, it must agree on the nature of the détente and its implications for NATO's security interests. The alliance had been plagued with internal political difficulties since the late 1950's, when the European countries began asserting their independence from American control and the détente between Russia and the United States was based on the status quo in Europe. It therefore did not prove an effective forum for discussing East-West problems and a European détente began developing outside the NATO framework. Nations of Western and Eastern Europe found they could reach agreement in areas of mutual economic and cultural interest without making any broad political commitments. Thus the European détente resembles the Soviet-American détente in that neither one is likely to culminate in any general rapprochement between Eastern and Western Europe until the German question is settled. However, there are still genuine areas of difference and West Europeans will most likely resist any progress in the Soviet-American détente that appears to subordinate West European interests. Since all its members are interested in arms control measures NATO could, by rethinking the nature and purpose of arms control measures, help to change a nonprogressive détente into a progressive one and reduce tensions in Europe.

II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

A. MODERN WAR

54
Baldwin, Hanson W. NO MORE WARS. Army, v. 17, Aug. 1967: 37-42. Ul.A893, v. 17

The lessons of history and the study of human nature show that optimistic predictions for a stable world free from armed conflict once the fighting in Vietnam ends will not come true. Although since 1945 man's nuclear capability has restrained him from engaging in an unlimited war, the frequency of limited wars during the postwar era has increased. According to Quincy Wright in his A Study of War there is no single solution to war; peace is the result of an equilibrium among multiple forces. If one accepts his thesis that war increases during times of rapid technological and cultural changes, the outlook is not comforting for the 20th century. Because in the past destructive instincts have overruled reason in governing man's behavior, war appears to be a human institution that cannot be eliminated simply by terminating current conflicts. The continuation of the partial stability created in Southeast Asia by the presence of U.S. forces in Vietnam depends on the outcome of the war together with the future economic, technological, and psychological influences operating in that area. Among the many global troubles which will continue whether or not the war in Vietnam ends are the population explosion, the friction created by the mixing of cultures in today's world of rapid communications, the failure to reach substantial arms control agreements, a depletion of the world's natural resources, the struggles of emerging countries, the conflicts arising out of the development of a multipolar world, and the weakening of major defense alliances in favor of nationalism and small power groupings. Although it is difficult to justify war, one can say "that some wars have nurtured greatness, that some have saved civilization, that until man learns to approach all problems--including his own emotions and instincts--with sweet reasonableness, there will be wars." Man cannot expect an end to war in the near future, but he can hope for future wars to be limited and fought only with conventional weapons.

55
Basu, Bikash B. AIR POWER--A STUDY IN MILITARY GEOGRAPHY. In United Service Institution of India. Journal, v. 97, Jan./Mar. 1967: 40-52. Ul.U5, v. 97

Discusses five categories of factors relevant to a state's development of airpower: the physical characteristics of the area, such as location, size, terrain, and weather; the economic resources of the state, including raw materials and fuels, its industrial potential, circulatory system and electronic communications, and socio-economic advancement; the political realities facing the state in its international relations at a given time; the human element; and the state's level of aviation and military technology. The concept of airpower, according to Basu, should incorporate the total capacity of a nation to use airspace for its economic, political, and military objectives.

56
Bowers, Ray L. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY PENCHANT FOR THE OFFENSIVE. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 93, Sept. 1967: 58-69. illus. Vl.U8, v. 93

The belief that offensive strategy has brought decisive victory in the past is demonstrably incorrect. Both the French strategy of the "offensive à outrance" during World War I and Hitler's obsession for the offense resulted in tragedy. The offensive concepts of antisubmarine technique during World War I and theories of offensive air warfare preceding World War II proved inapplicable upon the test of war. The allure of the offensive has been strong in the 20th century, and emphasis on first-strike nuclear weapons could blind future national leaders to the need for defensive capabilities. What is needed is the military planner who will be guided by thoughtful and rational precepts; an irrational commander directing offensive strategies will not be able to assess the nonrational extollments of partisans of the offensive approach. And unless he is able to inculcate defensive as well as offensive strategies, those he leads will become further victims of the "20th century penchant for the offensive."

57
Burns, Eedson L. M. MEGAMURDER. New York, Pantheon Books [1967] 297 p. UF767.B85

Contents.--War has become megamurder.--Bombing in World War I.--Theories of air warfare between the World Wars.--Bombing in World War II: 1939-1942.--Bombing offensives against Germany and Japan; introduction of the atom bomb.--The control of atomic energy and the atom bomb: 1945-1948.--Communist power extended over Eastern Europe.--Formation of NATO; the decision to make the H-bomb; the effect of the Korean War.--Massive retaliation; preventive war; pre-emptive attack.--Tactical nuclear weapons and limited war.--NATO and nuclear weapons.--Disarmament negotiations: 1960-1964.--The military-industrial complex, USA.--NATO and the control of nuclear weapons; the Cuba crisis.--The prospects for disarmament.

An examination and criticism of the theory and practice of air war as developed by the Royal Air Force and the United States Air Force plus a discussion of nuclear policies proposed by American strategic analysts. The author points out the origins and dangers of the threat of nuclear war which could result in massive killings of civilians or "megamurder." He emphasizes the urgency of finding ways to ease international tensions and to limit arms buildups in order to diminish the nuclear threat. [A review of the work by Homer A. Jack appears as abstract no. 1156 in vol. 3, no. 3 of this bibliography.]

58
[ISRAELI AIR WAR: LESSONS FROM AIRBORNE PREPONDERANCE] Israels Luftkrieg: Lehren aus der Luftüberlegenheit. Flugwelt, v. 19, Aug. 1967: 534-535. TL501.F626, v. 19

Contends that the June 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict was the first war in modern history that was won predominantly by an air force. The article enumerates the effective Israeli innovations in air war tactics, which, among other things, deceived the enemy's Soviet-made radars. Contrary to established concepts of air warfare Israel employed all its strategic air force units in action without keeping any reserves in the rear.

59
Lofgren, Charles A. HOW NEW IS LIMITED WAR? In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 47, July 1967: 16-23. Z7623.U35, v. 47

"Limited" war must be defined before applying the term to specific situations. Such a war is limited in its dimensions; i.e., in overall objectives, conflict techniques, amount and types of forces employed, weaponry, geographical area, and duration. Perhaps the best way to measure the restraint in a given situation is to compare it to the alternatives available at the time. Limited war involves employing force carefully and in a controlled manner for purposes of international communication and persuasion. Furthermore some form of bargaining between the opposing parties, whether formal or informal, is essential if the conflict is to remain limited. Diplomacy and threatened or applied force are traditionally interrelated, a relationship that has been strengthened with the advent of nuclear weapons. The Korean War was limited in the sense that Washington refused to authorize attacks on the Chinese mainland. On the other hand, the United States fought as it did "not because we believed in limited war but because we were reluctant to engage in all-out war over the issues which were at stake in Korea." The Nation had not yet recognized the value of mutual deterrence in limiting conflicts or of the use of force for persuasive purposes. If future historians apply these more sophisticated criteria to conflicts, Vietnam rather than Korea will stand as the first U.S. limited war in the nuclear age.

60
Matthäus, Gerhart. ["WAR IS POLITICS WITH BLOODSHED" (MAO TSE-TUNG'S "THEORY OF GUERRILLA WAR")] "Krieg ist Politik mit Blutvergiessen" (Zu Mao Tse-tungs "Theorie des Guerilla-Krieges") Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, v. 17, July 1967: 371-384. U3.W485, v. 17

Discusses Mao Tse-tung's doctrine of guerrilla warfare within the framework of Chinese Communist political ideology and tactics. Matthäus describes at length different aspects of the doctrine (e.g., political mobilization of the populace, operational flexibility, discipline, class struggle) and its historical evolution and variations.

61
Stucki, Lorenz. [SOUTHEAST ASIA BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES. PT. I. SOUTH VIETNAM] Südostasien zwischen China und Amerika. pt. 1. Südvietnam. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 5, July/Aug. 1967: 314-321. illus. P&GP RR

Tangible, evolutionary change from a feudal and agrarian to a democratic and industrial society represents the best protection against Communist revolution in Southeast Asia. Only when the change is too slow and the old, prevailing social order too rigid can the revolution exported by Mao Tse-tung count on strong popular support. Such has been the case in South Vietnam. Fortunately the Vietnamese example is not typical of Southeast Asia. Even in South Vietnam the war has not spread to cities and none of the religious or political groups of any consequence has accepted the Communist offer of cooperation. A tangible measure of social and economic progress achieved in South Vietnamese urban communities and "a credible hope" for further advancement without revolution accounts for their immunity to Maoist revolutionary propaganda. But the Vietnamese war is not merely a local civil war. It is an indirect struggle of global consequence between the United States and Red China. At stake is the most important question of our times: "whether war in the nuclear age can still be an instrument of politics and a means of ideological conquest of the world." The course of the domestic situation in Communist China will have a tremendous influence on that struggle and is therefore of utmost importance for the world.

62
Watkins, H. B. C. IS IT CREDIBLE? In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 112, May 1967: 153-156. U1.R8, v. 112

Because both East and West now possess tremendous capabilities for annihilation, the factor of credibility in the threats and policies of governments involved in politico-military situations has attained great significance and deserves analysis. An analytical formula could equate a country's credibility in politico-military situations to national prestige multiplied by the factors of strength and presence divided by time of reaction. National prestige stems principally from a delicate and fluctuating balance of past and present military and economic strengths, political integrity and stability, and national characteristics and way of life. Assuming a state of nuclear parity, a country's strength, i.e., its ability to support its military policies, is measured by its effective conventional military capacity and its economic prosperity. Its military presence in a strategic area on even a small scale can deter an aggressor. The threat of withdrawal of economic aid or commercial investments can also exert pressure for the maintenance of peace in certain areas. Finally, a nation must be able to act quickly and decisively in utilizing its conventional military strength in order to reinforce the credibility of its deterrent policy. In the case of Great Britain, it can no longer rely on past glories to maintain its credibility as an effective force but must take positive action to restore its prestige in the political and economic as well as military fields.

B. MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

63
ABM SYSTEM FUNDING WILL PEAK IN FY '70. Aerospace technology, v. 21, Sept. 25, 1967: 12-13. illus. UG630.M54, v. 21

Funding for the recently announced "thin" antiballistic missile [ABM] system will total about $1/2 bil-

lion in 1968, $1 billion in 1969, and slightly more in 1970, and will taper off in the mid-1970's. The system will take 5 to 6 years to complete, and will consist of 15 to 20 sites including 12 to 14 Spartan missile installations and 6 to 7 Sprints, each with a missile site radar, and several perimeter acquisition radars. Multifunction array radar, developed for a more sophisticated system, will not be deployed. Raytheon Co. will profit most from the ABM deployment, perhaps getting half of the $5 billion total expenditure for its missile site radar. Cost estimates on specific systems include $1 to $1.25 million for each Spartan missile, $1 million per Sprint, $120 to $130 million per missile site radar, and $70 to $80 million per perimeter acquisition radar. Initial production contracting should begin shortly, with full-flight tests for Spartan and Sprint planned for 1968. The addition of more faces to ABM radars would give the system capability against sea-launched ballistic missiles. The system as now envisaged will provide radar capability against both Russian and Chinese missiles.

64
Andrews, Walter. MALLARD MAY HELP CLOSE TECHNOLOGY GAP. Aerospace technology, v. 21, Oct. 23, 1967: 22-23. UG630.M54, v. 21

By providing the means for international competition on a technological rather than strictly a production capability basis, Project Mallard (the international field army communications program) may help close the technology gap between the United States and the foreign participants in the project--Australia, Britain, and Canada. The total package concepts applied to Mallard enable foreign companies with production capabilities inferior to those of U.S. industry to win the production contract if they win the technologically oriented contract definition. As the price for establishing technological expertise in areas in which they are relatively deficient, these countries must be willing to pay the difference in costs between a contract definition proposal involving their industries and one favoring the production expertise of U.S. industries. The participants in the Mallard program agreed to award at least 50 percent of the production contracts to international groups and the rest to either international or national groups.

65
Andrews, Walter. SPARTAN ANTI-MIRV CAPABILITIES UNDER STUDY. Aerospace technology, v. 21, Oct. 9, 1967: 15-16. illus.
UG630.M54, v. 21

The Army is considering development of an improved third stage for its Spartan antiballistic missile [ABM] to give it a "loiter capability." With such a capability the Spartan would not have to acquire and home onto a target from launch but could "cruise" at a reduced velocity and then intercept at higher speed. This development will not be incorporated in the Spartan missiles deployed with the recently approved thin ABM system but may be installed later. The Russians are developing the means to launch multiple warheads from one or more orbital or ballistic trajectories, and the new loiter capability can defend America against this threat. Last spring Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the orbiting of a sufficient number of weapons to be militarily effective could certainly be detected, but Gen. Earle Wheeler told the same committee that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned about the U.S. ability to detect weapons in orbit. The Russian ability to orbit weapons could become a grave matter, particularly if used in connection with other strategic systems. For example, an orbiting system combined with an intercontinental ballistic missile booster, with greater payload than the U.S. Minuteman and with the ability to carry multiple warheads, could tip the balance of deterrence in the Soviet favor. The Defense Department has also been studying sea- and air-based antiballistic missile systems to intercept enemy missiles in the boost or early orbital phase. Over-the-horizon radar designed by Radio Corporation of America and satellite reconnaissance systems may also be useful in tracking and detecting missiles. Two additional defense systems may aid in intercepting high-speed maneuverable vehicles that have breached area defense and are approaching at low altitudes: a detection and acquisition system based in space or a missile system with sufficient maneuverability and acceleration to intercept such vehicles.

66
[THE ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY OF THE EUROPEAN NEUTRAL STATES. PT. 7. THE GEBRÜDER SULZER COMPANY OF WINTERTHUR. GENERAL CONTRACTOR FOR SWISS PRODUCTION OF JET ENGINES] Die Rüstungsindustrie der neutralen Staaten Europas. 7. Gebrüder Sulzer, Aktiengesellschaft, Winterthur, Generalunternehmer des schweizerischen Düsentriebwerkbaues. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 5, May/June 1967: 235-239. illus. P&GP RR

Considers foreign licenses and the Sulzer Company government contracts for military jet aircraft engines. The article includes a description of the organizational schema of the entire Swiss production of military jet engines on license.

67
Astashenkov, P. T. [SOVIET ROCKET FORCES] Sovetskie raketnye voiska. 2d ed., rev. and enl. Moskva Voen. izd-vo, 1967. 344 p. illus.
UG635.R9A82

Partial contents.--Combat weaponry of the Soviet Rocket Forces. Their origin . . .--Today's rocket forces, their achievements in combat training.--Condition of a nuclear war and the training of rocketeers.

An account of the most powerful branch of the Soviet Armed Forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces. Astashenkov describes their operational and tactical weapons, antimissiles, and missile-carrying aircraft and destroyers. Whoever seeks to ignite another world war should remember that the Soviet Union will be able to stop the criminal designs of the aggressors by striking a crushing blow.

68
[ATAR FOR THE STARFIGHTER?] Atar für den Starfighter? Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Sept. 1, 1967: 452-453. illus.
U3.W38, v. 11

France's SNECMA [Societé nationale d'espace et de construction de moteurs d'avions] has for some time been studying the possibility of offering its Atar 09 K 50 (thrust class 5000 kg without reheat, 7180 kg with), for Germany's F-104 G interceptors. This

comes at a time when the Bundeswehr is going to have to make up its mind to keep this aircraft in service until 1975-78. Quite apart from the other forms of re-equipment now under discussion (e.g., for the strike role?), a change in the engines fitted will obviously have to be made. At a fairly early date Lockheed had already offered a redesigned version of the General Electric J 79 11 A at present operated by the German Air Force, in the form of the GE J 79 F as used in the Italian F-104 S model. This proposal has already been discussed in these pages. No difficulties would be experienced in fitting this engine to the modified F-104 airframe. However, the same is claimed for the Atar, which is described--with some justice--as a nonstop engine, not least in view of its impressive flight time in the Mirage fleet and the latter's predecessors. Its performance with the Israeli Air Force in the six-day Middle East war was also most encouraging. (Abstract supplied)

69
Bengeledorf, Irving S. TECHNOLOGY IN CHINA. New man, v. 19, July/Sept. 1967: 20-22.
P&GP RR

The United States shows a curious tendency to underrate the scientific and technological achievements and potential of the Communist nations. The Soviet Sputnik of 1957, it claimed, was the work of captured German scientists; the Chinese accomplishment is the work of Russian technical advisers and scientists who defected to China from the United States. The Nation refuses to acknowledge that China has undergone one of the fastest and most remarkable technological changes in world history. It now manufactures both standard industrial products and complex equipment such as electron microscopes, precision balances, industrial spectrographs, and computers. Its machine-tool industry and its progress in basic science are also remarkable. Perhaps the abrupt withdrawal of Soviet technical aid in 1960 spurred the Chinese to technical self-reliance. At first they experienced difficulty in staffing, but today Chinese universities are turning out highly competent scientists with excellent knowledge of current research outside China.

70
Bennett, Ralph K. TACTICAL BUILD-UP UNDER THE LOOKING GLASS. Data, v. 12, Apr. 1967: 12-13.
P&GP RR

The Vietnam War is proving to be a laboratory for the development of new tactical weapons designed for use in future "limited wars." One example is the American Ling-Temco-Vought A-7 Corsair II attack aircraft, which will become part of an interdependent tactical force for use in conventional warfare. The Russians too are realizing the value of tactical weapons as indicated by their increased shipments of helicopters to North Vietnam in order to "acclimatize" them to jungle warfare and their development of SAM's capable of hitting low-altitude bombers. This war should teach the United States not to impute to its present tactical weapons systems unrealistic capabilities for the future.

71
Butz, J. S. UNDER THE SPACEBORNE EYE: NO PLACE TO HIDE. Air Force and space digest, v. 50, May 1967: 93-95, 97-98.
UG633. A65, v. 50

Observation from space may well be "the most significant development in man's experience." Until competing financial demands, such as the Vietnam War and domestic programs, necessitated open justification of the space program, most of the factual information supporting this view was heavily classified. Recently, however, revelations concerning space equipment and its uses have been made. From a satellite 150 to 200 miles above the earth objects as small as garbage-can lids can be identified today, a ground resolution of about 3 feet. Increased camera focal length and film sensitivity are responsible for this revolution in technology. Multispectral systems, permitting comparisons of pictures taken in various portions of the spectrum, have also added amazingly to the capabilities of remote sensors. By 1970 systems should be developed that will be able to "see" into the ocean. Right now "reefs, mountains, fish, and objects submerged at substantial depths can be detected." Surface ships, too, would be easily trackable, for such straight-line phenomena as wakes have already been spotted with the naked eye by Gemini astronauts. Rapidity of transmission will also be immensely heightened by 1970. The Air Force's first attempt at real-time transmission of imagery will be the manned orbiting laboratory, due to fly in 1969. Completely up-to-date inventories of all the world's forces will be easily within reach. For example, the Navy will know the location of almost 100 percent of the surface and undersea vessels in the Pacific.

72
Cabiac, Roger. [OBJECTIVE: MACH 3.5] Objectif: Mach 3.5 [editorial] Aviation magazine, no. 474, Sept. 1967: 9. TL502. A854, 1967.

Gives the reasons France has to include in its 1968 budget the money to build a Mach 3.5 military aircraft in 1980. Cabiac notes that the Government must appropriate the $20 million needed for the first stage of development of a Mach 3.5 airplane or France will continuously lag behind the United States and the Soviet Union in aerospace technology.

73
Chew, John L. PACIFIC ASW. Data, v. 12, July 1967: 28, 30-31, 33. illus. P&GP RR

Antisubmarine warfare [ASW] has become a top priority mission in the Navy because of the proliferation of submarines in navies of hostile countries. In Vietnam, ASW groups operate as part of the 7th Fleet to protect naval shipping against the menace of the Chinese Communist force of 30 submarines, which includes a missile-launching conventional submarine of Russian design. Even though only a portion of Communist submarines venture out into the deep, maintaining surveillance is a prodigious task; the Pacific ASW forces protect American ships in an 80-million-square-mile area. Combating the Chinese threat are three ASW groups and four ASW carriers with their associated air groups and destroyers. There are also 15 patrol squadrons, most of which are equipped with P3 aircraft that can make contact with virtually any spot in the Pacific within hours. Although great strides have been made in ASW techniques and equipment the ASW mission is far from complete.

74
CHINA SUCCESSFULLY EXPLODES FIRST HYDROGEN BOMB. China reconstructs, v. 16, June 1967: 16-17.
DS701. C643, v. 16

Statement issued by Hsinhua News Agency on June 17, 1967, announcing China's successful hydrogen bomb test. Such success should heighten the morale of revolutionary people throughout the world, the statement proclaims, and encourage the Chinese people and Government to continue in their unswerving struggle for peace. China has conducted nuclear tests entirely for defense, with the ultimate aim of abolishing nuclear weapons and preventing nuclear blackmail by the U. S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists.

75
Cummings, Joseph D. GREATER MINE WARFARE CAPABILITY URGED FOR U.S. NAVY. Navy, v. 10, May 1967: 6-11. illus. VA49.N28, v. 10

Surveys the often neglected tactical value of mine warfare and suggests enlarging its role in naval strategy. Although expensive from a cost-per-unit point of view, the submarine is the vehicle best suited to planting undetected minefields and the only U.S. vehicle constantly in active service that is already equipped for the purpose. Minefields are a low-cost antisubmarine weapon both defensively for protecting U.S. bases and offensively for surrounding enemy bases. Additionally, submarines can plant mines to harass enemy surface ships and destroy icebreakers attempting to open passage to frozen ports. An inexpensive and versatile weapon, the mine should not become obsolete in an age of highly sophisticated weapons. The Navy should increase its familiarity with the mine through extensive practice in laying minefields.

76
Dacier, Michel. [THE NUCLEAR EQUILIBRIUM] L'équilibre nucléaire. Écrits de Paris, no. 263, Oct. 1967: 5-9. AP20.E355, 1967

The construction of a "thin" antiballistic missile [ABM] system is the beginning of a new arms race that will have a prolonged effect on the nuclear equilibrium. The ABM is part of the Nike-X complex, which is composed of three elements: a radar alert, an information center, and two types of ballistic interference weapons. The advanced perimeter acquisition radar, which is capable of over-the-horizon scanning and tracking enemy missiles traveling at speeds of more than 20,000 m.p.h., is the most important feature of the radar system. The information center gathers data from the alert stations and, if necessary, gives the orders for launching interceptor missiles. The two missiles are Spartan, a long-range exoatmospheric missile, and Sprint, a short-range atmospheric missile. The development of the Nike-X began in 1958 and has since cost the United States over two and a half billion dollars. During this period the Russians made great strides in the development of an ABM and, because of conclusive atmospheric tests which took place before the 1963 nuclear test ban treaty, may be ahead of the United States. However Secretary of Defense McNamara has assured Congress that the Soviet ABM is not capable of resisting America's huge offensive missile arsenal and that the nuclear equilibrium is being maintained since neither the United States nor Russia has an effective defense against nuclear attack.

77
Dawson, Judith E., and Allan R. Scholin. A GALLERY OF USAF WEAPONS. Air Force and space digest, v. 50, Sept. 1967: 214-251. illus. UG633.A65, v. 50

Lists various types of U. S. Air Force equipment, including missiles, helicopters, bombers, and utility and experimental planes, and gives their general physical characteristics, their contractors, and the primary Air Force commands that use them.

78
Diringshofen, H. von. [HUMAN FACTOR ANALYSIS AND ITS PROBLEMS AS A BASIS FOR AN "ANTHROPOTECHNIQUE"] Faktor-Mensch-Analyse und ihre Probleme als Grundlage der Anthropotechnik. Wehrmedizinische Monatsschrift, v. 11, Aug. 1967: 282-285. P&GP RR

During the development of weapon-systems an analysis of their human factors and of their cooperation with the technical factors should be made as early as possible, in order to test in time, whether the functions of the operating and maintenance personnel appear performable with adequate reliability and in order to apply the method essential for the anthropotechnical rationalization of such human-machine-systems at the beginning of their development. Examples are given of the importance of such human-factor-analysis for optimum weapon- and cost-effectiveness of weapon-systems. The author also points out the psychological causes for decreased effectiveness of weapons under fire. The author recommends that the governmental agencies issuing the orders for developmental projects compile detailed regulations for the consideration of human factors and human engineering. In the USA such dutybooklets have been used for some time. (Abstract supplied)

79
[THE DOMODEDOVO AIR DISPLAY. AN INSIGHT INTO THE DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL OF THE SOVIET UNION'S AVIATION TECHNOLOGY] Luftparade in Domodedowo. Einblick in das luftfahrttechnische Entwicklungspotential der Sowjetunion. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Sept. 1, 1967: 448-451. illus. U3.W38, v. 11

Soviet aircraft development, at any rate in the field of fighters and strike aircraft for tactical operations, has advanced into the Mach 2.5 to 2.8 speed range and has done so with a whole series of new aircraft types. One pure VTOL design has been built, along with several new high-performance STOL models with auxiliary lift jets. Finally, two impressive high-performance aircraft with variable geometry were also shown. In other words, the Soviet Union is not far behind the Western world in the military aircraft state of the art, at any rate as far as basic design and external features are concerned. All these military aircraft types have evidently been developed during the past five years. Their number is impressive not only because of the technical standard reached, but also, and above all, because of the astonishing breadth they reveal in the Soviet Union's aeronautical development capabilities. Together with the many recent new designs in the helicopter and commercial transport fields, they point to a creativeness among the design teams working in the Soviet Union that is not to be ignored. There would thus appear to be no reason for seeking to denigrate the Domodedovo display, as certain American reports have done, by stressing the similarities with Western types allegedly taken as models. Without a doubt Russian designers show no compunction in taking over anything good and progressive, wherever they may find it. But why shouldn't they, if it is permitted? All the same, it would be wrong to assume that, because the swing-wing princi-

ple of the American F-111, for example, has been adopted, the technical problems of the variable geometry wing have necessarily been solved. (Abstract supplied)

80
Fischer, Karl. [NAVAL ARMAMENTS AND MISSILE DESTROYERS] Marinerüstung und Raketenzerstörer. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Sept. 1, 1967: 456-459.
U3.W38, v. 11

Dr. Fischer dismisses certain outdated notions concerning the mission and equipment of the [West German] Federal Navy. Not merely Germany's budgetary difficulties, but also purely rational considerations lead him to offer suggestions for defending the Baltic approaches more efficiently and at far less cost than can be done through the employment of costly surface units. Naval strategy will have to make use of modern defense resources, even if this means that the Navy's role and importance are thereby reduced. (Abstract supplied, modified)

81
Gallery, Philip D. ASW-1967 [editorial] Data, v. 12, July 1967: 7-8. P&GP RR

Antisubmarine warfare [ASW] is a team effort in which each "player," i.e., destroyer, submarine, aircraft, and surveillance system, has a vitally complex role in detecting and destroying enemy submarines, which are an increasing threat as the Soviet Navy builds up its nuclear submarine force. The backbone of this operation is the destroyer, the dominant factor in the famed "hunter killer" forces--aircraft and destroyers that search and destroy enemy submarines and today are the principal active submarine weapon in the fleet. However effective ASW may be today, the variety of weapons and detection equipment employed in ASW is complex and presents certain problems. New torpedoes and sonar devices require personnel with sophisticated training while the astronomical increases in component parts of sonars has to be remedied by module replacements. Innovations such as the small manned helicopter that is due to replace DASH (the drone controlled helicopter delivering a homing torpedo) are being studied for future ASW operation even though controversies over size and capabilities may delay delivery for years. Up to now ASW has had to rely solely on magnetic anomaly detection [MAD], which has only localization capabilities. Research is being conducted to find a good periscope-detecting radar system that would remedy this situation. Another member of the ASW team, the attack submarine, has been modified by the Mk 48 torpedo. Because of its long-range passive detection capability, the attack submarine plays an important role in ASW search and destroy missions. Fixed surveillance systems continue to be an integral part of the ASW operation, but information about their capabilities is limited because it is classified.

82
Geisenheyner, Stefan. THE R.A.F.'S NEW "JUMP-SET." The Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 7, autumn 1967: 185-192. illus.
UG635.G7A1252, v. 7

An appraisal of the first operational V/STOL fighter-bomber, HS P.1127, which can take off and land vertically, fly sideways or backwards, and reach supersonic speeds at altitude and maximum subsonic speeds at sea level. After studying preliminary designs submitted by Hawker Aircraft and Bristol Aero-Engines Ltd. and testing several prototypes, the British Ministry of Defense gave its approval for the mass production of the HS P.1127 in November 1966. Since it is easily serviced and can land almost anywhere, the HS P.1127 will fill the close support role for the Royal Air Force. Although actual flying from dispersed sites no longer presents many problems, there are still serious questions relating to logistic support and command and control operations of the V/STOL aircraft.

83
Gralla, A. R. GUNS AND MISSILES. Sperryscope, v. 17, 2d quarter, 1967: 6-8. illus.
VK577.S67, v. 17

While 1944 represented the culmination of 100 years of developments in naval guns, it also ushered in aircraft tactics which were to stimulate the development of ship-launched guided antiaircraft missiles. The Navy's Bureau of Ordnance, in conjunction with private contractors, began to work on such a system, and it tested the first "Talos" ram jet and its modified short-range version, the "Terrior" weapon system, in 1945. The Korean War forced a delay in their development and evaluation, but by 1955 both systems were accepted by the Navy. Because of their bulk they were not suitable for the smaller fleet vessels and a lightweight system, the "Tartar," was devised and installed on these vessels. For the past 4 years considerable research has increased the effectiveness of these systems although very little effort has been devoted to improving guns. However, the Southeast Asia conflict has illustrated the cost-effectiveness of naval guns and attempts are under way now to improve gunfire control systems. Gradually the Navy has returned to its original idea that missiles were to extend the effective range of antiaircraft defenses beyond the range of guns. Wherever practicable, future gunfire and missile systems will use the same elements and be recognized as a missile-gun team in maintaining the fleet's readiness to defend against aggressors.

84
Harrison, J. E. A., and Aberporth Rae. ALL-DAY SYMPOSIUM ON TRIALS DATA AND THEIR HANDLING--DEVELOPMENTS IN RANGE INSTRUMENTATION. In Royal Aeronautical Society. Journal, v. 70, Nov. 1966: 987-996. TL501.R7, v. 70

Reviews the developments in Range Instrumentation for Trajectory Measurement over the past ten years. Instrumentation systems considered include kine-theodolites, tracking radars, multi-station Doppler systems, and interferometers. It is shown that "atmospheric refraction variations may be the limiting factor on the accuracy of modern trajectory measuring systems."

85
Healey, Vincent P. NAVMAT ASW SYSTEMS MANAGER POINTS OUT CHANGES. Data, v. 12, May 1967: 39-41. illus. P&GP RR

Interview with Capt. Vincent Healey, Deputy Manager of the Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) Systems Project. Healey describes the changes that have taken place in the ASW Systems Project Office, the greatest being the reorganization of the Naval Material Command on May 21, 1966, which established the six Systems Commands.

86
Hersh, Seymour. GAS AND GERM WARFARE: THE CONTROVERSY OVER CAMPUS RESEARCH CONTRACTS. New republic, v. 157, July 1, 1967: 12-14.
AP2. N624, v. 157

Chemical and biological warfare [CBW] research programs in American colleges and universities affect the morality, integrity, and democracy of higher education. Although CBW contracts are not officially classified they are for all practical purposes secret, since campus officials refuse to admit that there are CBW programs on their campus. Secret research projects defy evaluation of their necessity and effect on national security. Pentagon officials describe the campus CBW programs as defensive, primarily concerned with maintaining retaliatory capability and protecting the American public against surprise chemical attack. However, academic criticism (and that of the liberal public) has been centered on the fear that in this area offensive and defensive weapons can be interchangeable. The possibility of a treaty banning nuclear weapons makes any effective CBW program offensive as well as defensive. The morality of these programs has yet to be questioned. Rather, the general official academic reaction attributes opposition to "widespread misapprehension," as in the case of the University of Pennsylvania, where officials withdrew two CBW contracts from the campus. Campus protests have had little effect on the Pentagon, where officials regard liberal criticism as harassment.

87
HOW BIG IS CHINA? Nature (London) v. 215, Aug. 19, 1967: 801-802. Q1. N2, v. 215

That China fully intends to develop strategic nuclear weapons comes as no surprise. Certainly Chinese progress from fission to fusion has been faster than other countries', but then the Chinese have been more single-minded in this effort than have, say, the French. What does seem unusual is that the U.S. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has somehow convinced itself that "the Chinese are already possessed of medium range ballistic missiles and that rockets able to travel greater distances will be in service in the early seventies." China's aerospace technology is unsophisticated, and despite the fact that it is undoubtedly making an all-out effort in this area a mid-1970's target date seems more reasonable for a credible Chinese threat against other nuclear powers. By that time the attitudes of the Chinese leaders may have changed, perhaps as a result of domestic crisis but more likely because of their limitations in the field of advanced conventional weapons, which they sacrificed to make the bomb. They will, in essence, realize that "nuclear explosives do not bring instant prowess." By that time the superpowers may be willing to respond to Chinese nuclear power with talk rather than by the "development of nullifying hardware."

88
HOW GOOD IS THE MAIN BATTLE TANK?: AN INTERVIEW WITH GEN. BURBA. Armed Forces management, v. 13, Sept. 1967: 40-42.
UB153. A65, v. 13

Describes the program for codevelopment and coproduction of the Main Battle Tank [MBT] by the United States and West Germany. According to Maj. Gen. Edwin Burba, U.S. Program Manager for the MBT, "the primary reasons for cost-sharing are to reduce each party's overall development costs and at the same time incorporate in the item the technological advantages from the other nation." The MBT is designed for greater firepower, mobility, and crew comfort than current battle tanks. Before industry is requested to prepare production bids, the prototype of the MBT will undergo a year of performance and component testing. If negotiations are successful, countries other than the United States or West Germany will be permitted to purchase the MBT or to produce all or part of its components.

89
HOW THE NIKE-X "MISSILE-KILLER" WORKS. U.S. news & world report, v. 63, Oct. 2, 1967: 34-35.
JK1. U65, v. 63

A brief summary of the components and functioning of the Nike-X antiballistic missile system, recently announced for limited deployment by the United States.

90
Howze, Hamilton H. THE ARMED HELICOPTER IN THE DEFENCE OF EUROPE. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 12, Aug./Sept. 1967: 54-55, 58-62. illus.
UA646. F5, v. 12

Makes a case for the potential value of the armed helicopter in European conflicts. General (retired) Howze, Vice President in charge of product planning for the Bell Helicopter Company, asserts that helicopters can be rendered combat-survivable, that they can be extremely useful against tanks, and that they are capable of great flexibility for immediate response.

91
Iakubovskii, I. I. SOVIET GROUND FORCES. Survival, v. 9, Oct. 1967: 327-328.
U162. S9, v. 9
Extracted and abridged from an article in Krasnaia zvezda, July 21, 1967. Slav Rm

The efforts of all branches of the Soviet Armed Forces contribute to the Soviet Union's security and victory in case of war. But the fighting man will play the greatest part in armed conflict, hence the continuous emphasis of the Communist Party on high combat morale. Soviet ground forces have adapted themselves to nuclear weapons with their enormous firing and striking power, but nuclear weapons are not all-important in combat operations. Many situations require the use of conventional weapons only, and therefore the Party and Government assist in developing and improving standard weapons. Soviet ground forces are equipped with the most modern automatic weapons, rocket artillery, antitank weapons, antiaircraft weapons, etc., and all-weather missiles that can destroy enemy aircraft with great accuracy. The striking power of the ground forces depends upon great numbers of well-armed tanks, which are protected against conventional and nuclear weapons and possess the ability to cross river bottoms at any point. The ground forces have formidable weapons, but their main power is in the men who use the weapons.

92
Johnson, C. F. DESIGNING FOR THE WORST OF WORST CASES--NUCLEAR WAR. Electronics, v. 40, Aug. 21, 1967: 99-108. illus.
TK7800. E4384, v. 40

Surveys the radiation absorption processes that damage the electronics of a missile system and the

techniques being developed to reduce this damage. If the effects of a nuclear blast on the circuitry of a weapons system are understood, the system can be "hardened" to improve its survivability. Although hardening may reduce a warhead's effective range, it can at least prevent complete failure of the mission.

93
Keiser, Marcel. [SWEDEN AND MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN NEUTRALS] Schweden und die militärische Zusammenarbeit zwischen Neutralen. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 133, June 1967: 353-354. U3.A43, v. 133

Discusses briefly the prospects of Swedish-Austrian and Swedish-Swiss cooperation in the production of weapons. Keiser considers such cooperation highly important for Switzerland, especially when it decides to acquire nuclear arms. Swedish nuclear research and industry is quite advanced and can be of considerable help to the Swiss efforts in nuclear arms production and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

94
Krylov, Nikolai I. [STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES] Raketnye voiska strategicheskogo naznacheniia. Voennoistoricheskii zhurnal, no. 7, July 1967: 15-23. illus. DK50.A3, 1967

Today all branches of the Soviet Armed Forces are equipped with the most modern and powerful weapons, chief of which are rockets. Since rockets with nuclear warheads are strategically decisive in modern warfare the Soviet Union decided in 1960 to create an independent rocket force that would provide it with increased military power and greater strategic flexibility. Today the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces are capable of rapidly destroying enemy targets anywhere on the globe, and their rockets' enormous destructive power and accuracy make them practically invincible. Russian rocket technology has a long history. Formulation of the principles of rocket construction is ascribed to K. E. Tsiolkovskii. He also developed the theory of rocket flight and jet propulsion and suggested the idea of an artificial earth satellite. Lenin was interested in rocket engineering, and encouraged F. A. Tsander, who was continuing Tsiolkovskii's work on rocket engines and interplanetary ships. The postwar era saw the creation of a rocket with an effective propulsion system, precise control system, and nuclear warhead. Recently the emphasis has been on developing powerful long-range ballistic missiles capable of destroying important enemy targets. Their mass-strike capability, their invulnerability, and their ability to be used at any time and under all meteorological conditions made them ideal as the "basic strategic means of attack." While they were improving their ballistic missiles the Soviets were also working on nuclear weapons. Their ability to mass-produce nuclear weapons and rockets has revolutionized their military strategy. Strategic nuclear weapons permit the Soviet Union to destroy enemy military, industrial, and administrative centers at the first moment of a war and not by consecutive attacks as in previous wars. Soviet strategic nuclear forces will retaliate against any imperialist aggression.

95
Langer, Elinor. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: ONCE OVER LIGHTLY ON CAPITOL HILL. Science, v. 156, May 26, 1967: 1073, 1075. Q1.S35, v. 156

Although the administration did not initiate a reexamination of U.S. policy on chemical and biological weapons [CBW] as requested in a petition signed by more than 5,000 scientists, Congress did bring up the subject of CBW last February during a general review of U.S. disarmament problems by the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The public version of the testimony by Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus Vance was heavily censored but indicated that the hearings focused on two points. First, the Pentagon considers U.S. development of CBW to be a valuable "deterrent to the initiation of CBW attacks by other nations." Critics question the necessity of preparing to retaliate in kind and do not think that the Pentagon has made clear to what extent it feels bound to use CBW only in retaliation. The other point the hearings brought out was that CBW is likely to assume a significant position in U.S. defense plans in the event of international arms limitation agreements in other areas. The February hearings did not investigate the U.S. CBW policy in any depth and did not result in any efforts to place restraints on the American CBW program.

96
MAGNETIC EVENTS OCCURRING WITHIN TWO SECONDS AFTER NUCLEAR DETONATION. In U.S. Air Force. Office of Aerospace Research. OAR research review, v. 6, June 1967: 16-17. P&GP RR

Discusses generation and propagation of the magnetic disturbances detected all over the world during the first 2 seconds after a high-altitude nuclear detonation. Dr. Philip Newman of the Upper Atmosphere Physic Laboratory and S. L. Kahalas of Mt. Auburn Research Associates have made a thorough analysis of these signals--the first of which occurs within a few tenths of a second, and the second between 1.5 and 2 seconds after detonation.

97
MEANWHILE, BACK AT THE DRAWING BOARD--A LOOK AHEAD. Air Force and space digest, v. 50, Sept. 1967: 150-153, 155-156. illus. UG633.A65, v. 50

Predicts continued technological progress by the U.S. Air Force in survivability, flexibility, versatility, and mobility in the next decade. Research and development programs will examine the weapons, technologies, and strategies needed to combat future dangers to the free world. The wide variety of aircraft envisioned by the Air Force includes improved interceptors and tactical fighters, inexpensive close support and tactical planes for use in limited wars, giant transport aircraft to increase airlift capabilities, faster and more versatile takeoff and landing vehicles, and aerospace planes. The Air Force will also direct its efforts toward advancement in missile technology, materials and propulsion, sensor guidance and scanning techniques, military utilization of the laser, and molecular-dimension and solid-state electronic devices. With its tremendous opportunities for technological progress, the Air Force of the 1970's and 1980's should be able to maintain its position of superiority.

98
Mikhailov, V. THE ROCKET PROGRAMME. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 13, July 28, 1967: pt. 1, [item] 4, 1. Slav Rm
Translated from Pravda, July 28, 1967. Slav Rm

Comments on Bonn's appropriations, which will be increased 100 percent by 1971, to speed up the work in rocket engineering and on the plans of the Ministry of Scientific Research to intensify all national rocket-development programs in order to create West German rocket models and medium-range rockets. Mikhailov mentions the planned merger of the three state rocket-development organizations as well as the biggest aircraft-rocket firms.

99
Miller, Barry. U.S. PLAN TO ACCELERATE LASER DEVELOPMENT SPURS MARKET. Aviation week and space technology, v. 87, August 21, 1967: 92-103, 106. TL501.A8, v. 87

Outlines the military applications of laser systems, which are being investigated by various U.S. companies backed by Federal funds. The two categories of military laser applications approaching operational stages are rangefinding and illumination. The first group includes rangefinders for fighter bombers, helicopters, and tanks, to aid in bombing, weapon fire control, and artillery spotting. Laser illuminators are being developed as integral parts of "semi-active guidance schemes for missiles and modified conventional iron bombs," and for use in night vision and infrared surveillance devices. The laser may be used in the future as a thermal weapon against satellites, a surveillance system for tracking satellites, and an aid in missile defense.

100
MISSILES FOR MAO. Nature (London) v. 215, Aug. 19, 1967: 805-806. Q1.N2, v. 215

China will have nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles by the early 1970's. Such is the belief of the U.S. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, as set forth in a recent report. Fallout from China's fifth nuclear test indicated that its scientists had solved most of the problems of a fusion bomb, and the explosion of a megaton bomb was thus expected. The same report also discussed French nuclear progress, which is considered to be a long way behind China's. The French strength lies in its strategic delivery force, which Peking does not yet possess. The committee's report will play an important role in the U.S. controversy over antiballistic missile deployment, although it does not itself take an explicit stand on this matter or discuss possible effects of the cultural revolution on China's arms progress.

101
NEXT: AN ARSENAL OF NEW WEAPONS FOR U.S. U.S. news & world report, v. 63, Oct. 16, 1967: 38-39. illus. JK1.U65, v. 63

America's projected new weapons systems are intended to "offset any missile defense that the Russians might decide to build." This new arsenal of ICBM's will cost at least $10 billion to start, far more than the recently announced "thin" antimissile defense system. They will possess greatly increased penetration capabilities and will beef up the total of U.S. warheads from its current 1,710 to 7,500 or more without increasing the number of missiles. "Multiple independent re-entry vehicles" will be able to place warheads on targets hundreds of miles apart. The Minuteman I's and II's and the Poseidon, an updated Polaris, are expected "to carry the deterrent load in the 1970's." Still further in the future is the "Strat-X" long-range missile, expected to carry six to seven times today's payload. The Defense Department also seeks greater mobility for missiles and may even revive the plan to mount ICBM's on railroads or deploy them in movable emplacements on the ocean floor.

102
Oden, Delk. "AIRMOBILITY": KEY WORD IN MODERN ARMY. Data, v. 12, Aug. 1967: 9-10. illus. P&GP RR

An interview with Oden, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Ala. He traces the development of Army aviation since 1962, stating that air-mobile operations have accomplished a great number of tactical missions and have provided the Army with the capability to expand the geographical sphere of influence of each maneuver element. The General summarizes his views on training aids needed for air-mobile operations in Vietnam.

103
Oliszewski, D. A. ASW MOVING AHEAD AGAINST CHANGING FUNDING TIDE. Data, v. 12, July 1967: 15, 17, 19. illus. P&GP RR
"Interview with Vice Adm. Charles B. Martell, USN. Director, Antisubmarine Warfare Programs."

The pressures of funding have restricted research and development in the antisubmarine warfare [ASW] program, especially in areas that may be significant in 5 to 10 years. The major problem facing ASW is to ensure that it retains its present technological advantages, and this is possible only through continual pressing of R&D programs. Research on the SQS-26 sonar and two torpedoes, Mk 46 and 48, is being given top priority, and progressive developments are being made in ASW aircraft and aircraft platforms. The P3C land-based and VSX carrier-based aircraft will have computerized command and control systems. They will have computer tracking equipment and a radius of action from the carrier of 1,000 miles as compared with the 100 miles of present carriers. The VSX carrier, which is in the concept formulation stage, will be the most flexible and mobile airbase from which to launch aircraft.

104
Perret-Gentil, Jacques. [THE FRENCH NUCLEAR-POWERED MISSILE-LAUNCHING SUBMARINE "REDOUTABLE"] Das atomgetriebene französische Raketen-U-Boot "Le Redoutable" [by] Jacques Pergent Wehrkunde, v. 16, July 1967: 362-365. U3.W396, v. 16

Describes the development of the French nuclear-powered missile-launching submarine and gives technical data on its construction, weapons system, performance, and the size and training of its crew.

105
Polmar, Norman. HELICOPTER WARFARE: FROM THE SINAI DESERT TO THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. Air Force and space digest, v. 50, Oct. 1967: 64-68. UG633.A65, v. 50

Points out that small as well as major countries can employ the helicopter in combat situations, as demonstrated by Israel in the Arab-Israeli war. The Israeli Air Force substituted helicopter missions for parachute operations since helicopters provided

greater maneuverability and versatility in transporting troops and supplies. Also helicopters are proving of value in patrolling the vast area which came under Israeli control following the war. The shift from parachute to helicopter assault forces by other small nations depends partly on such factors as the availability of sufficient funds for such a costly program, possession of the technical competence to maintain and operate the equipment, and the ability of the defense forces to closely coordinate their efforts for successful helicopter operations.

106
Proniakin, IU., and V. Gzhel'skii. A STRATEGIC FORCES WORKDAY] Budni strategicheskikh. Sovetskii voin, v. 49, May 1967: 21-28. illus.
U4.S645, v. 49

Describes the activities of a strategic rocket installation. The installation consists of two parts: one part contains living and study quarters and facilities for rocket research and development, and the other part, below the surface, stores rockets and combat instruments. The heart of the underground stronghold is a self-sufficient power station that in an emergency could immediately be connected with all units. The authors emphasize the skills and personal dedication of the rocketeers who design, build, and launch their own small-scale rockets. In case of attack, many similar strongholds dispersed throughout the country will be able to respond instantly from their submerged bases and destroy the enemy.

107
R & D: PROGRAMS RANGE FROM BENEATH THE SEA TO OUTER SPACE. Armed Forces management, v. 13, Apr. 1967: 142-143, 148, 150, 152. illus.
UB153.A75, v. 13

Divides the Defense Department's research and development [R&D] program into four catagories and describes the major projects within each subdivision. In defending the R&D program from the charge of "no new starts" Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara averred that the improvement of existing systems is often as valuable to overall U.S. military strategy as the development of entirely new systems. The first stage in the Pentagon's R&D program is research, which is organized along the lines of scientific disciplines, i.e., chemistry, oceanography, etc. Efforts in the second stage, exploratory development, are directed to the study of the military application of new devices, components, and materials. More than 800 projects, including the Defender project, designed to provide concepts for advanced defensive systems against missile attack, will share the $988 million requested for exploratory development in FY 1968. Almost $1.3 billion is requested for the third stage of the program, advanced development, which includes the Defense Department's share of the V/STOL project and studies on the SAM-D, the advanced surface-to-air missile system. Projects which are being engineered for service but which have not been approved for production and deployment are listed under the fourth category, engineering development. The efforts to develop techniques for detecting nuclear detonations by using satellite instrumentation and the test programs for tactical fighter aircraft are listed under this category.

108
[REMOTE CONTROL WEAPONS OF THE SOVIET NAVY] Lenkwaffen der Sowjet-Flotte. Atlantische Welt, v. 7, Sept. 1967: 10. V3.A8, v. 7

Reports on the various types of guided missiles assigned to Soviet warships and mentions plans for further development of both weapons and carriers.

109
Rhea, John. MALLARD CONTRACTS LET; GANDER STUDIED. Aerospace technology, v. 21, Oct. 23, 1967: 21-22. UG630.M54, v. 21

The Army has awarded 11 contracts to American firms to study the battlefield communications techniques involved in the Mallard communications network ("an integrated communications system in which data would be handled entirely in digital form and automatically switched") and has begun studies of a post-Mallard system known as Gander. Gander is projected as a totally integrated automatic data processing and communications system covering Mallard and ADSAF (automatic data system within the Army in the field). Eleven additional contracts for reviewing the system and subsystem design of the Mallard network will be divided among the foreign participants in Mallard--Australia, Britain, and Canada. By 1970, competitors are expected to begin bidding for hardware production for Project Mallard, which by the time of its planned deployment between 1975 and 1977 may have evolved from the current four-nation army system into a multination network serving all branches of the armed forces. In addition to its studies on the Mallard system, the Army is investigating the ADSAF and communications satellite elements of Project Gander.

110
[RHEINMETALL SELF-PROPELLED 90-MM. ANTITANK GUN] 90-mm-PAK mit Hilfsantrieb von Rheinmetall. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Sept. 1, 1967: 471-472. U3.W38, v. 11

Rheinmetall has developed its 8.8-cm. anti-aircraft gun into an antitank gun that is suitable for use against both light and heavy armoured vehicles. With its own auxiliary power source, the 90-mm. antitank gun has good cross-country capability, is simple to operate and has virtually the highest degree of accuracy attainable. In developing this weapon Rheinmetall has been able to call on the experience amassed in more than 75 years of the design and production of up-to-date arms and arms systems. As a result the 90-mm. antitank gun has been equipped with its own source of power, to make it independent of towing vehicles on the battlefield. The driver can move the gun up into firing position, then reverse out of cover after firing and take up a new position. (Abstract supplied)

111
Root, Walter H. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LIMITED WAR. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 47, Oct. 1967: 11-17.
Z6723.U35, v. 47

A rational discussion of limited nuclear war should assume that the nuclear powers are of roughly comparable strength, each with a strategic deterrent and something more potent than a token capability for tactical nuclear war. Any limited war between such powers would produce possibilities for unprecedented escalation and strong incentives to achieve stability at lower levels of violence. Mutual acknowledgment and observance of limits controlling the scope and intensity of the war require a plan that is readily perceptible, mutually acceptable, and credible. A national boundary is an excellent example of a limit with these qualities.

In the nuclear spectrum a no-nuclear-weapon limit also fits the requirements, but once nuclear weapons are used little prospect remains for agreement on limits. At all points on the nuclear intensity scale there is a uniform lack of credibility concerning nuclear limits. Escalation to unlimited nuclear war probably occurs when one side succumbs to the irrational fear that such war is underway or soon will be. If a choice exists between fighting a limited conventional war or a limited nuclear war, without doubt the conventional option is preferable, except in two circumstances. The first is when the enemy initiates the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Perhaps eventually both sides will realize that with such weapons war has little to offer and everything to lose. Controls on tactical nuclear weapons could offer a promising beginning toward a nuclear disarmament agreement, eliminate the first rung in the escalation ladder, and remove the economic burden of weapons of dubious value. The second circumstance that calls for the use of tactical nuclear weapons is one in which the United States is losing a conventional battle where vital interests are at stake for which it would be willing to accept the consequences of unlimited nuclear war. The Nation must maintain its tactical nuclear weapons capability not because it represents a rational option but because "the capability and evident willingness to be irrational at the tactical level is a deterrent to irrational behavior at that level." The capability should be employed only if the deterrent fails and there is no other choice short of all-out war, and then only with an appreciation of the possible consequences.

112
Rudnitskii, M. A. [SOVIET SUBMARINES] Sovetskie podvodnye lodki. Morskoi sbornik, no. 7, July 1967: 29-34. illus. V5.M3, 1967

Chronicles the development of the different kinds of Soviet submarines, from the simple "Dekabrist," the first Soviet submarine, to the nuclear submarines of today, which are equipped with automatic systems of communication, observation, and navigation. The submariners themselves have also quickly adapted to the modern combat materiel, as evidenced by the successful Soviet submarine voyages to the North Pole and around the world.

113
[STOL, VTOL, V/STOL: A MODEL FOR AIRCRAFT OF THE FUTURE. VIETNAM AND ISRAEL CONFOUND THE SKEPTICISM OF PROFESSIONAL STRATEGISTS] STOL, VTOL, V/STOL--Flugzeugformel von morgen. Vietnam und Israel widerlegen die Skepsis der konservativen Strategen. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Sept. 1, 1967: 444-445.
U3.W38, v. 11

The forthcoming decisions regarding the procurement of flying equipment for the German Air Force will be largely influenced by the political components in the defence concept now engaging the serious attention of the Cabinet. The precise definition of the Bundeswehr's defence role will also affect the detailed technical problems arising in connection with the choice of replacement aircraft for the Fiat G.91 and--towards the end of the seventies--the F-104 G Starfighter. Despite the running battle being waged by the supporters of the nuclear strike role, it looks definitely as if the aircraft chosen will be for purely conventional, or nonnuclear, operations. In view of the Federal Republic's geographical situation, the availability and operational readiness of field landing grounds and runways of 1000 to 2500 m. length assume cardinal importance. Hence, the decisions must be for or against aircraft with very short take-off runs, if not actual vertical take-off. There can be no doubt that these qualities offer the Luftwaffe reduced vulnerability and better chances of survival in a real emergency. On the other hand they demand entirely new thinking on the part of military logistics experts. It is thus not surprising that such radical changes encounter resistance, not only from the lower echelons. And the outlook for V/STOL in the Federal Republic paradoxically is not altogether improved by the fact that this country happens to be in the lead in the field of VTOL development. Doubtless the situation would be different if the United States had projects of this kind to offer . . . . However that may be, recent practical experience in the Middle and Far East fighting suggests that there will be no avoiding a decision to match the new aircraft to the revised defence concept. Which amounts to the question of what the combat aircraft of the eighties is to look like, if its technical qualities are to ensure optimum chances of survival. (Abstract supplied)

114
Sagalyn, Arnold, and Joseph Coates. WANTED: WEAPONS THAT DO NOT KILL. New York times magazine, Sept. 17, 1967: 6, 12, 14, 16.
AP2.N6575, 1967

Describes the impact that the Chemical Mace and other incapacitating agents could have on domestic law enforcement and assesses their utility in subduing violent individuals or unruly crowds.

115
SECOND SOURCING SET FOR ABM COMPONENTS. Aerospace technology, v. 21, Oct. 23, 1967: 10.
UG630.M54, v. 21

According to Lt. Gen. Austin W. Betts, Director of Army Research and Development and head of the ABM [antiballistic missile] Systems Command (a new organization established to administer the procurement of the ABM system), substantial second sourcing is planned for the procurement of electronics equipment and other subsystems for the missiles in the U.S. ABM program. He also implied that the bulk of the missiles for use in testing the capability of the ABM system would come from existing ICBM systems. Other sources report that about $1.2 billion of the total $5 billion cost of the ABM system will be spent by the Army Corps of Engineers for site preparation.

116
Sington, Anne. NATO'S AIR DEFENCES--A CHILD'S GUIDE TO NADGE. NATO letter, v. 15, Apr. 1967: 8-16. illus. D845.2.A44, v. 15

Sketches plans for the NADGE [NATO Air Defence Ground Environment] system which will run the entire length of NATO's defense perimeter, and discusses problems encountered in drafting the plan. The role and status of France and Great Britain are mentioned, and a schematic drawing and the text illustrate how NADGE will work.

117
[THE SITUATION OF THE GERMAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY] Lage der deutschen Rüstungsindustrie. Atlantische Welt, v. 7, Sept. 1967: 14-15.
V3.A8, v. 7

The West German defense industry, which produces only small-caliber weapons, is almost totally dependent on military contracts. A lack of prospective contracts for the next couple of years will mean substantial shrinkage, which would adversely affect research and development activities that keep it in step with world technological progress. The West German shipbuilding industry, on the other hand, depends mostly on civilian contracts, making the broadening of its production capacity economically unnecessary. The same is true of the automotive industry, which is now able to satisfy the Bundeswehr's needs, although further defense cutbacks may impair its capabilities. Further development of French-German partnership for defense research and development could be advantageous for the Federal Republic of Germany.

118
[THE SPARTAN ABM WILL HAVE A VARIABLE-SPEED THIRD STAGE] L'ABM "Spartan" aura un troisième étage à poussée variable. Air and cosmos, v. 5, Oct. 14, 1967: 19. P&GP RR

The United States will ultimately construct a third stage for the Spartan missile, which will have the capacity to travel at variable speeds to combat incoming multiple independently guided warheads. The Russians' new fractional orbiting bombardment system with multiple warheads poses the most serious threat to antimissile defense systems. Whereas the classical ICBM could be easily tracked the multiple warhead can change course rapidly and make a reentry on an unknown trajectory. To combat this the United States is developing the Spartan third stage and employing a new radar system of over-the-horizon detection.

119
U.S. Library of Congress. Aerospace Technology Division. NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS: COMPILATION OF ABSTRACTS [by Frederick W. Pindy. Washington] 1966. 64 p. (Its ATD report 66-60) Z663.23.A2, no. 66-60

Abstracts of Soviet articles dealing with "nonnuclear explosions in or about the Earth, the ensuing shock waves in soils and other continua, and their effects on certain materials and structures." The material, which was published during the 3 years before mid-April 1966 and is available in the Library of Congress, covers energy propagation in solids and liquids, shock and blast waves in rocks and soils, shock and blast effects on materials and structures, and mechanisms of explosion.

120
USAF, INDUSTRY STUDYING ABM CONCEPTS. Aviation week & space technology, v. 86, May 15, 1967: 84-87. TL501.A8, v. 86

Describes orbiting-weapon deployment concepts under analysis by a committee sponsored by the Air Force Systems Command [AFSC]. Composed of representatives from industry and the U.S. Air Force under the chairmanship of Maj. Gen. Glenn A. Kent, AFSC Deputy Chief of Staff for Development and Plans, the group is studying ground- and space-based defense capabilities. In order to provide the broadest coverage of defense capabilities, the study includes a survey of potential threats from armed satellites classified either as first-orbit penetration systems (FOPS) or multiorbit penetration systems (MOPS). Both FOPS and MOPS would be difficult to track and could function as reconnaissance as well as attack vehicles. Defense against FOPS and MOPS weapons in the orbital path could include direct-ascent intercept from the ground and satellite intercept. The study group is probably also considering methods of deploying satellites to intercept ballistic missiles during their boost phase.

121
U. S. STUDIES COSTLY 'SUICIDES' AMONG LASERS. Electronic design, v. 15, Sept. 13, 1967: 42, 46. illus. TK7800.E437, v. 15

Reports Air Force alarm over the self-destructive tendencies of high-power pulsed lasers. From a survey of current literature on high-power laser research, Carl Pitha, a research physicist in the Solid-State Sciences Laboratory at the Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories, has determined correlations between self-inflicted laser damage and the characteristics of the laser materials. The Air Force is particularly interested in improving ruby oscillator rods, which are important to its special weapons projects because they produce the most powerful laser beams.

122
Unwin, A. W. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. Humanist, v. 82, Aug. 1967: 230-233. BL2700.H78, v. 82

Most research on chemical and biological weapons is secret, but recently several researchers were allowed to publish the results of some of their work on chemical weapons in scientific journals. According to this information various types of chemical weapons exist. Among the least harmful are riot control agents such as DM (a vomiting agent) and CS and CN (tear-gas type agents). At the next level are the incapacitants, the best known of which is BZ, a derivative of LSD that causes physical and mental slowness and hallucinations. The seven known nerve gases are by far the most lethal, the majority causing almost immediate death after only slight inhalation. These include Tabun (GA), Sarin (GB), Soman (GD), GE, GF, and the V-agents, VE and VX. Events in Vietnam have proved the utility of chemical weapons developed for nonhuman targets such as foliage. Biological weapons are far more difficult to pinpoint, both because their use is not an accepted practice of war, and because basic research in microbiology can be directed towards a variety of goals. A successful biological weapon must cause a particularly virulent and highly infectious disease that kills quickly. However, the user must have a means of protecting his own men which the enemy does not have and must be able to produce the microorganism in large quantities and store it without deterioration. The most crucial problem in biological warfare is how to deliver germs to their targets. Before the advent of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons were the principal means of mass destruction available to mankind and should nuclear weapons be abolished, they could become so again. Just as it is difficult for the man who releases a nuclear rocket to feel responsible for the destruction it causes, so also the researcher on disease is divorced from the killing of human beings that can result from his efforts. If men are to be responsible for the consequences of their actions they must be informed; the secrecy surrounding chemical and biological weapons must be broken.

123
Wagner, Joe H., comp. FIFTH ANNUAL MILITARY SYSTEMS DIRECTORY. Armed Forces management, v. 13, Apr. 1967: 101-140.
UB153.A75, v. 13

Lists over 3,000 major weapons and defense support systems and programs. The project name, military nomenclature, branch of military service, Government agency, description, use, contractor, and project status are given for each item when applicable. The items are divided into the following categories: spacecraft, missiles, and rockets; aircraft; ships, boats, craft; and artillery, vehicles, small arms.

124
Wang, Chi. NUCLEAR RESEARCH IN MAINLAND CHINA. Nuclear news, v. 10, May 1967: 16-20.
QC770.N75, v. 10

Evidence of the scope of nuclear research and development in mainland China is provided by the number of its research facilities as well as its tests of nuclear devices and published materials on nuclear science. Nuclear research was initiated in Communist China by the Institute of Modern Physics--part of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which was founded in 1949--and is presently coordinated by the Academy in its Institute of Atomic Energy. One of the two research centers of the Institute of Atomic Energy is located in Peking. Its staff of about 300 works in basic nuclear physics and high-energy physics. The other, about 50 kilometers from Peking, employs approximately 700 staff members in theoretical, experimental, and neutron physics research units. Additional nuclear research is conducted by institutes of the more than 20 regional branches of the Chinese Academy of Sciences; by the Committee of Atomic Energy and the Committee of Isotope Applications under the Academy, which concentrate on overall planning of nuclear research; and by research laboratories for the application of atomic energy to agriculture and medicine. Prior to the withdrawal of Russian technical assistance in 1960 a large number of Chinese scientists were trained in the Soviet Union, but now the training of scientific personnel is concentrated in China's own universities and research institutes. The Chinese progress in nuclear science is reflected in the high quality of recent magazine articles and books written by scientists trained both inside and outside China. Although China does not compare with the West in nuclear technology, it can be expected to continue its rapid advances in the field.

125
Ware, Richard S. FORECAST A.D. 2000. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 47, June 1967: 30-39.
Z6723.U35, v. 47

As the world moves toward the 21st century, two major trends will shape the development of the new technological and industrial revolution. The first, proliferation of nuclear weapons, is unlikely to be halted, and as numerous countries join the nuclear club it is reasonable to assume that through accident or miscalculation some nuclear weapons will be used. Yet mass destruction is improbable. The two superpowers, particularly, will hesitate to use their vast arsenals against one another in peripheral skirmishes. "In fact, the probability of deliberate use of nuclear weapons may decrease with proliferation." Continued unchecked population expansion marks the second world trend. Because of it the condition of the average individual has worsened in many areas despite gigantic strides in technology. The increasing abundance of electric power represents the greatest single hope for improving human existence. Two "widely divergent military missions" will characterize the military doctrine of the year 2000. Limited-war capability, designed to maintain order during a period of minor wars and disorders in the developing areas, and the maintenance of strategic superiority through sophisticated technology will be the orders of the day for the American defense community, as well as for all of the developed nations. Maintenance of world order will be well beyond the singlehanded capacity of the United States, and the advanced nations will have to devise some method of sharing responsibility, perhaps through regional arrangements or the commitment of troops to a central organization. The weapons of the year 2000 will be critical in the maintenance of strategic superiority. In the United States a central computer system will greatly enhance weapons research and revolutionize military organization. Administrative personnel will be largely replaced by computers, but the manpower pool for the Armed Forces will grow as automation increases and civilian unemployment increases. Ground forces will take to the air, permitting undreamed of force mobility. Long-range force transportation will normally be by rocket, and in instances where secrecy is necessary, by huge, nuclear-powered undersea vehicles. Weapons now only in the imagination state include devices to jam the electrical impulses that operate the human brain. Radar, sonic, and laser beams may be turned into antipersonnel weapons. Before the end of the century, in any event, military forces will have learned "through bitter experience" that they must expect the unexpected.

126
Wettern, Desmond. BRITISH POLARIS SUBMARINE PROGRAM ADVANCES. Navy, v. 10, May 1967: 27-29. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 10

Sketches the progress of Great Britain's Polaris submarine program. The first of the four 7,000-ton fleet ballistic missile [FBM] submarines was launched last fall and should be commissioned before April 1968. When operational the FBM submarines will each be equipped with 16 Polaris missiles and will be assigned to NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. Although the FBM program cost of about $1.2 billion reduces the funds available to the British Navy for other types of ships, the program will enhance the Navy's prestige and strengthen Britain's ability to protect its interests in Southeast Asia.

127
Whalen, Richard J. THE SHIFTING EQUATION OF NUCLEAR DEFENSE. Fortune, v. 75, June 1, 1967: 84-87, 175-178, 183.
HF5001.F7, v. 75

Increased Soviet missile production and development of sophisticated penetration and defensive methods threaten the advantage in strategic technology and weaponry held by the United States. U.S. strategic objectives must be revised if they are to deter the Soviet technological innovations that are reducing to a fiction U.S. numerical missile superiority. The effectiveness of the Soviet antiballistic missile [ABM] system that encircles Moscow and defends the northeast coast must be evaluated in terms of strategic and technological deterrence. The backbone of this system

is Galosh, a solid-fueled, long-range interceptor that carries a high-yield warhead and that may be capable of an exoatmospheric trajectory, that would eliminate the need for Russian fallout shelters. Russian experiments on high-yield nuclear explosions in the upper atmosphere have made the ABM a matter for concern. Sophisticated Soviet atmospheric nuclear tests have not been matched by the United States. When the nuclear test ban treaty was signed, the United States had not yet completed theoretical studies of high-yield effects, while the Russians were already employing confirmed results. However, U.S. tests have shown that "before man-made radiation belts could achieve a particle density lethal to warheads the earth's magnetic field would prove too weak to support them, and the umbrella would 'leak.'" A "shield" effect against incoming warheads is ruled out, but effective defenses may be able to utilize manmade radiation. Therma! x-rays could be used for area defense. They would penetrate incoming missiles and cause them to explode internally--the Spartan will contain this "zapp" effect. The Soviets' ABM, their growing ICBM strength, and their first-strike capabilities make strategic deterrence unstable. The Soviet deterrent is already influencing U.S. behavior. Should U.S. diplomats fail to talk the Russians out of deploying the ABM--which appears to be the case today--the United States will go ahead with plans to construct counterweapons--Nike-X and the Poseidon, a Polaris-type missile with defensive capabilities. Russia's new strategic deterrent has also challenged the assured-destruction concept and leveled the cost-exchange ratio of offense-defense deployment relationships almost to parity. Deploying an American ABM system would restore the strategic balance, counter the Chinese threat, restore Europe's faith in NATO, and convince Russia that the United States is not obsessed with offensive first-strike weapons.

128
WORLD WAR 3: WHEN? Time & tide, v. 48, July 13-19, 1967: 10-11. AP4.T445, v. 48

Today the world is closer to the peril of war than ever before, and the reason is Red China. "Backward, primitive, Red Guard-enslaved hysterical China" is cannonballing toward a full nuclear-delivery capacity. In response the United States will have to go ahead with deployment of an antiballistic missile system, for Mao and his henchmen not only can channel the resources of an entire nation for their objectives but also are obsessively aiming at a Chinese-dominated world. They are "wholly disoriented from any idea of sanity." The free world simply cannot deal with China but instead must show the utmost firmness. The United States must be supported in Vietnam, and within the free world itself Red sympathizers must be made to understand that the Communists are not merely agrarian reformers. China will inevitably have to be dealt with, and only by preparing now can the free world win the confrontation with China.

129
Young, Judith H. THE FRENCH STRATEGIC MISSILE PROGRAMME. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967. 13 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 38)
P&GP RR

Discusses France's strategic missile program including an examination of the two types of intermediate-range ballistic missiles [IRBM]: a land-based system [SSBS] and a submarine-based system [MSBS]. These missiles are expected to be fully operational by the year 1975. Young notes that although the cost of a nuclear program is high, France has had certain technical and economic advantages--important production licenses have been granted by American companies to France in the fields of materials, tracking radar, and guidance--as well as unique strategic and political advantages that other countries embarking upon a nuclear program might not share.

130
Zabelok, B. GUARDING THE SOVIET SKIES. Soviet military review, no. 8, Aug. 1967: 13-16. illus.
P&GP RR

The Soviet Air Force has made great progress from its civil war antiaircraft batteries to modern jet-propelled aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of hitting any point on the globe. The Soviet Air Force plays an important part in the defense of the country and has become a self-supporting service with clearly defined strategic tasks. It contains antiaircraft forces, interceptor aircraft, radar units, and uses automatic systems and electronic computers. Soviet antiaircraft missiles are capable of destroying enemy objects in flight at almost any altitude and flying speed; their efficiency has been demonstrated against the U.S. U-2 spy plane and against U.S. aircraft in Vietnam. Its effective modern weapons and high training standards enable the Air Defense Forces to protect Soviet territory against any attacker.

C. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGIES

131
THE ABM: DAMNED IF WE DO--MORE DAMNED IF WE DON'T [editorial] Saturday evening post, no. 22, Nov. 4, 1967: 88. AP2.S2, 1967

Secretary McNamara's decision to deploy a "thin" antiballistic missile [ABM] system against a Chinese attack was the right one despite criticism that he has submitted to the "military-industrial complex" and started a new arms race. The idea of basing world peace on rationality in high places is itself somewhat irrational. The Chinese provide a clear example of irrationality and it would be foolish to entrust them with the task of world peace. An antimissile system that could prevent accidental war or the destruction of one city could prove crucial, and a large ABM system with fallout shelters could protect 55 million more American lives than a "thin" system. U.S. deterrence against a Soviet attack must remain viable no matter what the cost and must maintain the "unacceptable" consequences of nuclear war.

132
Agnew, Harold M. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: A NECESSARY DETERRENT OR PROVOCATION? Air Force and space digest, v. 50, May 1967: 66, 68, 70. UG633.A65, v. 50

In today's new national defense equations, what is good for this Nation may also be good for the enemy; conversely, what is bad for the enemy may be bad for the United States. This concept, which supersedes the old formula that a plus for one country represented a minus for its enemy, makes stability all-important. The Defense Department now says that no matter which side owns them, weapons that weaken stability are

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bad and those that strengthen it are good. Equality between the United States and other powers has become the goal, rather than superiority over them. Technological innovation, one of the chief factors contributing to military superiority, has been stifled by this thinking. Political decisions have canceled or delayed the full utilization of American technological superiority in area after area. Systems are being built or considered only in response to a clearly defined threat, so this country is continually on the defensive. Since Washington has given up the initiative, time lags involved in reacting to threats will eventually place America's responses to threats hopelessly behind the threats themselves. Moreover, since only those threats that are clearly proven are taken into account, how can the United States possibly maintain a deterrent, which by definition must attempt to take into account any enemy action against the Nation? Innovation is ruled out because it is said to be provocative, although there is no proof that this is so. At the same time provocation is ruled out as a tactic. Yet only through constant innovation, both defensive and offensive, can the United States maintain its military and economic superiority. The Soviets do not take so cautious a view of innovation. A recent Soviet Defense Ministry document asserts Moscow's intention to continue seeking the initiative in weaponry so that Russia will be superior if war comes. The renunciation by one side of a potential technological advantage by no means guarantees that the other side will not discover the same thing and use it. America's world commitments demand that it keep up with its adversaries.

133
Amme, Carl H. THE SOLDIER AND THE BOMB. Army, v. 17, Sept. 1967: 29-37. Ul. A893, v. 17

The use of tactical nuclear weapons in the early stages of a local conflict reduces chances of terminating it at the least destructive level. On the other hand, to wait until defeat is imminent to use nuclear weapons intensifies pressures for their widespread use and increases chances for escalation into general nuclear war. Predetermined guidelines are urgently needed, for soldiers on the battlefield cannot be expected to assess the risks involved. While military analysts differ on the risks of using nuclear weapons, they agree on certain tactical principles. For instance, concentrations of supplies and troops are extremely vulnerable to nuclear attack. Troops must disperse into reasonably small and self-sufficient units, and must "dig in," for the Army estimates they can weather a low air nuclear blast of 20 kilotons if they are at least 1,300 meters from ground zero in properly prepared foxholes. Conversely, mobility is also essential on a nuclear battlefield to avoid an anticipated enemy attack or contamination from weapons used against the enemy and to permit rapid redeployment. Tactics for fighting a ground battle with nuclear weapons are fraught with contradictions, however, for if the troops are dispersed they cannot fight well against an enemy concentrated for a conventional attack, and if they are reasonably concentrated they offer tempting targets for nuclear attack. Most analysts agree that a local battle in which both sides use nuclear weapons would result in a destructive standoff. Both might restrict themselves to low-yield weapons initially, but if one side perceived a chance for gain by expanding the war it might be tempted to employ slightly larger weapons, or if it sees defeat as its only alternative, the pressures will be tremendous to employ nuclear weapons on a wide scale. And if one side uses nuclear weapons and inflicts tremendous casualties, the other will be tempted toward massive nuclear retaliation. A credible willingness to use nuclear weapons is essential to the bargaining process in war but only if the other side recognizes the limited aims of its opponent and exercises an option that is less unfavorable than escalation. The discriminate use of weapons coupled with a clear warning or threat offers a chance of terminating the conflict at a lower level. The objective of a nuclear constraint policy is not to determine the most efficient means to destroy enemy forces but rather to use the weapons as a communication and bargaining device to bring hostilities to an end.

134
ARMS: IS U.S. LEAD SHRINKING? U.S. news & world report, v. 63, Sept. 25, 1967: 61.
JK1. U65, v. 63

In a recently issued report entitled The Military Balance [notated as no. 707 in v. 3, no. 2 in this bibliography] Britain's Institute for Strategic Studies shows the United States still ahead of all the other nations of the world in military power. The Soviet Union, however, leads the United States in defensive weapons systems and is coming up from behind in the development of offensive systems. The Soviets have 450 to 475 ICBM's and claim to have space weapons. Mainland China has lost ground in conventional forces because of its internal power struggle, but it is making rapid strides in nuclear weaponry and may pose a serious nuclear threat by the 1970's. According to the report America should hold its lead through 1968 despite rapid Russian development.

135
Atkinson, James D. COUNTER-DETERRENCE AND THE ABM. In American Security Council. Washington report, Aug. 21, 1967: 1-4.
P&GP RR

While the United States futilely attempts to persuade the Soviet Union to dismantle its present antimissile [ABM] defense system and refrain from future missile development, the Soviets stall the negotiations and continue to build and deploy ABM's. Some argue that Soviet capabilities are no cause for alarm since the cold war is over, but recent evidence indicates "that storm clouds are flying in the Kremlin." An official statement of the Soviet Communist Party issued in June 1967 proclaimed that the growth of Soviet military power has ended imperialist domination. The Soviet secret police have appointed a member of the ruling Politburo as their chief for the first time since Beria's execution in 1953, a clear indication of the growing importance of cold war operations. The Bulgarian Minister of Defense publicly stated that the Soviet Union continues to be the main political and material base of world revolution. Soviet escalation of the war in Vietnam and their hard-line opposition to Israel are further indications of stormy weather. Developments in China are also cause for concern, for the Chinese are making rapid progress in intercontinental ballistic missiles and in thermonuclear weapons that can be delivered by aircraft. According to a report published by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the U.S. Congress, the Chinese will have the capability to reach the United States by the early 1970's. At present the United States lacks an ABM system to repel such a strike. The value of a deterrence system is its credibility, and if the Soviet Union believes it can neutralize U.S. offensive forces

with its ABM systems, it may be inclined to risk nuclear war in an international crisis. Thus U.S. deployment of an ABM system would have a definitely stabilizing influence on world politics.

136
BILLIONS TO STOP A MISSILE ATTACK: NEW DEFENSE AGAINST NUCLEAR WAR. U.S. news & world report, v. 63, Oct. 2, 1967: 33-35.
JK1.U65, v. 63

On September 18, 1967, the U.S. Government announced its decision to deploy a limited antiballistic missile [ABM] system, to be completed within 5 years and to cost initially $5 billion. Whether American ABM deployment will trigger a new arms race or not depends primarily on the Soviet Union--the so-called "thin" U.S. system is not intended to thwart a Russian missile attack but rather the Chinese threat. Top military and civilian decisionmakers, however, still press for a full anti-Soviet system, which would cost upwards of $20 billion, despite Defense Secretary McNamara's assertion that such a system would not be effective enough to warrant that expenditure. That McNamara approved even the limited system resulted from Soviet snubbing of American moves to agree on a nuclear freeze, the increasing nuclear capability of Communist China, and the influence of congressional and Pentagon leaders. McNamara apparently still hopes to solicit Russian cooperation in curbing the arms race, having offered the Soviets a "tacit deal which would enable Moscow to achieve virtual parity with the U.S. in offensive missiles in exchange for an understanding that neither country would go all out with the ABM build up" but merely maintain protection against Red China. American military experts hold little hope for this plan, and most observers agree that the danger of a renewed arms race is increasing.

137
Bottome, Edgar M. MYTHOLOGY OF THE A.B.M. Commonweal, v. 87, Oct. 20, 1967: 74-76.
AP2.C6897, v. 87

The antiballistic missile [ABM] gap favoring the Soviet Union is a myth, and its supporters are ignoring two important historical considerations: the mythical bomber and missile gaps and past Soviet strategic doctrine. Soviet strategic policy is based on minimum deterrence, involving the ability to deter a nuclear attack while maintaining conventional forces to respond to less than all-out aggression against the Soviet Union. If Russia were to deploy a sophisticated ABM system it would need between 3,000 and 12,000 ABM's to ensure a positive kill ratio against the existing American missile force. In addition, it would be many years, if ever, before the Soviets could achieve the 80 percent kill ratio of former bomber defenses after years of development. An ABM system deployed against China lacks credibility, because any delivery system the Chinese could develop by 1970 will not threaten the existence of American retaliatory forces. In fact if the Chinese, or anyone else, act irrationally, as ABM proponents propose they will, then no amount of offensive or defensive weapons will prevent nuclear destruction. Unfortunately, the growing Chinese missile threat and limited Soviet ABM "will have the same expansive impact on American military expenditures as past alleged gaps." The millions of dollars that will be spent on the ABM will not add one degree of security to the strategic position of the United States.

138
Bragin, Nikolai. ANOTHER NATO'S "FIRE BRIGADE." Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 13, July 19, 1967: pt 1, [item] 6, 1.
Slav Rm
Translated from Pravda, July 19, 1967.
Slav Rm

Criticizes the decision of NATO's military committee to recommend the creation of a "multi-national naval force," suggested by the American Adm. Thomas Moorer, as a concession to Washington's militant circles, which have demanded escalation of the "dirty war" in Vietnam and encouraged the Israeli aggressors in their territorial expansion. The force is intended as a "fire brigade," with six destroyers and other warships. It will be able to move instantly to any tension area on the globe. The establishment of a multinational naval force is attributed to a desire to involve the NATO allies in aggressive American actions; apart from the ensured existence of a mobile NATO naval force in case of emergency, Washington wants to show a united allied front, despite the differences between NATO member countries. Although the Pentagon and the West German Bundeswehr play the leading parts in NATO, a semblance of "equality" is maintained among the participants of the planned naval force, the commanders of which will be inchangeably drawn from different countries of NATO.

139
Brown, Neville. BRITISH ARMS AND THE SWITCH TOWARDS EUROPE. International affairs (London) v. 43, July 1967: 468-482.
JX1.153, v. 43

With the "confrontation threat" in South Asia quickly evaporating due to the withdrawal of British troops "East of Suez," Great Britain is embarking upon an "entry into Europe" and directing its main defense effort toward the Continent. As a result, Western Europe is faced with the dilemma of either consolidating the Atlantic alliance or welcoming Great Britain into the Common Market and creating a defense system independent of the United States. Western Europe's complete political and military dissociation from the United States would be unrealistic. An independent Western European nuclear deterrent could not afford guarantees to countries outside the Common Market during East-West "conflicts"--Russian threats directed at Turkey during the Cuban missile crisis were perpetrated without fear of European retaliation. In fact Western Europe cannot insure itself against nuclear attack unless it is prepared to spend exorbitant amounts for defense planning and research. Which institution will serve as the European pillar in the reorganization of the strategic and local defense of Western Europe? The Common Market would "probably become far too unwieldy to take over such functions as crisis diplomacy or nuclear command and control," therefore the instrument best suited for European defense would be the Western European Union [WEU], a formal defense alliance of Common Market countries plus Great Britain. The backbone of this defense would consist of an Anglo-French strategic alliance within the framework of WEU. The integration of an Anglo-French alliance into the framework of WEU could contribute to progress in arms control. British-French cooperation would induce the French to abate nuclear testing by giving them access to British warhead designs. The absence of a nuclear power in Western Europe leaves it vulnerable to Soviet attack

even under a flexible-response strategy. An alliance would serve notice to Russia that Europeans would stand firm against its probes and threats and make disengagement in Germany appear more practical and attractive. The emergence of a cohesive West security defense policy seems improbable in the light of present opposition from the President of France. As long as Charles de Gaulle is in power it is unlikely that France will reenter NATO or allow the WEU to make strategic defense or military decisions. It is possible, however, that De Gaulle's successor will enter into negotiations with Great Britain to pave the way for "the emergence in the 1970's of a stable Atlantic Alliance grouped around the United States and the WEU."

140
Brunner, D. [ARMS LIMITATION AND STABILITY] Limitation des armements et stabilité. Swiss military review, v. 112, Aug. 1967: 359-364. illus.
U2.R5, v. 112

The deployment of an antiballistic missile [ABM] system by the superpowers would be extremely costly and would accelerate the arms race and upset the strategic equilibrium without giving the United States or Russia any added superiority. An ABM system could lead a power to believe that it is invulnerable, thus making a first strike more attractive. Two more reasons for not deploying an ABM are that tremendous costs are involved--estimates range from $20 to $30 billion for a "thick" ABM system--and that construction of an ABM system would cause each side to spend money on new and more devastating offensive penetration missiles.

141
Buck, James H. THE JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES. Asian survey, v. 7, Sept. 1967: 597-613.
DS1.A492, v. 7

Summarizes some of the major differences in the social and psychological orientation of the pre- and postwar Japanese Armed Forces and describes the organization and military techniques of the Self-Defense Forces of today. Buck notes that before the war Japanese society taught an individual how to die rather than live for his country and family. Today in Japan there is a sanctification of individualism although Japanese soldiers are still forbidden to partake in any form of political activity. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces presently account for one-quarter million men "capable of executing limited defensive operations in accord with the law of the land." The main threat to these forces comes from Communist China. Whether Japan will produce nuclear weapons to counter this threat will be "the most difficult political choice that any postwar Japanese government has faced."

142
Burr, William E. CENTRALIZED CONTROL. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 46, May 1966: 78-83.
Z6723.U35, v. 46

Present-day cold-war tensions demonstrate the importance of evaluating and improving techniques for centralized control of the Armed Forces. It is particularly important in situations which could lead to dangerous escalation, such as the confrontations between the United States and the Soviet Union in Berlin and Cuba and in local situations where fluctuating political factors govern military activity, such as in the Dominican crisis and in Vietnam. Direct control of all base operations from the top is not possible or desirable. The enormous size of operations necessitates limiting the number of decisions referred directly to the top. Intermediate officers in the chain of command often increase the value of the information contained in field reports through experienced analysis and help ensure that directives from above are accurately interpreted and followed. Bypassing the chain of command consistently would not only deprive those at the top and the bottom of the valuable professional advice of these officers but would also weaken the structure and threaten the existence of the chain of command. Other hazards inherent in centralized control are the possibilities that a breakdown of communications might paralyze the system or that errors from above might be reflected throughout the entire system. The effectiveness of centralized control can be improved by a clear understanding by all those concerned of the criteria for selecting situations which require central control, an efficient flow of information up and down the chain of command, and an understanding of military capabilities by top-level decisionmakers. Politico-military war games can provide valuable experience in practicing the techniques essential to a system involving central control of military operations.

143
Cameron, Neil. AIR POWER AND OUR FUTURE WORLD ROLE. The Royal Air Forces quarterly, v. 7, autumn 1967: 175-183.
UG635.G7A1252, v. 7

A reduction of the percentage of the Gross National Budget allotted for defense spending and a necessary decrease in overseas spending have prompted a reappraisal of Britain's future defense role. Questions concerning the effect of alterations in the nuclear balance of power, China's intentions as a nuclear power, and the future shape of Asia complicate the work of the defense planners. Britain's military policy in the years ahead will center on a home-based defense force and full support for NATO with a gradual withdrawal from Southern Arabia and noninvolvement insofar as possible on the Asia mainland and in the Middle East. However, Britain should maintain a mobile and flexible intervention force to provide worldwide military assistance to allied and friendly nations and to aid U.N. peacekeeping forces. The maintenance of Britain's peripheral strategic interests will require greater interdependence of the three branches of the Armed Services. Airpower will play a vital part in the peripheral strategy by covering intervention forces, providing mobility to land forces with improved tactical and strategic airlift capabilities, and providing offensive air support to the Army and Navy.

144
[THE CHINESE H-BOMB] La bombe H Chinoise [by J. H.] Perspectives, v. 23, July 1, 1967: [item 5] 1-5.
HC10.P4, v. 23

Gives a detailed chronicle of the development of the atomic bomb, including a synopsis of Communist China's recent H-bomb tests. The author concludes that China believes world war is inevitable and that the United States must face a crucial decision: whether to spend money on an antiballistic missile defense system in order to minimize the threat from China's nuclear offensive capability.

145
CIVIL DEFENSE NOW ON FIRMER FOUNDATION. In Canada. Emergency Measures Organization, Ottawa. EMO national digest, v. 7, June 1967: 13-14.
UA929.C2A3, v. 7

"Reprinted from 'The Region One Spotlight,' Office of the Secretary of the Army, Office of Civil Defense, U.S.A." P&GP RR

The primary objective of the U.S. civil defense effort is to develop a nationwide fallout shelter program that would save tens of millions of lives. This program would utilize existing structures for fallout protection and would be managed through State and local governments. Current surveys show that 155 million people in America can be protected from fallout by using public facilities. In the State of Maine about 40 percent of the population is protected from fallout by public shelters. Although civil defense ca cannot insure 100 percent security, it is a practical program that can be effectively carried out on the Federal, State and local levels.

146
Cleveland, Harlan. THE FUTURE OF NATO--OFFICIAL VIEW OF U.S.: STILL VITAL TO WESTERN DEFENSE. U.S. news & world report, v. 63, Sept. 11, 1967: 61-64. JK1.U65, v. 63

Excerpts from the address of the U.S. Ambassador to NATO given before the National Press Club in Washington, Aug. 23, 1967. Cleveland emphasizes that the current upsurge of political dialog between Eastern and Western Europe is at least partly dependent on the continuation of NATO's deterrent rather than an indication that the Organization is no longer necessary.

147
Cleveland, Harlan. [THE REAL DETERRENT] La vraie dissuasion. Revue des deux mondes, v. 19, Oct. 1, 1967: 321-332. AP20.R3, v. 19

In the past there were but two final consequences of war: victory or defeat. Today an aggressor can only make a guess, based on strategic theories and hypotheses, as to what his enemy's response to an attack will be. The aggressor's uncertainty, combined with knowledge of his opponent's nuclear capabilities, has created a stalemate. There is little doubt that the Russian deployment of an antiballistic missile system can effectively mollify the effects of an offensive nuclear attack by the United States and shift the strategic balance. The strategic equilibrium maintains world peace but it cannot prevent limited wars. It is useless in application to local conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Latin American, but in Europe, where the confrontation between the Great Powers is direct and the political priorities are high, it rules out limited or local war. Any attack by the Soviet Union against Western Europe should be met by a counterattack--a nuclear one if the situation warrants it. Yet NATO must convince Russian leaders that its deterrent force will be effective in both general and limited crises. Should the Soviet Union come to believe that NATO would hesitate in using its tactical nuclear force it could appropriate Berlin and present NATO with a fait accompli. NATO leaders do not wish to use nuclear arms, for any war would destroy the greater part of Western Europe, but to avoid use of nuclear weapons NATO must demonstrate to the Soviet Union that, if necessary, it will be willing and able to use them.

148
Davis, Paul C. THE COMING CHINESE COMMUNIST NUCLEAR THREAT AND U.S. SEA-BASED ABM OPTIONS. Orbis, v. 11, spring 1967: 45-66.
D839.O68, v. 11

The decision to deploy a U.S. antiballistic missile [ABM] defense system in the light of the Chinese nuclear offensive capability will be predicated on the military implications of U.S. nuclear credibility in Asia, which involve strategic, political, and semi-technical considerations. In fact such a decision will not be based on U.S. defense considerations but rather on the need to ensure a damage-denying defense of China's enemies in Asia. By 1975 Communist China will have a limited ICBM capability. At present the credibility of a Chinese attack upon the United States is low, but increases in Chinese nuclear sophistication would tend to depress the morale of non-Communist Asian states. These nations would begin to doubt the willingness of the United States to uphold its commitments in the Far East if it were vulnerable to nuclear attack. On the other hand, the American public might not be quick to believe that the risk of attack is low, and this doubt could be reinforced by Chinese ideological dogmatism and revolutionary fervor. A sea-based AICBM system as an alternative to a system based in the continental United States [CONUS] would reduce the problem of blast radiation and fallout over U.S. cities and require a less costly civil defense program. This system would also have a higher intercept rate due to its forward deployment. A CONUS-based system might run into political difficulties, particularly those arising from the danger of fallout over Canada, that would not occur with a sea-based AICBM system. The greatest disadvantages of a sea-based system are the effect of the weather and the ease with which an attack could be launched from behind it by enemy submarine-based missiles. The former, difficult to control, would reduce the efficiency of an operation during storms; the latter could be redressed by employing an antisubmarine warfare system. Communist China will deploy a token ICBM force in order to assume the status of a great power, but the real threat from China's arsenal will come from its IRBM's [intermediate-range ballistic missiles] and MRBM's [medium-range ballistic missiles], offensive missiles that require a different type of defense system. The alternatives for this system are a land-based or a mobile, air- or sea-based, AIRBM defense system. Since the United States could not protect every Asian country it would have to guard the two countries most valuable to it in the Far East--India and Japan. An AIRBM would have to be damage-denying, since both India and Japan could be devastated with few weapons. The establishment of a sea-based AIRBM system would provide the advantage of a gain in security because it would not be exposed to sabotage or espionage. Unfortunately this system would be ineffective in protecting nations that are not separated by water from China--with one exception: India could be defended by a sea-based operation in the Bay of Bengal at the risk of heavy fallout. An AMRBM [antimedium-range ballistic missile] that is ground-based would be impractical; to deter the short flight of this missile would require an automatic defense using terminal-type missiles.

149
Elegant, Robert S., and Sidney C. Liu. RED CHINA'S DIVIDED ARMY. Reporter, v. 37, Aug. 10, 1967: 13-16. map. D839.R385, v. 37

The job of Communist China's People's Liberation Army [PLA] is to maintain order amid the internal

chaos wrought by Mao's cultural revolution, and in so doing it has assumed control of the vital facilities of the nation. The Army may now be the only stable institution left in China. Scarcely a first-rank, modern Army in any event, the PLA has been weakened further by the fact that one of the primary issues in the cultural revolution is whether to update the Armed Forces technologically or to concentrate on spiritual and ideological weapons. Regional dissensions typify the cultural revolution, and even an Army twice the size of the PLA would be inadequate for China's 2,200 counties. The Army itself retains many regional loyalties, and the wholesale reassignment of officers, along with the abolition of formal ranks and recent emphasis on The Thought of Mao Tse-tung, have done little to alter the PLA's regionalism and autonomy. The Army maintains its own farms, newspapers, intelligence organizations, and communications networks. Areas once controlled by the four great field Armies are no longer strongly behind Mao or Lin Piao, former commander of the Fourth Field Army. As internal strife increases, the role of the PLA will become even more vital. The PLA may lead China into a loose confederation under its aegis. Or it may even go so far as to depose the Mao-Lin group and set up a new and more flexible national regime.

150
Emmet, Christopher. RUSSIA'S ROLE IN VIETNAM: MYTHS AND REALITIES BEHIND OUR HOPE FOR AN AMERICAN-SOVIET DÉTENTE. America, v. 117, July 29, 1967: 112-113.
BX801.A5, v. 117

The Johnson administration is ignoring the real aggressor and enemy in the Vietnamese War--Soviet expansionism. Washington is doing everything possible to minimize Russia's expansionist role in Southeast Asia by attributing Soviet policy to its fear of yielding influence to Red China. Consequently the war has lacked the "meaning and dignity of being part of a confrontation against an enemy." The illusion of Soviet-American détente has brought defense cuts even in West Germany, the gradual breakdown of the Atlantic alliance, Soviet aggression in the Middle East, and the increasing influence of Soviet "hawks," who take advantage of a "détente" to clothe a long-range policy of attempting to dominate the free world. The United States must advocate a policy that entails realistic negotiations with Russia while at the same time recognizing the pervasive Soviet threat to democracy.

151
Enke, Stephen, ed. DEFENSE MANAGEMENT. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall [1967] 385 p.
UA23.E6

Partial contents.--Pentagon decision making.--Cost effectiveness applications.--Special defense problems.

A collection describing the recent "revolution" in Pentagon defense planning. Modern "cost-benefit analysis"--a highly sophisticated form of operations analysis--has made it possible to choose among rival weapons systems even far into the future. The first section gives a broad picture of the methods used, including the "cost effectiveness of cost effectiveness"; the remaining two sections deal with such diverse topics as civil defense, force mobility, manpower utilization, research and development, the effect of defense on the international and domestic economies, NATO defense planning, and military assistance programs. All competent and experienced analysts, the authors of the chapters were selected with the restriction "that no one should contribute who, on date of publication, was serving in the Office of the Secretary of Defense."

152
Finkelstein, Marina S., and Lawrence S. Finkelstein, eds. COLLECTIVE SECURITY. San Francisco, Chandler Publishing Co. [1966] 278 p.
JX1952.F59

Partial contents.--What is collective security?--The principle of common concern.--The assumptions and conditions of collective security.--The justification of international concern and response to aggression.--Implementation of the common concern.--Sanctions open to a collective security organization.--Collective security and national control of power.--Evaluations of collective security.--The future and collective security: an essay by the editors.

Compilation of essays analyzing the meaning and application of collective security principles in international relations. All members of a collective security community, whether established on a regional or on a worldwide basis, must react against a threat to the peace of any one member. Thus, the participants must first reach a consensus on acceptable peacekeeping procedures. Although the world today is far from a general agreement that all nations should "subordinate their individual interests to agreed procedures for resolving their differences," the editors conclude that the United Nations may provide a forum from which a consensus could evolve that "will enable the world to move by stages to a higher degree of collective policing capability on the part of the organized international community."

153
Fonde, Général. [THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE CARIBBEAN ZONE] L'importance stratégique de la zone Caraïbe. Revue de défense nationale, v. 23, Oct. 1967: 1548-1558.
D410.R45, v. 23

Since the 15th century the Caribbean area has been of strategic importance for many nations, beginning with the Spanish conquistadors, who used the Antilles as a base of operation for the conquest of "the New World of the West Indies." For two centuries European powers exploited Latin America until in 1823 the United States instituted a "hands off" policy with its Monroe Doctrine. The economic as well as strategic value of the Caribbean greatly increased with the construction of the Panama Canal in 1914. From 1900 to 1967 the United States intervened in Latin American affairs no less than 30 times to protect its economic interests and the security of the Canal Zone. U.S. intervention in Santo Domingo in 1965 and its blockade of Cuba in 1962 were in line with a policy based on the Monroe Doctrine and the "big stick" policy of Theodore Roosevelt. Today the Caribbean, especially the Panama Canal, is strategically important to the United States, perhaps more so than ever before.

154
Freisinnig-demokratische Partei der Schweiz. [DECLARATION ON THE NEAR EAST CONFLICT BY A (PARLIAMENTARY) FRACTION] Fraktions-

Erklärung zum Nahost-Konflikt. Politische Rundschau, v. 46, no. 4/6, 1967: 226.
Hl.A16, v. 46

Gives the text of the resolution adopted at the June 1967 meeting of the members of Switzerland's Radical Democratic Party in the Nations Federal Assembly. The party deplores the United Nations inability to prevent the Near East conflict and points out the diminishing credibility and value of the U. N. peacekeeping machinery. Current political developments demonstrate that the security of a small neutral nation such as Switzerland depends more than ever on its own determination to defend itself--a view which is shared by the Swiss Government.

155
Freistetter, Franz. [WE AND DETERRENCE] Die Abschreckung und wir. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 5, May/June 1967: 215-220.
P&GP RR

Solutions found by the Great Powers' "defense research factories" hardly suit the requirements of a small neutral nation such as Austria. However, where their situations are analogous the European neutral states should cooperate in defense research. Austria is situated in a "playing field" of international politics and potential military confrontations. Yet it cannot have any significant influence on the course of the "game." It lives under a nuclear "umbrella," which is a variable that can't be counted on in Austrian defense planning. A neutral state cannot plan for "assistance from abroad." However, if attacked, it can accept foreign aid, taking into account "its own interests and the ability of the helper." But it must rely primarily on itself to preserve its independence and neutrality. In conventional arms Austria has a deterrence capability in some sections of the country. It can also conduct certain forms of "subconventional warfare" but would not undertake a Mao Tse-tung type of guerrilla war, which is unsuited to European conditions.

156
THE FUTURE OF NATO: MEANING TO U.S. U.S. news & world report, v. 63, Sept. 11, 1967: 60-61.
JK1.U65, v. 63

Contrary to the popular impression, NATO does not come up for formal renewal in 1969. Rather nations may, by giving a year's notice, resign from the alliance in 1969. Without formal resignation, membership continues automatically, and experts consider it unlikely that so many nations will quit that NATO will fall apart. While the French withdrawal was a shock to the Organization, it was by no means a catastrophe, and a continuing need for NATO is seen. The threat of Soviet aggression against Western Europe has almost vanished, but "a premature weakening of NATO . . . would undermine prospects of moving toward a European settlement with Russia based on mutual concessions." Thus NATO will develop a new strategy, marked by the maintenance of a 17-division "shield force" rather than enough conventional forces to hold off a Soviet invasion for 60 to 90 days. A new political role for the Organization is also emerging; it will coordinate the allies on key policy issues and negotiations with Russia. NATO will be effective as long as U.S. nuclear power, increasingly the only credible deterrent against Soviet Russia, is "visibly committed to the defense of Western Europe."

157
Garland, R. S. FLUID WARFARE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. Australian Army journal, no. 217, June 1967: 3-11.
Ul.A92, 1967

Current U.S. air-mobile concepts will form the basis for strategic and tactical concepts for all future wars. While conventional-type wars will be the most prevalent in the future, nuclear war cannot be ruled out. Australia's Army should train to fight in the postnuclear period (the phase that decides the outcome of the war) by utilizing air-mobile units--infantrymen and helicopters. These units must be homogeneous and capable of hiding in broken terrain and performing under the most extreme conditions. Warfare in the nuclear age will degenerate into a large number of dispersed battles; success will depend upon an army's ability to achieve mobility both in the air and on the ground. Logistics must complement mobile forces: supporting hardware must be portable and all items must be "assessed on their combat usefulness versus their maintenance requirements in pounds weight." If China launches a massive nuclear or conventional attack in Asia, it should be countered by operations based on helicopter air-mobile concepts.

158
Gorshkov, S. G. [DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET NAVAL ART] Razvitie sovetskogo voenno-morskogo iskusstva. Morskoi sbornik, v. 50, Feb. 1967: 9-21. illus.
V5.M8, v. 50

Traditionally the Soviet Navy has served as an auxiliary to Soviet land power. In the mid-20's a "small war" theory prevailed in Russia, and the Navy was equipped mostly with cutters and coastal artillery. In the 1930's submarines were assigned to coastal defense, but it took World War II to teach the Soviets how to operate submarines far away from their bases. During World War II, only "heavy artillery" ships were deemed capable of fighting the enemy. The Navy lacked strategic mobility and the ability to strike remote targets. It fought gallantly, but always as an adjunct to land forces. However since World War II the international situation has changed. The threat to the Soviet Union is no longer from a continental power, but from the navies of imperialist powers, and new weapons have revolutionized the role of navies. With the development of ballistic missiles, navies gained new importance as fundamental strategic instruments. Today a third of the whole American strategic nuclear missile potential is centered in its nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers, and by 1970 this proportion may increase to one-half. A belt of Western military bases encircles the Soviet Union, and the danger of an attack from the ocean is growing. In the 1950's to counter this danger the Central Committee of the Communist Party authorized the development of a modern fleet, no longer a defensive but an offensive force, giving priority to submarines and aircraft equipped with nuclear weapons. New methods were also introduced on the operational and tactical level.

159
Grant, N. B. TO MAKE OR NOT TO MAKE THE BOMB. In United Service Institution of India. Journal, v. 97, Jan./Mar. 1967: 1-12.
Ul.U5, v. 97

A nation's survival today may depend on its ability to plan for and solve problems well in advance of future conflict. In such planning mathematical calculation is essential, for there is no other way to discover how

many missiles are needed to destroy a target system or how to disarm with security. Both operations analysis and systems analysis have these basic components: an objective or number of objectives; alternative means for accomplishment; the cost of each system; a mathematical or logical model of objectives, alternatives, environment, and resources; and a criterion for choosing the preferred alternative. The selection of objectives and criteria is the central problem in systems analysis for if the choice is wrong the design is worthless. Military choices range in importance from things that might be nice to have to those that are a necessity. Cost analysis is also useful in evaluating military systems. Some factors, such as morale, ésprit de corps, tradition, and organizational behavior, are not subject to quantitative analysis. Any military systems analysis must consider in its recommendations the objectives of the nation and its forces, the military capabilities required to attain these objectives, enemy capabilities and objectives, and the technological possibilities, effectiveness, and costs of each alternative. While systems analysis is no guarantee that all relevant alternatives will be considered, it does force greater explicitness and make the alternatives more open to scrutiny.

160
Griffith, Samuel B. THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY. New York, Published by McGraw-Hill [1967] 398 p. illus., maps. (The United States and China in world affairs)
UA839.3.G7

Attempts to realistically assess China's military power. General Griffith, U.S. Marine Corps, retired, discusses Chinese Communist military developments in the context of the Chinese revolution, tracing the history of the People's Liberation Army and demonstrating what a significant achievement it was for the Communists to attain the military strength they evidenced during the Korean War. He evaluates current Chinese capabilities, asserting that while its accomplishments in military technology are impressive China still lags far behind the more advanced nations of the world and that the leaders in Peking no doubt realize this.

161
Heelis, J. E. INTEGRATION IN CANADA--WHAT LESSONS HAS IT FOR US? In Royal United Service Institution, London, Journal, v. 112, May 1967: 132-136.
U1.R8, v. 112

Reviews the implications for British defense policy of Canada's integration of its Armed Forces under a single defense staff. The article summarizes the aims, progress, and difficulties of the Canadian military reorganization directed at total unification of the Army, Navy, and Air Force by 1970. Britain is not in as favorable a position as Canada to carry out a drastic military reorganization. Britain has greater and more varied military commitments, including protection of economic interests overseas, provision of internal security for overseas dependent territories, responsibility for home defense, and obligations to assist countries with which it shares defense treaties. However, the Canadian experiment may provide valuable lessons to British defense planners interested in reducing the current disproportionate administrative costs of the Armed Forces without impairing Britain's capabilities to fulfill its worldwide military commitments.

162
Hirschfeld, Oswald. [THE BUNDESWEHR AS AN INSURANCE POLICY?] Bundeswehr als Versicherungspolice? Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Sept. 1, 1967: 436-437.
U3.W38, v. 11

It has been clear to politicians and military alike for years that a new defense concept adapted to changed world conditions, both political and military, is needed for NATO and for the Bundeswehr. The author once more points out the present discrepancies and indicates some of the reforms needed. Up to the present, however, the Federal German Government has shown little or no practical initiative in this direction, perhaps as a result of the persistent uncertainties and difference of approach in Bonn's relations with Washington, Paris and Moscow. One fact that gives cause for concern, however, is that the reforms recently announced by Bonn have been dictated not by political or military considerations, but by financial necessity, by shortages in the overall German budget. Such motivation naturally incurs the risk of short-sighted decisions, against which no warning can be too strong. Another argument brought forward in the accompanying article amounts to a criticism of certain prevalent views concerning the Bundeswehr. The latter is not there just to serve as an instrument of defense policy in peacetime, but to ensure protection for the country in wartime; yet no adequate provision has been made for effective defense in the event of war. This astonishing tendency towards "make believe" as exhibited by the former spokesman for the Defense Ministry is thought-provoking, particularly since it might be assumed to reflect current thinking among service chiefs. Should this be the case, it would inevitably lead to the grotesque conclusion that the German armed forces are all right for peacetime garrison duties, but by their very nature would be quite useless in war. Without a doubt a dangerous philosophy. (Abstract supplied)

163
Hittle, J. D. NATIONAL SECURITY. V. F. W. magazine, v. 55, Oct. 1967: 7.
E181.F7, v. 55

While most Americans are turning their attention toward Vietnam and away from NATO and Western Europe, the Russians still regard the destruction of NATO as one of their primary aims. Western Europe is essential to the security of the United States, and without the United States Europe, strategically speaking, would "be in a shambles." The most significant move against NATO by the Soviet Union is the big buildup of its Mediterranean fleet. The Mediterranean is the southern flank of NATO, and until recently the U.S. 6th Fleet controlled these waters unchallenged. This is another example of Soviet expansionism and one good reason why the Veterans of Foreign Wars is right in urging an increase in NATO's military strength.

164
Huglin, Henry C. OUR STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY--WHY WE MUST CONTINUE TO HAVE IT. Air university review, v. 18, Sept./Oct. 1967: 42-49.
TL501.A5574, v. 18

The United States must continue to maintain its strategic superiority in order to ensure international stability and to deter expansionist nations from carrying out their plans for "liberating" the rest of the world. As long as the United States has a significant advantage in nuclear weapons it will prevent Russia and China from blackmailing and coercing the free world. U.S. strategic superiority is vital not only in case of war but

in all phases of its relations with other countries. U.S. strategic strength deters further escalation of limited wars, counters Russia's attempts to alter the strategic balance as it did in the Berlin and Cuba crises, prevents Communists from infringing on international rights--the Soviet Union has given up harassment of U.S. access routes to Berlin for the time being--and gives our leaders confidence in their ability to protect the ideals and vital interests of the United States. The maintenance of strategic superiority is no easy task. It requires the exploitation of advanced technology and the constant tending of those intangible elements, will and persistence. Strategic superiority, although primarily manifested in military and technological progress, is based on education, national will, economic strength, and political and diplomatic competence. Without these foundations the framework of strategic deterrence would crumble.

165
Huizinga, J. H. THE BASHFUL AMERICAN AND HIS BOMB. Contemporary review, v. 210, June 1967: 281-285. AP4.C7, v. 210

That the smaller nations afforded protection by a great one should demand a share in that nation's power was once unthinkable. Yet today the nations of Europe, perhaps mistaking their relative wealth for strength, seem to assume that they possess an inalienable right to the exercise of the enormous might of the United States. Despite the fact that Washington would be quite justified in replying "Who do you think you are?" to these demands, America's leaders are in fact uncomfortable with what they try to avoid referring to as their "hegemony." Certainly proposals for nuclear sharing are in some measure motivated by an American desire to ensure that its view of the world will prevail in the West. But this desire, in turn, stems not from the will to power, but rather from an age-old fear of entangling alliances. Fortunately everybody's demands but France's apparently can be satisfied with such sops as "joint contingency planning" or "joint crisis management." These terms mean next to nothing, for when the chips are down the only nation that counts is the one that has the power to control the "escalade" up to the brink of war or to deal with brushfires throughout the world. And U.S. power in these realms cannot be shared. Even so, Washington has not abandoned efforts toward some kind of Atlantic Deterrent Community [ADC]. ADC schemes embody the concepts of abandoning national control over nuclear resources and pooling them, thereby creating "the compulsion for joint action." The European nations, of course, would have to forfeit a great deal more freedom of action than the United States under any such plan, since they would be required to contribute the whole of their nuclear resources while the United States would hand over only a very small portion of its arsenal. In any event a joint approach is infinitely safer for Europe than going it alone. Whether it offers any real hope for the future depends on America's continued ability to adapt to the pace of technological change and to resist the temptations of hegemony. With luck Europe will "achieve the best of both worlds: a measure of emancipation with retention of American protection."

166
Huwe, Klaus. [WILL DE GAULLE LEAVE THE ALLIANCE? PARIS STRIVES FOR BILATERAL AGREEMENTS INSTEAD OF NATO] Verlässt de Gaulle das Bündnis? Paris strebt bilaterale Verträge statt der NATO an. Christ und Welt, v. 20, Sept. 22, 1967: 7. BR4.C37, v. 20

De Gaulle's Eastern policy rests on the assumption that no danger of military conflict exists in Europe any longer. Hence he has made overtures to the East in the hopes of speeding up the dissolution of the blocs. This goal is, however, too long-range for the time left to him so he may resort to a spectacular move to make the reluctant East more receptive to his ideas. France's final break with the Atlantic alliance would be such a move. However, France's international prestige still rests in an important measure with the alliance, and the usefulness of the French "force de frappe," especially the Mirage IV and medium-range rockets, depends on the NATO air defense system's early-warning network. Without minimum cooperation "with its conventionally armed partners," France would have too little latitude for diversification of its defenses. Thus even if it withdrew from the Atlantic Pact it would still want to cooperate, but on the basis of bilateral agreements. Since "a massive presence of Americans" in Europe may not continue in the 70's, the German-French talks on common strategy are of great importance for the future security of Europe.

167
Ishibashi, Masashi. ESCALATING NATIONAL DEFENSE--PROBLEMATICAL POINTS OF THE THIRD DEFENSE BUILD-UP PLAN. Japan Socialist review, no. 138, Aug. 15, 1967: 24-30. HX9.J3, 1967

The Japanese Socialist Party must struggle actively inside the Diet and workshops to prevent the Government from violating article 9 of the Constitution by implementing the third stage of the defense buildup plan to strengthen the Self-Defense Forces [SDF]. The third stage of the plan envisages a major increase in the war potential of the SDF with particular emphasis on the modernization of weapons. The Government is laying the groundwork for access to nuclear weapons by promoting domestic production of the Nike-Hercules missile, which is capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and long-range fighter bombers that can carry nuclear bombs.

168
Johnson, Frank J. ARABS AND ISRAELIS: WHERE DO THE SOVIETS GO FROM HERE? In American Security Council. Washington report, Aug. 28, 1967: 1-4. P&GP RR

In the aftermath of the disastrous Arab-Israeli War the Soviet Union is trying, against a background of great caution and cynicism, to repair its battered prestige. The Soviets sought to make amends for their failure to aid the Arab armies through U.N. resolutions condemning Israel and demanding its withdrawal from conquered territories, but this tactic too ended in political defeat. Now they are resupplying the Arab nations with as much military hardware as their trained manpower can handle in order to make up for their heavy equipment losses. They are also sending two types of military advisers, first the technicians proper and then the higher level administrators, and are forcing Nasser to accept far greater Soviet controls and restrictions on equipment than ever before. Nonetheless Soviet military prestige in the Middle East is low. Many Arabs recognize that claims of British and U.S. aid to Israel during the war are false and that the Soviet Union backed down in the face of the powerful U.S. 6th Fleet. Because it lacks a common frontier with friendly or cooperative nations in the Middle East, the Soviet Union could not bring its massive conventional land power to bear and

did not want to risk confrontation at sea. It now must act in a careful and measured manner to recoup lost prestige and capitalize on strained U.S.-Arab relations, but must not permit the Arabs to start any trouble which the Soviet Union would be forced to settle for them. The United States now has the opportunity to project an image of itself as a true friend of Arab moderates, one who is willing to work for the genuine prosperity of the Arab people.

169
Jackson, William E. DEFENSE: THE MISSILE NOBODY NEEDS. New republic, v. 157, Oct. 28, 1967: 13-16.
AP2. N264, v. 157

Challenges Secretary McNamara's strategic reasoning on an antiballistic missile [ABM] system against China and draws attention to domestic political pressures that influenced the shape and the timing of the ABM decision, which is seen as "one more gesture to the knee-jerk hawks" in Congress.

170
Kavic, Lorne J. INDIA'S QUEST FOR SECURITY: DEFENCE POLICIES, 1947-1965. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967. 263 p. maps.
UA840. K3

Partial contents.--The defence policy of British India, 1858-1947.--The origins, bases, and aims of Indian defence policy.--Himalayan policy, 1947-1958.--Himalayan policy, 1959-1961.--The Indian Army, 1947-1962.--The Indian Air Force, 1947-1962.--The Indian Navy, 1947-1962.--Defence production, 1947-1962.--Civilian-military relations, 1947-1962.--Himalayan conflict, 1962-1965.--The new Indian defence programme.

A study of the evolution of Indian defense policy, beginning with the British rule. Kavic emphasizes the Indian approach to issues of national security under the Nehru administration. Although the New Delhi Government tried to project a public image of India as a nation whose policy was based upon higher ideals than those motivating other governments, in practice it resorted to force on several occasions and spent a good deal on building up the strength of the Armed Forces. Before the 1962 border conflict with China the Indian defense program appeared to "be as much a symbol of desire for international status as a reaction to any specific threat." After 1962 officials pursued more vigorously than ever an ambitious defense program based upon the assumptions that "the People's Republic of China posed the major threat to Indian security; a Pakistani threat could materialize at any time; Sino-Pakistan collusion against India was conceivable; and India required a credible military sanction for her diplomacy."

171
Kintner, William R. PEACE AND THE STRATEGY CONFLICT. New York, F. A. Praeger [1967]
264 p. UA23. K483

Contents.--Competitive paths toward peace.--The nuclear thrust: from Alamogordo to Cuba.--The technological arena.--The balance sheet: strategic assets and liabilities.--The Soviet dilemma.--Arms control: cooperation or competition?--NATO in the face of détente.--U.S. strategy in crisis.--Power and persuasion.--Appendix.--Index.

Describes the diverse views currently held by Americans on the most effective path toward peace. Kintner disagrees with those who believe that nuclear weapons possess no political or military utility except the deterrence of general war. He feels that the strategic nuclear superiority of the United States is essential to the present tenuous stability and peace. The Soviet Union has made sustained efforts to reverse the strategic balance of power, primarily through exploiting science and technology, and to divide the West and neutralize U.S. power before the growing Chinese threat consumes its attention. U.S. strategy will depend on whether it views relations with the Soviet Union as evolving toward nuclear cooperation or competition, for efforts to slow the arms race are at odds with the maintenance of strategic superiority. At present, Kintner concludes, "U.S. strategic superiority is indispensable to the preservation of peace."

172
Kissel, Hans. [PROBLEM "DEFENSE"] Problem "Verteidigung." Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 5, May/June 1967: 192-201. map.
P&GP RR

Comparison of Austria's defense problems with those of West Germany and Switzerland. Kissel uses as a point of departure the theory that only through operational movements, not by adoption of stationary defense positions, are wars won. Austria's defense possibilities are in that respect much worse than West Germany's or Switzerland's. In a war its defense line would be very quickly reduced to a few isolated strongholds in the highest mountains. It must thus contemplate conducting "small wars" (guerrilla warfare) on territory occupied by the enemy.

173
Kosaka, Masataka. [A PEACE STRATEGY FOR EAST ASIA. THOUGHTS ABOUT JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY VIS-A-VIS COMMUNIST CHINA] Eine Friedensstrategie für Ostasien. Gedanken zur japanischen Sicherheitspolitik gegenüber dem kommunistischen China. Europa-Archiv, v. 22, July 10, 1967: 471-478. D839. E86, v. 22

Japan's relative unconcern with its own military security is perfectly justified. The chances of Red China's invading its neighbors are limited. The Himalayas and the Chinese mainland's underdeveloped highway system preclude an invasion by China of any countries but Korea and Indochina. The Soviet Union on the other hand, although possessing adequate technical means for coping with logistical problems, is kept in check by the presence of the American 7th Fleet in the area. Communist China's nuclear capacity cannot affect the military balance of power in Asia as long as Red China lacks intercontinental ballistic missiles that would enable it to make a direct strike against the United States and thus impair the Asian nations' trust in American nuclear deterrence in Asia. The American strategy of flexible response makes very good sense in Asia, although not in Europe, for "the deterrence efficacy of the United States total military power is by far stronger in Asia than in Europe." While the Red Chinese threat in Asia is thus primarily political, it carries with it potentially important military consequences, especially since Communist China's proclaimed goal is to change the status quo. The present balance of military power renders the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan unnecessary. The American-Japanese security treaty is most important for the

nation's present security and will gain importance with the further development of Red China's nuclear capacity. The independence of South Korea, which is of the utmost strategic importance to Japan, would be threatened by a concerted Soviet-Red Chinese effort. Therefore, while the Sino-Soviet split continues, Japan is trying indirectly to reinforce the Soviet position in Asia. Also the continued American presence in Okinawa, which represents a rear echelon for a possible Korean front, is in the interest of Japanese security. By its economic and technical aid to underdeveloped nations in Asia, Japan can contribute importantly to the stability of their governments and thus make them more resistant to Red Chinese "political aggression." In the long run however Japan must develop a program of peaceful coexistence with its most important neighbor, Communist China.

174
Krusche, Heinz. THE STRIVING OF THE KIESINGER-STRAUSS GOVERNMENT FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS A THREAT TO EUROPEAN SECURITY. German foreign policy, v. 6, no. 2, 1967: 152-160.
P&GP RR

The growing support of the Warsaw Pact nations for measures that will strengthen European peace and security presents a sharp contrast to the strivings of the "aggressive forces of imperialism" to perpetuate tensions in Europe, to continue the arms race, and to revise existing frontiers in Europe. The German Democratic Republic supports the renunciation of nuclear weapons by both German states and the creation of nuclear-free zones. On the other hand, the Kiesinger-Strauss government seeks to participate in the planning and use of nuclear weapons through the McNamara Committee, the nuclear committee of NATO, and eventually to gain access to the weapons themselves. It is dead set against a relaxation of tensions, continues to seek "a special influence on the decision for the release of atomic weapons," wants a greater voice in the formulation of NATO nuclear policy, and is unwilling to relinquish its demand for the "physical co-ownership" of nuclear weapons. By its demand for nuclear weapons through NATO or some "supranational but merely European concoction" the West German Government has placed itself squarely against the conclusion of a nonproliferation treaty, despite its statements to the contrary. The Socialist states will not tolerate such a flagrant violation of the will of the majority of nations. In recent years the West German government has systematically pursued its research aimed at the production of nuclear weapons. According to a study by the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, West Germany could now manufacture 186 Nagasaki-size bombs per year if it employed the reactors at its disposal for the production of plutonium. West German nuclear ambitions threaten peace and security in Europe and are clearly the main source of tension in the area.

175
Kruzhin, Petr. NEW APPOINTMENTS IN THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES. In Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., Munich. Bulletin, v. 14, July 1967: 35-44.
DK266.A2I52, v. 14

Analysis of the changes in the top command of the Soviet Army and Navy after Khrushchev's ouster. The author believes these changes constitute a rejuvenation of the command structure but are not "of a revolutionary nature." The article lists changes made within each service.

176
Kux, Ernst. SOVIET ANTI-MISSILES. Swiss review of world affairs, v. 17, June, 1967: 4-6.
D839.S9, v. 17
"Written for the Neue Zürcher Zeitung."
Newsp

The Soviet Union has installed operative antiballistic missiles [ABM's] around Leningrad (the two-stage antimissile "Griffon") and around Moscow (the multi-stage "Golosh"). This Soviet action could accelerate the arms race and change the strategic balance of power. The erection of an ABM defense system is based on a new Soviet strategy, which is following the American example in turning from "total deterrence" to more "flexible reactions." Since Khrushchev's ouster, Soviet strategy has begun to take into account limited and local conflicts as well as global war. The Soviet Union's strategic missile forces remain the backbone of the Army. The Soviet Navy has a fleet of nuclear submarines, and the Air Force has long-range bombers equipped with nuclear missiles; but Soviet land forces and the armies of the Warsaw Pact members have also been modernized. A controversy has arisen among the Soviet leaders over the effectiveness of their missile defense system. The official line is cautious: the Soviet air defense is capable of destroying all attacking aircraft and most missiles, but only certain areas can be protected against missile attack. The cool Soviet response to President Johnson's proposals in January for a moratorium on antimissiles is connected with the controversy among the Soviet military; Moscow demands that offense missiles, in which the United States still leads, be included in an ABM moratorium. Today medium-range Chinese missiles can reach the interior of Central Asia and Eastern Siberia. So when the Soviets justify their ABM program by saying that only antimissiles can protect against an aggressive enemy, they seem to have China in mind rather than the United States.

177
JSP REGRETS OVER CHINESE NUCLEAR TEST. Japan Socialist review, no. 135, July 1, 1967: 6-7.
HX9.J3, 1967

Statement issued by the Japanese Socialist Party on the occasion of Communist China's first successful hydrogen bomb experiment, June 17, 1967. The party expresses regret over the Chinese test, but recognizes that U.S. aggression in Vietnam and its containment policy against China are partly responsible for the Chinese decision.

178
Lang, William W. CAN SWEDEN DEFEND HERSELF? In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 93, Sept. 1967: 47-57. illus.
VI.U8, v. 93

Examines Sweden's defense posture and proposes several alternative uses of available military strength. A Swedish force de frappe is inconceivable; it is at variance with the nation's foreign policy and counter to the humanitarian interests of the Swedish people. Tactical nuclear weapons, higher levels of conventional armament, or unilateral disarmament are inimical not only to the nature of the Swedish people but to logical defense requirements. It appears likely

that the present level of preparedness (which involves 5 percent of Sweden's GNP) will be continued. Sweden's present defense posture has been effective enough to deter any potential aggressor and it has made the "level of attack" as high as it can be made with conventional weapons. Referring to a public opinion poll concerning Swedish resistance to outside aggression, Lang concludes that because it has never been occupied and because of its high standard of living, Swedes are doubtful about armed resistance against a threat of nuclear attack.

179
Lanz, U. [THE ARMAMENTS INDUSTRIES OF EUROPE'S NEUTRAL STATES. PT. 8. SWISS FEDERAL WEAPONS PLANTS] Die Rüstungsindustrien der neutralen Staaten Europas. pt. 8. Die eidgenössischen Militarwerkstätten. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 5, July/Aug. 1967: 329-336. illus. P&GP RR

Reports on Swiss Federal weapons plants, "die eidgenössischen Militärwerkstätten" [M+W]. Lanz outlines the history and present state of all six M+W's: construction workshops in Thun; ammunition plants, one in Thun and the other in Altdorf; an arms factory in Bern; and an aircraft factory in Emmen. These establishments are subordinated to the Chief of the Federal Military Department, the Defense Minister, through the War Technical Division which is responsible for the procurement of all "armaments material" for the Swiss Armed Forces. In all their other relations and their business administration the M+W's operate as private enterprises and are in principle financially independent. However, they may not make a profit on Swiss governmental contracts.

180
Leeb, Anton. [DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL MILITARY DEFENSE CONCEPT IN AUSTRIA] Über die Entwicklung des Konzeptes der militärischen Landesverteidigung in Österreich. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 5, May/June 1967: 257-259. P&GP RR

Since 1955 Austria's national defense concept has gone through four phases. The first phase (1955-56) was marked by establishment of the nation's border defense measures, including border troops. In the second phase (1957-62) emergency forces were created to raise the price an aggressor would have to pay for attacking the country. This policy put a higher premium on speed and mobility than on extended defense action. In the third phase (1963-65) a number of measures were undertaken to improve extended action and thus make the aggressor pay a still higher price for his attack. A number of measures are still to be taken to achieve the goals set, among them the modernization of arms and improvement of the armored service. The emphasis in the fourth phase (1956-67) is on further development of the nation's air defense to protect its neutrality.

181
London. Institute for Strategic Studies. THE GROWTH OF STRATEGIC STUDIES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES. London, 1966. 18 p. (Its Adelphi papers, no. 31) U162.A3, no. 31

Surveys institutions throughout the world that are doing research in the field of strategic problems. The listing is restricted to programs initiated or books published from the beginning of 1964 to the fall of 1966 and supplements Adelphi paper no. 7, published in December 1963.

182
MacDonald, Scot. STRIKE'S ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO MID-EAST, AFRICA. Armed Forces management, v. 13, Aug. 1967: 34-35, 74, 76. illus. UB153.A65, v. 13

The United States Strike Command [STRICOM], organized in 1958, was the result of a shift in emphasis from strategic air forces and massive retaliation to tactical air forces and conventional warfare. The direction that founded STRICOM stipulated that it would be based within the continental United States. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in December 1963, decided to assign the STRIKE commander [CINCSTRIKE] a "second hat"--that of Commander in Chief, Middle East-Southern Asia and Africa South of the Sahara [CINCMEAFSA]. His STRIKE and MEAESA responsibilities do not present any inconsistencies or complications. In fact "the requirement to have plans for this area and the ability to have forces available, supervise their training and readiness, are entirely consistent." The unified command plan requires CINCSTRIKE to maintain readiness to deploy an appropriate subheadquarters overseas, which requires two 72-man joint task forces [JTF's] within the STRIKE command staff. To insure rapid response and combat readiness the two JTF's deploy troops in training exercises every two months. These exercises frequently uncover joint doctrinal requirements and unresolved problems. STRIKE is a key link in the unified command structure and is able to "reenforce the other unified commands on short notice to meet overseas emergencies."

183
MacDougall, Colina. THE VIEW FROM PEKING. Far Eastern economic review, v. 56, June 29, 1967: 707-710. HC411.F18, v. 56

The precise timing of the Chinese hydrogen bomb experiment to coincide with the U.N. emergency session on the Middle East crisis could imply a single policymaking body in Peking in control of both the nuclear program and foreign affairs. However, Sinkiang, where the nuclear test site is located, is under the control of General Wang En-mao (an outspoken critic of Mao's policies), indicating the possibility of that faction's control of the nuclear facility. The decision to develop the bomb in spite of the economic sacrifice required indicates a switch in Chinese policy from "the make-friends and influence people attitude" to "expanding power to impress people into toeing the Chinese line." On the other hand the Chinese are careful not to get directly involved; in Vietnam they "simply stand on the sidelines and shout encouragement to Hanoi." Chinese foreign policy has changed little in the last 2 years, as high-level officials become more preoccupied with their own survival than with new policy initiatives. The rough treatment that foreign diplomats are experiencing at the hands of the Red Guards reflects the political insecurity of the Chinese foreign ministry. Harassment of diplomats and other foreigners is a foreign policy tool, a means of showing disapproval in a manner that will receive worldwide headlines and show the man in the street that his government is really taking action. The "inertia and sporadic adventurism" which typifies current Chinese policy is the product of a nation riven by internal dis-

pute. The Chinese hard line will continue with decreasing rationality as the internal structure weakens. The outcome of this internal struggle will determine future Chinese foreign policy.

184
McKinney, John B. RED PAPER TIGER. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 47, Oct. 1967: 3-10.
Z6723.U35, v. 47

Will China become a major power in the next decade? Politically the Communist regime is firmly in power. China's population will undoubtedly continue to grow, and even mechanization of agriculture will not produce enough food for the number of people expected in the next 15 years. Since China must spend its limited foreign exchange on food and related items, it is unable to industrialize as fast as it hoped. Better relations with the Soviet Union and United States might permit China to obtain credit on the industrial equipment that it needs. The nation has ample natural resources and adequate technology but lacks the transportation facilities and capital needed for industrial growth. Chinese leaders realize their entire economic base is extremely vulnerable to air attacks and are careful to follow a prudent course in strategic actions in contrast to their belligerent propaganda. For Peking to allocate additional funds to maximize its military threat would be unwise, for its economy is too weak to support the effort, and its defense expenditures could be only a fraction of the amounts spent by the Great Powers. Great Power status through industrialization is likewise infeasible, for China lacks two qualities it needs to become a modestly self-perpetuating economy: capital and sound economic guidance. Chinese leaders have tried to expand industrial output too rapidly, have failed to obtain foreign capital or devise an adequate system of incentives, and their economic policies lack flexibility. The People's Liberation Army is not a threat to the superpowers, but its enormous conventional force is a continuing threat to nations on its rimland. Nonetheless, for the remainder of this century China will not attain sufficient economic, technological, or military progress to be categorized a Great Power.

185
MacMillan, Norman. [. . . WILSON MAKES USE OF A RED PENCIL] . . . Wilson setzt den Rotstift an. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Sept. 1, 1967: 446-447.
U3.W38, v. 11

Discusses the impact of British defense cutbacks on the nation's defense industry, especially on development and production of air and naval weapons systems. MacMillan also considers the effect of the cutbacks on the nation's land, air and naval forces.

186
McNamara, Robert S. MCNAMARA EXPLAINS "LIMITED" MISSILE DEFENSE FOR U.S. U.S. news & world report, v. 63, Oct. 2, 1967: 106-111.
JK1.U65, v. 63

"Full text of an address by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara before the United Press International editors and publishers in San Francisco, Calif., Sept. 18, 1967."

A discussion by the U.S. Defense Secretary of the reasons behind the recent decision to deploy a "thin" antiballistic missile [ABM] system. McNamara defines "first-strike capability" as the ability to substantially eliminate the retaliatory forces of the attacked nation, and asserts that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union possess first-strike capabilities so defined. The reason, he goes on to explain, is each nation's assured destruction power, the keystone of deterrence. Moreover the United States has no intention of allowing the Soviets to gain first-strike superiority over it, even if a nuclear arms race is the result. At this juncture deploying a light ABM system will suffice, for it is the correct response to the moderate Soviet ABM and will not prod Moscow into a further buildup of its offensive forces. On the other hand, if the Soviets expand their ABM system the United States can easily respond in kind, maintaining the deterrent balance. In McNamara's view the light ABM system will also be useful against a potential Chinese threat. He makes quite clear the American opposition to nuclear proliferation and points out the psychological and strategic hazards involved in ABM defense.

187
Martin, Laurence. MCNAMARA DROPS THE OTHER SHOE. Spectator, v. 219, Sept. 29, 1967: 353-354.
AP4.S7, v. 219

U.S. deployment of a "thin" antiballistic missile [ABM] system could disturb Soviet-American relations by introducing appealing byproducts such as defenses against Soviet missiles and a NATO ABM system. European hostility to American ABM's stems from their destabilizing nature--they cloud calculations of mutual strength and accelerate the arms race. However, their most destabilizing effect is that their development will require atmospheric testing and thus violation of the test ban treaty. Atmospheric testing would be regrettable for public health reasons and detrimental to the cause of disarmament. Resistance against atmospheric testing remains strong, but pressure to resume testing from those who produce nuclear weapons is increasing. American ABM deployment has implications for Europe. Despite the preponderance of Russian missile power against Europe, American experts believe that a European ABM system would be worthwhile. An American ABM system should not discourage proponents of a European nuclear force. Should Russia neutralize a European ABM by adopting other means of attack, Europeans could "exploit the wide range of delivery systems other than missiles to which the advent of ABM will now direct attention" and create an offensive penetration force of its own.

188
Martin, Paul. NATO'S VALUE TO CANADA. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 5, summer 1967: 177-185.
D839.A85, v. 5

"A summary of testimony before the Committee on External Relations of the Canadian Senate, March 15, 1967."

Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin describes the benefits derived from NATO, summarizes the consequences of a withdrawal of troops and, in answer to questions, discusses Canadian policies relating to the Atlantic Community. (Abstract supplied)

189
Mendl, Wolf. FRENCH ATTITUDES ON DISARMAMENT. Disarmament, no. 14, June 1967: 13-17.
JX1981.P7D5, 1967

Three broad but overlapping phases of French disarmament policy since 1945 are evident. During the first, which lasted until 1957, France sought to assert its role as a major power by acting as intermediary between the United States and the Soviet Union. It also set two conditions for participation in any disarmament agreement: The agreement must not discriminate between one group of powers and another, and it must mark a step toward universal disarmament. French emphasis on the first condition, equal treatment for all powers, became much more explicit during the second phase of its disarmament policy, from 1957 until 1962. The fear that the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union might make a deal at the expense of France and other nonnuclear powers dominated its strategic thinking, causing France to oppose all arms control measures that might limit its own nuclear weapons development and not also that of other powers. The third phase in French policy began in 1962 with the nation's refusal to participate in the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference. However its withdrawal from active participation in negotiations does not indicate an absence of any policy. France opposes the dissemination of nuclear weapons, but in the light of its own position it cannot condemn the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state's own efforts. Therefore it contends that existing nuclear powers must negotiate an agreement over arms reduction as a first step toward disarmament. De Gaulle's demise will not bring unilateral French renunciation of its nuclear force as many observers hope, but French leaders may use the force as a bargaining device to ensure French security in Europe and to seek some form of European integration. Once it has completed its testing of thermonuclear devices France may be more willing to sign the nuclear test ban treaty and to negotiate limited arms control measures. French disarmament policy will continue to reflect its dual purpose: to restore France's status among the powers of the world as a member of the nuclear club, and to ensure national security by emphasizing nondissemination, with a special eye toward West Germany.

190
THE MILITARY MINILOOK [editorial] Swiss review of world affairs, v. 17, June, 1967: 1-2.
D839. S9, v. 17

The decision to withdraw 35,000 American and 6,000 British troops from Europe in 1968 has cast doubts upon NATO's new doctrine of "flexible response." Belgian and Canadian contingents in Germany will also be reduced, and there is talk of rearmament or reorganization of the Bundeswehr. The American withdrawal is described as "rotation" or "redeployment"; the units will remain assigned to NATO and in a crisis can be rapidly moved across the Atlantic. Technically this movement is possible, but its political feasibility is questionable. The continuous presence of troops at an assigned location has an automatic effect, but their dispatch to a critical center must wait for a decision and involves many elements of uncertainty. The argument for rotation is based on the supposition that there will be no surprise attack, and NATO's Ministers of Defense believe there is no immediate threat. The reduction of troops will weaken the defense of Western Europe, and it is doubtful that a flexible response will then be possible. But while the West plans to reduce its troops the Soviets have made no similar gestures. If this one-sided reduction were to disturb the East-West power balance, political problems would arise in Germany sooner or later. The United States defended and protected Europe for over 20 years; Europe developed and flourished without assuming a proportionate share of the U. S. efforts. The European reaction to the American withdrawal is a reduction of its own, the consequences of which cannot be forseen in the Atlantic alliance.

191
Nambiar, K. R. CHINESE TACTICS AND STRATEGY. In United Service Institution of India. Journal, v. 97, Jan./Mar. 1967: 30-39. Ul. U5, v. 97

China's present population is around 700 million and is likely to double in the next 25 years. Through the ages successive Chinese regimes have embarked on aggression; the streak of expansionism is in the Chinese blood. A familiar pattern of action is now emerging--pleas for lebensraum, propaganda and provocation, and then aggression. Prompt and effective countermeasures are essential to contain China's large and well-trained army. The Chinese have a penchant for protracted warfare because of their immense manpower resources, the size of their country, and their national traits of perseverance and stoicism. Mao Tse-tung's ten commandments of warfare outline this strategy. India's first line of defense against China is the Himalayas; troops must therefore be trained and equipped for mountain warfare. Adequate air and naval strength, good weapons, and a thorough study of Chinese strategy are also necessary. It is difficult to visualize how India can counter the Chinese nuclear threat without its own nuclear weapons unless the superpowers guarantee its nuclear defense, which seems unlikely. Economic and political stability are also important aspects of security. A vigilant watch must be kept for subversive factions, "and their nefarious activities nipped in the bud." Asian developments such as the Sino-Soviet rift, the Vietnamese War, the emergence of Japan, and the shifting balance of power in the area will have profound influence on Sino-Indian relations. Those who advocate greater defense at the expense of economic development fail to realize the importance of economic stability and strength to war potential. China cannot be checked by military might alone; it will take the unity and vitality of the Indian people.

192
NIKE-X CONTRACTS EXPECTED BY EARLY 1968. Aviation week & space technology, v. 87, Sept. 25, 1967: 16-18. illus. TL501. A8, v. 87

Although he remains opposed to U.S. deployment of an antiballistic missile [ABM] system against the Soviet Union, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara has approved deployment of a light ABM system against China. Contracts will be awarded within 6 months for the $5 billion Model 167 Nike-X ABM system, which should be operational by 1972-73 to counter the marginal Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile capacity expected by the mid-1970's. Based on the intercept capabilities of the Spartan long-range and the Sprint short-range missiles together with two guidance radars (missile site radar and perimeter acquisition radar), the Model 167 system will probably include about 18 missile sites to protect present offensive missile sites plus approximately 6 perimeter acquisition radars. McNamara warns against following up Model 167 with Model 267, the $40 billion anti-Soviet ABM model advocated by the Army, since it would only accelerate the arms race and could not provide an adequate shield against Soviet attack. Instead, he stresses the deterrent

value of strong offensive weapon capabilities and emphasizes that the less sophisticated ABM system would be effective against a Chinese attack and would assure Asians of U.S. aid against nuclear blackmail by China. It would also defend the offensive missile force against Soviet attack and give added protection to the population against an accidental launch of a nuclear weapon.

193
NIKE-X DEPLOYMENT REMAINS EXPLOSIVE. Armed Forces management, v. 13, Apr. 1967: 66-67.
UB153.A75, v. 13

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara told a joint session of Congress' Armed Service Committees that the Pentagon did not endorse the immediate deployment of the U.S. Nike-X antiballistic missile [ABM] system. A Nike-X system designed to protect U.S. cities against Soviet attack could cost as much as $40 billion over a 10-year period and still not substantially reduce the damage from an attack. Technological developments in offensive weapons and improvements in Soviet strategic offensive forces could seriously degrade the effectiveness of the system. Since the time it would take for the Communist Chinese to develop a significant missile force is greater than that needed by the United States to establish a defense, it is not necessary to begin developing an anti-Chinese ABM system at this time. However, McNamara concludes that it would be worthwhile to include $440 million in the FY 1968 budget for testing and evaluating the Nike-X system, which utilizes four basic radars and two missiles. He proposed that approximately $375 million be included in the budget to enable the administration to reconsider deployment of at least a light ABM system to protect U.S. offensive weapons in case U.S.-Russian negotiations to limit deployment of the ABM prove unsuccessful. He also requested $111 million to continue the civil defense program.

194
Niu, Sien-chong. THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE PACIFIC. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 12, Aug./Sept. 1967: 41, 43-44.
UA646.F5, v. 12

Because a major world power confrontation may be in store for the Pacific area, this vast, island-dotted body of water has high strategic value for the West. Fortunately for the United States all of the strategic island groups except the Kuriles and the Indonesian archipelago are controlled by Washington or its allies; these islands thus comprise a far-flung American strategic network. Above the equator three major lines of defense exist--the central, northern, and western. South of the equator the American position seems even stronger, but only because at present there is no strong, hostile power in that area. Recognizing the strategic importance of its island Gibraltars in the Pacific, the United States should utilize them to maximum advantage by supporting a forward strategy, pushing its defense lines to their westward limits. Strategic planners must not put all their eggs in the nuclear-deterrence basket and thereby forget the importance of seapower, supported by U.S. Pacific bases. If deterrence fails, these island outposts will provide essential logistic support to retaliatory forces. Moreover, in limited war Pacific bases provide the wherewithal for the rapid action that helps avoid escalation. The Pacific bases also demonstrate the American determination to stay in the Asian area.

195
Perret-Gentil, Jacques. [SOVIET BLOC FORCES] Les forces du bloc Soviétique. Swiss military review, v. 112, July 1967: 291-303.
U2.R5, v. 112

Gives a statistical account of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and its satellite countries. According to Perret-Gentil, Russia's military strength is formidable but it does not compare to that of the United States. The Eastern bloc countries have a total of 7.5 million men compared to 8.5 million for the West. The author notes that from Europe's point of view Russia has a tremendous offensive posture. He also discusses the creation of the Warsaw Pact and the political fragmentation that is beginning to weaken it.

196
Piétrasik, Jérôme. [THE ATOMIC PISTOL] Le colt atomique. Nouvel observateur, no. 147, Sept. 4-10, 1967: 22-23, illus. AP20.O2, 1967

Secretary of Defense McNamara has decided to deploy a "thin" antiballistic missile [ABM] system against a potential Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM] attack, despite his conviction that America's strategic offensive capabilities are a sufficient deterrent. The Secretary would prefer to develop a multiple-warhead missile capable of altering its trajectory and dispersing decoys to confuse enemy defenses and maximize assured destruction. McNamara believes that in a war between the United States and the Soviet Union between 120 and 150 million Americans would die; yet even a full ABM system would only reduce this figure to 60 million. Because the United States cannot have both a perfect defensive and offensive posture--the cost is too high--it must decide which system it will develop fully. The perfection of a strategic offensive capability will maintain the "balance of terror" while even a "thick" ABM system, incapable of protecting 100 percent of the population, would destroy it.

197
THE POLITICS OF ALLIGATOR, from a correspondent. West Africa, no. 2626, Sept. 30, 1967: 1259.
DT491.W4, 1967

Some 8,000 members of the French Armed Forces cooperated with 1,500 Ivory Coast troops in a military exercise called Operation Alligator III, which involved a theoretical invasion of the Ivory Coast. The exercise was intended to test the effectiveness of French military assistance called for by the 1961 defense agreement between France and the Ivory Coast. Although some observers questioned the suitability of the equipment and forces deployed by the French in the maneuver, it was generally recognized that any type of intervention by the French against the small African armies would be decisive. However, most African countries with which France has defense agreements do not doubt the effectiveness of French intervention but question whether or not France would intervene at all. Operation Alligator indicated that France would at least come to the assistance of the Ivory Coast.

198
Possony, Stefan T. THE CHINESE H-BOMB. In American Security Council. Washington report, July 10, 1967: 1-4. P&GP RR

Pentagon officials assure the Nation that the Chinese will not acquire intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM's] for at least 8 years. However the Chinese threat to the U.S. mainland is only part of the danger. Within months the Chinese could have the capability to deliver nuclear weapons, using Soviet bombers or their soon-to-be-acquired medium-range ballistic missiles [MRBM's], which are capable of hitting targets within 1500-mile range, including Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. Of all the nations, China has least to fear from nuclear war, since a loss of even 200 million people would leave a sizable population. Chinese leaders have openly stated that it does not matter how many lives are expended provided capitalism and imperialism are destroyed. Antiballistic missile [ABM] systems could cut population losses drastically, but Defense Secretary McNamara has refused to deploy them. McNamara hopes to persuade the Soviet Union to discontinue its ABM program, but the Russians are unlikely to "grant U.S. or Chinese missiles a free ride to the USSR." The Soviet missile force is growing faster than anticipated, yet U.S. policy remains unchanged. As always, this strategy of "too little and too late" will end in failure.

199
Powell, Craig. THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES: PEACE-KEEPER OF THE SEVENTIES? Armed forces management, v. 13, June 1967: 35-38. illus.
UB153.A65, v. 13

The Canadian Armed Forced [CAF] are taking on a new image. Prime objectives of the new program include unification of the services, logistic flexibility, and the creation of a highly mobile force to ensure fulfillment of Canadian military commitments to the Western alliances and to the peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations. The Canadian Defense Ministry has launched a $1.5 billion, 5-year reequipment program that debunks speculation that Canada may convert its forces into a peacekeeping organization lacking capability beyond U.N. peacekeeping missions. In its future role the CAF will be qualified to carry out both peacekeeping operations and its responsibilities to NATO and North American Air Defense Command [NORAD]--a double commitment which will include cooperation with the United States in the defense of the North American Continent. The nature and scope of these commitments has not been determined, and some of the equipment now consigned to support of NATO and NORAD is not compatible with peacekeeping functions. However Canadian support of NORAD involves commitment of resources badly needed elsewhere. Notwithstanding these limitations Canada will be able to make a definitive contribution to world order.

200
Rietzler, Siegbert. [THE SWISS FORTRESS SYSTEM] Das Schweizer Festungswesen. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 5, July/Aug. 1967: 336-338. map. P&GP RR

Outlines the history and present status of the military stronghold system in Switzerland. The country is divided into four stronghold areas, each defended by an Army Corps. The present fortifications are based primarily on a structure established during World War II. The troops manning the strongholds are taken from the infantry, artillery, and Air Force, and the communications and engineer services.

201
Rousset, David. NUCLEAR TRIUMPH: HOW CHINA DID IT. Atlas, v. 14, Sept. 1967: 32-33.
AP1.A83, v. 14
"Translated from Le Nouveau Candide, Paris."
P&GP RR

The most amazing feat in China's H-bomb development was not the solution of theoretical problems--China has over 700 Ph. D. scientists who were educated in Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union--but the technical triumphs achieved while China was undergoing an economic depression. Both the mobilization of skilled workers to manufacture the bomb and an increase of the military budget to $6.8 billion contributed to a permanent lag in the Chinese economy. Yet even possible civil war and a "cultural revolution" did not arrest H-bomb production. Scientists working on the project were encapsulated in the Sinkiang Autonomous Region, where they would be unaffected by prevailing civil disorder and intellectual repression. This neutral territory was created by an understanding between the warring factions within the Communist Party, which agreed at least on the need for a nuclear force. The Chinese H-bomb is causing anxiety among the Great Powers. Russia can hope for an internal revolution that would assuage Sino-Soviet relations, while the United States appears to have but one alternative, preventive war. One fact is certain: settlement of the Chinese question is indissolubly linked to the Vietnamese War.

202
Saltzman, Stephen J. TOMORROW'S STRATEGY--OUT OF THE JUNGLES AND INTO THE LAB. Air Force and space digest, v. 50, Aug. 1967: 32-37.
UG633.A65, v. 50

Tomorrow's strategy must ensure U.S. capability to defeat communism and maintain technological superiority, national security, and world stability. The introduction of radically new weapons to affect climate or human reproductive processes and nervous systems would support a strategy that could be used psychologically or politically, as well as militarily. A new strategy might continue foreign aid on a selective basis and maintain a nuclear retaliatory capability. The Soviet Union and Communist China have been building up their technological and strategic capabilities while the United States is investing its time and money in the Vietnamese War. The United States must choose between regaining the lead in the technology race and continuing a war in a country that cannot maintain a stable government.

203
Scharndorff, Werner. [MOSCOW FORCES ANTIROCKET DEFENSE] Moskau forciert Raketenabwehr. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 5, May/June 1967: 214-215. P&GP RR

Argues that the U.S. proposals to the Soviet Union for mutual renunciation of antiballistic missile defense [ABM] systems were made at least 1 year too late. The Soviet Union is now too far advanced in its deployment of an ABM system to give American proposals any serious consideration. Because of its totalitarian system it was able to build a reliable civil defense system in its population and industrial centers before the United States.

204
Scharndorff, Werner. [SOVIET STRATEGY IN TRANSITION] Sowjetische Militärdoktrin im Wandel. Politische Studien, v. 18, Sept./Oct. 1967: 555-560.
H35.P66, v. 18

The single dominant characteristic of Soviet military strategy under Khrushchev was the preponderant role it assigned to long-range rockets with nuclear warheads. This strategy called for a massive blow against enemy administration, population, and industrial centers at the very onset of the war. It held that any limited war between the nuclear powers would in no time escalate into a global nuclear war. Members of the Soviet military establishment undoubtedly differed as to the soundness of Khrushchev's strategy. Periodical changes in the Soviet military leadership under Khrushchev and his followers indicate the modifications and about-faces of the official Soviet line on that matter. In March 1963 the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal M. V. Sakharov, was replaced by Marshal S. S. Biriusov, the commanding officer of the Rocket Forces. With Khrushchev's downfall in October 1964 Marshal Sakharov returned as Chief of the General Staff. But the formulation of a new Soviet strategy was checked in 1966 by the United States decision not to build an antiballistic missile defense system. For Moscow that decision automatically upgraded the role of the Soviet "Strategic Rocket Forces." Their commanding officer, Marshal N. I. Krylov, Biriusov's successor, then became the First Deputy Minister of Defense. The recent death of the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal R. IA. Malinovskii, caused a shift in the top Soviet military positions. The most responsible posts went to specialists in the conduct of conventional war. Marshal A. A. Grechko became Minister of Defense, and Gen. S. L. Sokolov the First Deputy Minister of Defense, replacing "Rocket Forces Commander" Krylov. The present leadership wants a uniform development of all services so that, whenever possible, the Soviet Armed Forces will be able to conduct war successfully without resorting to nuclear weapons.

205
Sherman, Michael E. A SINGLE SERVICE FOR CANADA? London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967. 14 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 39)
P&GP RR

Canada's adoption of a radical three-phase military reorganization plan has aroused a good deal of controversy at home and abroad. In phase one, parallel support functions for all three military services were consolidated under a single executive authority as recommended in the Glassco Report issued by the Royal Commission on Government Organization. In phase two the command functions held by the individual Chiefs of Staff were integrated under a single Chief of Defense responsible to the Minister of National Defense. With the bases of the three services already undermined by the first two stages of reorganization, the services were abolished as legal entities and a single armed service for Canada was established in 1967. The integration of support and command functions has resulted in some overhead savings, but not enough to substantially increase the percentage of the defense budget expended on capital equipment. Although consolidation has apparently increased administrative efficiency, it may have jeopardized strong civilian control of the military by reducing to one man the formal military channels to the Defense Minister. From an analysis of Canada's military roles, the final change to the one-service organization did not appear to be necessary--particularly in light of the ill feelings it generated. Few features of Canada's defense reorganization could be applied to other nations since most nations don't enjoy the special circumstances such as a sense of security from attack, the relatively small size of the Armed Forces, and the absence of difficult domestic political obstacles to reorganization efforts that created the favorable atmosphere for the military organizational experiment in Canada.

206
Snyder, Glenn H. STOCKPILING STRATEGIC MATERIALS: POLITICS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE. San Francisco, Chandler [1966] 314 p.
HC110.D4S5

Partial contents.--The Stockpiling Act of 1946.--Organization and administration.--Stockpile acquisition, 1946-1950.--The establishment of stockpile objectives.--Stockpiling in partial mobilization, 1950-1953.--The Eisenhower stockpile program.--Recent history and current problems.--Summary and conclusions.--Stockpiles of strategic and critical materials, October 1964.--Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act.

Describes the development of stockpiling policy in terms of the conflicting and common interests of Government agencies, congressional committees, and private groups and their relative bargaining power at various periods of history. Snyder contends that the history of stockpiling policy reveals it is relatively isolated from developments in broad defense policy and strategic planning. However since 1961 stockpiling strategy has become more compatible with both the nuclear and the conventional aspects of military policy.

207
Sokolov, V. [THE MAN AND THE ROCKET] Chelovek i raketa. Voennye znaniia, no. 8, Aug. 1967: 47.
U4.V874, 1967

Reviews publications on various topics, including postwar revolutionized military affairs, development of the Strategic Rocket Forces and nuclear-powered fleet ballistic missile submarines, the operational and tactical nuclear weapons of the ground forces and Navy, the improved tank and artillery divisions, the Armed Forces' high maneuverability and ability to deliver swift nuclear blows, and the moral and psychological hardiness of the fighting man. The article, regardless of the variety of its themes, stresses the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces for modern war. It concludes that man is the decisive factor in combat; it is he who uses the crushing power of the weapons.

208
Taylor, Maxwell D. RESPONSIBILITY AND RESPONSE. New York, Harper & Row [1967] 84 p.
UA23.T32

"Based upon a series of lectures delivered by General Taylor at Lehigh University."

Drawing on Vietnam as an example of U.S. involvement and policy, discusses the problems of dealing with a multipolar world. The world has changed greatly since Washington was confronted with a monolithic Communist bloc, according to General Taylor, and the "War of Liberation" in Vietnam typifies the strategy of "troublemaking" nations, not all of which are Com-

285-218 O-68--4

munist. The weaker nations of the underdeveloped world are targets of nations such as the Soviet Union, Communist China, Cuba, and the United Arab Republic, and while the United States must be selective in choosing areas to defend, "we must take sides." General Taylor discusses the available alternatives in Vietnam and concludes that the United States follows the only viable one--pressing forward the limited goal of a cessation of Vietcong and North Vietnamese aggression in the south. From his experiences in Vietnam he has derived proposals for new or improved policymaking bodies to formulate and implement American policy--proposals that may enable the U.S. Government to cope more effectively with multipolarity.

209
Uezumi, Minoru. A VISION OF FOREIGN POLICY FOR ASIA. Japan Socialist review, no. 136, July 15, 1967: 16-25. HX9.J3, 1967

Describes steps the Japanese Government is taking to bring economic and political stability to surrounding nations when America withdraws from Vietnam. Uezumi discusses the trend toward regional self-reliance and Japan's place in an Asian bloc. He calls for Japan to take a resolute stand in favor of the peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam, grant loans for the construction of the public sector of the economy of non-Communist Asian nations, and maintain a strict policy of nonalinement and peace.

210
[U.S.A.: ABM CONTROVERSY] U.S.A.: controverse autour de l'ABM. Air & cosmos, no. 214, Sept. 30, 1967: 19, 48. P&GP RR

Among the United States reasons for deploying a "thin" ABM [antiballistic missile] system are its desire to reduce the risk of a Chinese attack, defend second-strike ICBM's (as opposed to cities), and ensure protection against accidental war launched by any other country. The effectiveness of this system will depend on the speed of U.S. radar detection and the sporadic distribution of launching sites. The political and military effects of ABM deployment could be far-reaching. It will probably increase the already existing gap between European and U.S. defenses and may also cause the United States to violate the 1963 test ban treaty if it required resumption of atmospheric testing. It could precipitate a new arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. With respect to the Atlantic alliance, Great Britain, for example, might become politically and militarily isolated as a result of U.S. ABM deployment. The ABM would reduce the chances for a nonproliferation treaty and destroy the possibility of future negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons. Canada has already demonstrated its opposition to the "thin" system by prohibiting any part of the ABM "Chinese-oriented" network on its soil.

211
Vernant, Jacques. [WASHINGTON AND ANTIMISSILE DEFENSES] Washington et les "anti-engins." Revue de défense nationale. v. 23, Nov. 1967: 1840-1845. D410.R45, v. 23

Evaluates Secretary of Defense McNamara's reasons for deploying a U.S. antiballistic missile [ABM] system. Vernant notes that the accusation of irrationality in government can not be restricted to the Chinese. It is a device that is being used by advocates of a "thick" ABM to enlarge the "thin" system. Since the ABM will protect missile sites, presumably to guard against a Russian attack, Vernant believes that the ABM's credibility against a Chinese attack, which according to their strategy would be based on attacking or holding hostage American cities, is in doubt. ABM deployment could affect U.S. policy in the Far East by ensuring protection to those countries that would otherwise be subjected to Chinese nuclear blackmail. Vernant concludes that deployment of the ABM will either cause the United States to escalate the war in Vietnam or open negotiations on Vietnam and make peace.

212
Wagner Joe H. NATO FACES GERMAN DEFENSE CUTBACK. Armed Forces management, v. 13, Aug. 1967: 39, 44, 47. chart. UB153.A65, v. 13

West Germany has economized on Federal spending for defense to the tune of $2.34 billion. Among the reasons for the fiscal straightjacket are a decline in German economic growth beginning in mid-1965, a chronic shortage of manpower for the armed forces, and the inflexibility of the defense budget because of a myriad of statuatory obligations. The cutback will affect the Bundeswehr most and the German Navy least. The Army will have to try to reach the highest possible combat efficiency with the few funds available, while the Navy, which is small compared to other services, will still be able to procure modern equipment. If the political leaders of NATO do not exploit German defense development to promote a détente, "the erosion of western military strength in Europe will have hit a new low."

213
[. . . WHAT WAS IT TO PROVE!] . . . was zu beweisen war! Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Sept. 1, 1967: 474-475. U3.W38, v. 11

Assesses the effectiveness of Israeli air strategy in the latest Arab-Israeli war. The importance of efficient organization for successful air war is underlined.

214
WHERE WE STAND--THE GLOBAL AIR FORCE, CIRCA 1967. Air Force and space digest, v. 50, Sept. 1967: 132-134, 143-146. illus. UG633.A65, v. 50

Describes the versatility and widespread capabilities of the U.S. Air Force which make the United States the greatest aerospace power in the world. The Air Force's mixed strategic force of manned bombers and missiles constitutes a deterrent against general war by guaranteeing destruction to an aggressor. To meet its responsibilities at lower levels of conflict, the Air Force maintains tactical attack forces, counterinsurgency units, and airlift forces. By providing an early warning system, implementing civil defense plans, and protecting U.S. retaliatory forces, the Air Force also contributes significantly to the aerospace defense of North America.

215
Williams, Alan Lee. A STAKE EAST OF SUEZ. Socialist commentary, Sept. 1967: 17-19. HX3.S74, 1967

Britain's withdrawal from bases East of Suez need not diminish its capability to intervene in the area by sea and air. In light of Britain's economic weaknesses,

the real defense issue facing it is the total size of military expenditures and the proportion to be spent in Asia. Military commitments are expensive, particularly for a nation "living in reduced circumstances," and many find it frankly not worth the effort. However, the fact that Britain is not economically a Great Power does not mean it is not a power at all, or that it should retreat into a "fortress Britain" and abdicate its influence in the world. National requirements come before international commitments, but Asia is important to British security. Britain should join with its allies in formulating a Western strategy in the area based on the peculiar vulnerability of India, Australia, and New Zealand and on American involvements to counter Chinese efforts. Those who argue that Chinese expansionism cannot be contained because Mao's influence extends to Africa and Latin America as well as Asia should be reminded of erroneous arguments against containment of Soviet communism because it was not confined to Europe. The only nations that do not seek aggrandizement are those deterred from doing so by others. Of course guerrilla activities are more difficult to deal with than regular war, as the American experience in Vietnam shows, but this is no reason to abandon the task. By preserving a military stake in an area of the world whose nuclear potential is growing at a rapid pace, Britain maximizes its chances to play a crucial role in the power-backed diplomacy that will precede any genuine disarmament agreement. The East of Suez policy has paid off in the past in campaigns against Communist guerrillas and in enabling Britain to influence American strategy. It would be false economy now to leave such matters to the vagaries of American politics, which could turn that country to isolation or perhaps escalation into something much worse.

216
Wood, David. ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967. 24 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 34)
U162.A3, no. 34

Traces the development of collective security arrangements in Latin America from 19th-century efforts to the present Organization of American States. Wood presents an overall description of the Latin American military establishment and notes that since 1945 no Latin American nation has conducted overt military operations against any other, although a number of frontier disputes exist. He assesses the military strength of each nation in both manpower and equipment, and outlines its total defense expenditures in relation to gross national product, its armed forces in terms of total population, and its receipt of U.S. military assistance.

217
Wood, David. THE STATUS SEEKERS. Far Eastern economic review, v. 57, July 20, 1967: 161-162. illus.
HC411.F18, v. 57

Communist China's recent thermonuclear explosion is particularly significant in view of its confused political situation and the suspected control of Sinkiang--the Province in which the main testing grounds for Chinese nuclear and missile programs are located--by an anti-Maoist faction led by the local military commander. Either local politicians are prepared to compromise their political differences with the central government and support the critical defense effort, or the central government has made ideological concessions to local leaders to avoid disruption of the nuclear program. Also significant is China's decision to produce U-235 instead of embarking on a plutonium-based nuclear program, a decision that cost an estimated 1 billion U.S. dollars. China has made little progress, however, in the more traditional fields of military technology. Banking on the assumption that it would not be involved in a major military operation for some years, the nation has devoted perhaps half of its total defense budget to its nuclear program, virtually starving its armed forces of conventional equipment. However, although the initial investment is large, once a stockpile of fissionable material is accumulated the cost of producing a hydrogen bomb is relatively cheap. Furthermore, the decision to use guided missiles as a means of delivery instead of a strategic bomber force has eliminated a whole stage of military technology and procurement. The nuclear program has not so much diverted resources from the economy as it has held back the modernization of conventional armed forces. China holds membership in the "exclusive H-bomb club" and yet possesses one of the most poorly equipped military establishments in Asia. It may have medium-range missiles by 1970 and intercontinental missiles by 1975, but unless it expands its Navy sufficiently to test-fire its missiles over the sea and builds up an effective air defense, its military threat will not be significant. But if China's goal is, as it claims, to assert its diplomatic rather than military power, it may well have achieved it.

218
Zitzewitz, Horst von. [THE BUNDESWEHR IN THE YEAR 1970. THOUGHTS ABOUT CHANGES IN THE ORGANIZATION, ARMAMENTS, AND STRUCTURE OF THE GERMAN ARMY.] Die Bundeswehr Anno 1970. Gedanken zur Umgruppierung, Umrüstung und Umgliederung der deutschen Landstreitkräfte. Wehrkunde, v. 16, May 1967: 233-240.
U3.W396, v. 16

Criticism of Bonn's indecisiveness in modernizing the West German Army. Zitzewitz considers the present strength of the Army inadequate for an effective, large-scale defense action, and he postulates reorganization of various components of the Army, including those assigned to NATO.

D. CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

1. Biological

219
Bronshtein, I. E., E. M. Krisiuk, and A. N. Liberman. [DEPENDENCE OF THE MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE EXPOSURE ON THE INTENSITY OF X-RAY OR GAMMA-IRRADIATION] O zavisimosti predel'ne dopustimoi ekspozitsionnoi dozy ot energii rentgenovskogo ili γ-izlucheniia. Gigiena i sanitariia, no. 9, Sept. 1967: 47-50.
RA421.G5, 1967

This work is based on the previously experimentally determined correlation between the general biological effect on the body and that produced in certain critical organs with the average dose gamma- and X-rays. The authors' calculations allow determination of the maximum permissible doses of irradiation for the whole body, the crystalline lens, the skin and the male gonads. (Abstract supplied)

220
Doyle, A. W., R. Dennis, and D. B. Lull. NEW TECHNIQUES FOR DISSEMINATION OF CHEMICAL AGENTS. Bedford, Mass., GCA Corporation, 1966. 155 p. (GCA Corporation. Technical report 66-14-G)
Sci RR
AD 489404.
L. C. copy on microfiche.
United States Army, Physical Research Laboratory. DA-18-108-AMC-249(A).

Investigates "new techniques and concepts for the dissemination of solid and liquid chemical agents." Experimental work was conducted in the areas of explosive and ultrasonic dissemination.

221
Fischer, [illegible]. [EXPERIENCES OF GERMAN PATHOLOGISTS IN THE AREA OF MILITARY MEDICINE] Wehrmedizinische Erfahrungen deutscher Pathologen. Wehrmedizinische Monatsschrift, v. 11, Aug. 1967: 293-298.
P&GP RR
"From the Bundeswehr Academy of Health and Hygiene."

The evaluation of further data on the activities of pathologists in the 1939-1945 War brings out valuable facts which should command attention even today. Moreover, they show the importance of accurate pathologico-anatomical diagnosis for a review of the sequence of wounds and diseases. The analysis of the findings of 9228 postmortem examinations gives an important picture of the numerical breakdown of individual wounds and diseases. (Abstract supplied)

222
Gorizontov, P. D. "ARMOUR" AGAINST RADIATION [interview] Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 13, June 28, 1967: pt. 1, [item] 8, 1-4.
Slav Rm
Translated from Sovetskaia Rossiia, June 10, 1967.
Slav Rm

The long-term effects of radiation are not fully understood. Scientists have to know the source, intensity, and length of irradiation in order to determine its consequences. X-rays, gamma rays, neutron fluxes, etc., in large doses cause radiation sickness, and the extent of the sickness depends on the dose and the surface area affected. Long contact even with tiny radiation doses causes leukemia and malignant tumors in bones and lungs. The death rate among American radiologists and roentgenologists from leukemia is higher than that of other medical specialists. Traces of radiation remain in the organism of healed radiation cases for years and can erupt later and cause cancer, leukemia, and many other abnormalities. Despite the gloomy picture of the consequences of radiation sickness, there are hopeful signs in its prevention and treatment. Experiments on animals have shown that even simple therapy, such as a timely and proper use of antibiotics, vitamins, sedatives, or blood transfusions, raises the rate of survival by 40 to 50 percent. Experiments involving transplants of small portions of marrow or any other blood-forming organs increase that organ's resistance to even a deadly dose of radiation. The introduction of certain chemical substances prior to radiation offers some protection. Additional research is being done on new antiradiation preparations, and there is hope an effective one can be found soon.

223
A GOVERNMENT SURVEY OF ATOM-BOMB SURVIVORS. Japan quarterly, v. 14, July/Sept. 1967: 278-283.
DS801.J274, v. 14

In response to a 1964 resolution passed by the Diet on increasing aid to atom bomb survivors, the Japanese Government conducted a nationwide survey on the present status of the victims. Over 275,000 were questioned, most of them living in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The rate of employment of male survivors is slightly below the national average, and the percentage of women who are unmarried or separated is slightly higher. Both male and female survivors reported experiencing discrimination in getting married because they had been exposed to radiation. The 35-39 age group had twice as many survivors as any other group, evidence perhaps that individuals exposed to radiation in the strongest and healthiest years of their lives (16-20) managed to survive in greater numbers. In addition the ratio of elderly survivors is high, probably because they were a higher percentage of the population at the time of the bombing (the younger men were fighting in the war).

224
Gus'kova, A. K., and others. [WORKING CONDITIONS AND THE HEALTH OF EXPERIMENTAL NUCLEAR REACTOR PERSONNEL] Usloviia truda i sostoianie zdorov'ia rabotaiushchikh pri ekspluatatsii issledovatel'skikh iadernykh reaktorov. Gigiena i sanitariia, no. 9, Sept. 1967: 39-43.
RA421.G5, 1967

This paper describes the hygienic features of labour conditions at research nuclear reactors of various types. The main unfavorable occupational factors are external gamma and neutron radiation and the contamination of the environment with radioactive substances. The elaborated principles of planning protection and equipment provide safe working conditions. The various kinds of irradiation do not exceed maximum permissible levels. The state of health of persons working at reactors is satisfactory. No cases of chronic radiation sickness were registered. (Abstract supplied, modified)

225
Kurdiumov, N. "SILENT WEAPONS" ON CONVEYOR. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 13, May 12, 1967: pt. 1, [item] 2, 1.
Slav Rm

A long article by Seymour Hersh [published in the July issue of the New Republic and abstracted as no. 86 in this bibliography] gives a graphic picture of broad U.S. preparations for chemical and bacteriological warfare. "We preserve an active program of developing chemical and bacteriological weapons," U. S. Under Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance declared. This year the Pentagon spent $230 million on this program. It controls production of these "silent murderers" through six installations scattered throughout the country. One at Pine Bluff, Ark., is ready to begin mass production of bacteriological weapons while the Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland experiments on new agents using animals and people as guinea pigs. Storage facilities are located near Denver, Colo., and Newport, Ind. In addition, private research firms and universities aid this program. Despite President Roosevelt's 1943 declaration of non-use of chemical and bacteriological agents, the

United States has used them in Vietnam, thus violating that pledge and demonstrating its refusal to accede to the international convention against their use.

226
Scheel, H., J. Kunert, and H. Bose. [THE Sr^{90} CONTAMINATION OF SOIL AND PLANTS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC IN 1964 AND 1965] Die Kontamination von Böden und Pflanzen durch ^{90}Sr in den Jahren 1964 und 1965 auf dem Territorium der DDR. Kernenergie, v. 10, Aug. 1967: 255-258. QC770.K4, v. 10

Communication issued by the Staatliche Zentrale für Strahlenschutz der DDR [The State Main Office for Protection of the German Democratic Republic from Radiation]

In 1964 and 1965 the Sr^{90} contamination of soil was on the average 30 to 35 nCi/m^2. The determination of the Sr^{90} content of various plants and plant parts showed that the decrease of Sr^{90} contamination was not in accordance with the decrease of the Sr^{90} fallout. Whereas in 1965 the Sr^{90} fallout in the various periods was 18 to 24% of that in 1963, the Sr^{90} content of dried plant materials had only decreased to 40 to 87%. The decrease of the sunshine units was more pronounced (22 to 81%). Estimations showed that since 1963 the ratio of surface contamination to total contamination permanently decreased. Furthermore, the Sr^{90} retention during growth period was between 4 and 21% for the investigated plants. The uptake from soil was estimated to be 0.1% for potato tubers and about 1% for the other plants. (Abstract supplied)

227
Voelz, George L. NEW EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES FOR RADIATION EMERGENCIES. Archives of environmental health, v. 15, Sept. 1967: 298-304. RC963.H22, v. 15

Describes the National Reactor Testing Station's new equipment to "increase radiological emergency response capability." The improved facilities include a "routine thermoluminescent dosimeter for external dosimetry, a medical van which includes a whole body counter capable of performing rotational scans, and a medical emergency radiological decontamination center."

228
Wood, James W., and others. THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN EXPOSED IN UTERO TO THE ATOMIC BOMBS IN HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI. American journal of public health and the nation's health, v. 57, Aug. 1967: 1374-1380. tables. RA421.A41, v. 57

Discusses the results of a study of children now 17 years old who were exposed in utero to atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The examiners found the victims generally smaller than average, shorter, lighter, and with smaller head circumferences. The month of gestation at time of exposure did not vary these effects.

229
Wood James W., and others. MENTAL RETARDATION IN CHILDREN EXPOSED IN UTERO TO THE ATOMIC BOMBS IN HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI. American journal of public health and the nation's health, v. 57, Aug. 1967: 1381-1390. tables. RA421.A41, v. 57

Finds that 30 of the 1,613 subjects studied have gross mental retardation, that within 1,500 meters from the hypocenter of the explosion the prevalence of retardation was five times as high as within 1,500 to 1,999 meters, and that the most sensitive period was from the 6th to the 15th week of gestation.

2. Economic

230
Barnett, James W. WHAT PRICE CHINA'S BOMB? In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 47, Aug. 1967: 16-23. Z6723.U35, v. 47

Chinese leaders probably had very little knowledge of the magnitude of their undertaking when they decided to embark on a nuclear weapons development program, and many of them do not understand what its true costs have been even today. Labor and materials are only a small part of the total costs of such a program. Of far more significance are the benefits denied to the nation by diversion of a significant portion of the economy to an essentially nonproductive program. The Chinese nuclear program from 1957 through 1964 (the year of their first explosion) cost approximately 2.5 billion in U.S. dollars. The current annual cost is $470 million, excluding the costs of developing a nuclear delivery system and the detrimental effects of diversion of scarce resources from other uses. The price of the Chinese bomb equals that of 38 new chemical fertilizer plants, enough to produce all the fertilizer China needs to improve its agricultural production so that it could use its foreign exchange for the capital goods needed for industrial growth rather than for food. If the Chinese had invested $2.5 billion in steel production, they could have added 3.5 million tons to their annual quota, an increase of 25 percent over present capacity. Two and a half billion dollars could add 70 billion kilowatt-hours to China's annual production of electric power or 16.8 million tons per year to China's petroleum production. In paperboard mills it would provide the Chinese with approximately 41,500 tons per day, a level of production that would create an export potential of approximately $2.5 billion per year. Finally, if spent on transportation, the same money could buy a combination of 40 airfields, 400 jetliners, 100,000 trucks, and 4,000 miles of two-lane all-weather roads. Obviously the Chinese leadership places political gain ahead of economic development and views possession of nuclear weapons as a definite political asset. "It is difficult to foresee circumstances in which China's possession of the nuclear weapon will be worth the price the people have paid for its development."

231
THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY: A PROSPEROUS PEACE? Magazine of Wall Street and business analyst, v. 120, Aug. 5, 1967: 12-15, 45-47. illus. HG4501.M3, v. 120

Surveys the major defense development and procurement programs that would keep military expenditures high even if the costly Vietnam War were to end. Many expensive projects have been restricted because of the priority given to the war and would demand a larger portion of the budget once hostilities ended. Just one year's funding of the war, $22 billion, could pay for the deployment of a complete Nike-X antiballistic missile system around the United States. Advocates of the complete system must now settle for only a limited deployment of the Nike-X, which will still involve

thousands of contractors and subcontractors throughout the country. About $4.5 billion of the FY 1968 budget is being contracted for missile production, research on new missile systems, and the adaption of old missile systems to new uses. Industrial competition is high for the development and production of the many types of aircraft that will take an estimated $10 billion of the defense budget in FY 1968. Military planners are also interested in expensive space vehicle projects, including the manned orbiting laboratory and the military communications satellite program.

232
Gonzalez, Henry B. THE WAR PROFITEERS. Progressive, v. 31, Aug. 1967: 20-22.
AP2.P8655, v. 31

Given the great disparity between individual sacrifices and corporate financial benefits in the normal course of events, those doing business with the Federal Government in time of war should at least be expected to eschew profiteering. Unfortunately, however, war profiteering appears to be on the upswing. This issue receives little attention in Washington; indeed the preferred term there has been "excess profits" rather than "profiteering." Significantly, during fiscal 1966 the Renegotiation Board determined excess profits of $24.5 million, which were returned to the U.S. Treasury by its private contractors. When officials and newsmen ignore the issue of profiteering it can flourish, with the profiteer pushing "his special interest legislation with one hand while pocketing 'excess profits' with the other." Boeing, for example, not only attempted to charge the Federal Government for the development of the 707 commercial airliner as part of its military aircraft contract, but it also tried making the American taxpayer foot the bill for commercial institutional advertising, selling costs, and entertainment expenses. North American Aviation and General Motors have also been involved in excess-profits investigations by the Board. The upshot has been a movement to abolish the Renegotiation Board. Profiteering usually grows with a sudden upsurge in Government procurement. With the 1966 surge in the Vietnam effort the stage was set for profiteering. Federal powers in the realm of profiteering have been increasingly constrained. The Renegotiation Act of 1951 was "strong and sound," but from 1954 on the Board's ability to do its job has been slowly but surely reduced. Exemptions have multiplied, while at the same time the floor has been raised for prime contracts falling under the Board's jurisdiction. Industrial profiteers are not only gouging the Government, they are also reducing the efficiency of its war effort and are "in reality guilty of sabotage." Clearly something is amiss when a nation's young men are imprisoned for resisting conscription while some businessmen stay home and take advantage of the national emergency. The lower limit for contracts subject to renegotiation ought to be brought back down to $250,000, and many of the recent exemptions should be eliminated. When the Renegotiation Act comes up for renewal again in 1968, attempts will undoubtedly be made to kill it--the Board has been the subject of congressional investigation a number of times. In actuality, profiteering should be investigated with an eye to new and more effective legislation.

233
NUCLEAR ATTACK: THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE. In Canada. Emergency Measures Organization, Ottawa. EMO national digest, v. 7, Apr. 1967: 18-20, 22. UA929.C2A3, v. 7

"Prepared by the Economic Planning Division, Canada Emergency Measures Organization, May 1966."

A nuclear attack against Canada would cause widespread damage to its economy. Still a major task of rehabilitation could make the economy viable under postattack conditions. In an attack many essential supplies would be destroyed and transportation and communication lines would be dislocated while imports would be drastically curtailed. Essential survival needs of the nation would have to be met by reserve supplies rather than through normal productive capacities. Shelter would be hard to find. The payment of salaries, collection of taxes, and other contractual obligations would be difficult to meet. To cope with these economic problems measures would be undertaken to control prices, rents, and wages; to legislate a moratorium on debt payments; and to provide lodging for the destitute through welfare services. Plans are being made by the Canadian Government through its Civil Emergency Measures Planning Order to delegate authority to local officials who are cut off from their superiors after an attack so that they could continue to supervise these recovery programs.

234
Peterson, John. NEW WRINKLE IN CREDIBILITY CLOAK. Data, v. 12, Sept. 1967: 7-8.
P&GP RR

The increasing cost of the war in Vietnam is adversely affecting congressional appropriations for U.S. strategic forces. A new credibility gap, between the military and the Johnson administration, is contributing to cutbacks in funds for vital military projects. The Nike-X antiballistic missile and the Navy's fast deployment logistic [FDL] ships and its version of the TFX bomber are examples of military projects for which appropriations have been cut or substantially reduced; the TFX allotment was cut by 80 percent. The greatest failure of the administration has been that it has not impressed upon the country the "scope of the War in Vietnam in context with the scope of strategic problems." The administration is going to have to reevaluate its priorities and decide whether the United States can have guns and butter. Should the administration find out that it is not as rich as it believes, then it must increase the Federal budget--by more than the 10 percent surtax--to meet domestic and especially strategic needs.

235
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATION BILL, 1968; report to accompany H.R. 10738. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1967] 67 p. (90th Congress, 1st session. House of Representatives. Report no. 349)
UA23.3.A5, 1967a

Report on the bill that provides appropriations for the regular military functions of the Department of Defense, including money for the conflict in Southeast Asia. Expenses for strategic forces for the fiscal year 1968 are estimated at $7.6 billion. This provides for more Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles], the first procurement of the Poseidon submarine-launched missile and includes nearly $5 billion for the Nike-X project, which will allow for a "thin" antiballistic missile defense system.

236
Varma, Paul. THE DEFENSE OF INDIA. 1. THE ECONOMIC BASE TO MILITARY SECURITY. In United Service Institution of India. Journal, v. 96, Oct./Dec. 1966: 282-299. Ul.U5, v. 96

The distinctive feature of modern war is its total involvement of the community. Colossal industrial support, including total mobilization of both military forces and the entire civilian labor force and resources, is essential to sustain it. A nation's place in the world is determined by its moral standing, political strength, and military power. Military power depends on a vigorous economy with access to strategic materials. A nation's industries, food supply, and standard of living are all aspects of its military potential. India is particularly vulnerable to any interference with its food supplies. Its supply of natural rubber is adequate, but it is unlikely to obtain equipment and financial backing for synthetic rubber production for many years. India is one of the world's largest producers of both fiber and jute cloth, but superior and cheaper substitutes are competing for today's textile market. The nation is seriously deficient in high grade coal, and its steel production does not meet its needs. Demand for petroleum has risen sharply in India as in all parts of the world, requiring dependence to a large extent on external sources of supply. Nuclear power stations are being established in India but demand large amounts of foreign exchange. The nation's rivers and canals are largely unsuitable for navigation, and the excessive humidity in many areas imposes tactical limitations on the movement of troops. The chemical industry is still in its infancy, and despite progress in heavy-engineering fields, most complex military equipment must be imported. Self-sufficiency in defense, which is desirable for a nation seeking to maintain its sovereignty, requires establishment within its own territory of those industries vital to its war production. Neither India nor any other Southeast Asian nation can claim this self-sufficiency. While to date India has not encouraged foreign capital investments, economic development requires a change in this outmoded policy.

3. Ethical and Social

237
Béné, Professeur, Dr. Jona-Lasinio, and R. P. Cottier. [MODERN WAR AND SCIENTISTS' RESPONSIBILITY] Guerre moderne et responsabilité des scientifiques. Chronique sociale de France, v. 75, June/July 1967: 73-81. illus. P&GP RR
Reprinted from Nova et Vetera, Jan./Mar. 1965. AP24.N6

It is a paradox that the survival of civilization depends on the maintenance of peace and stability by weapons of mass destruction. War between the superpowers would annihilate the populations of the world. Political institutions and the moral consciousness of humanity are too primitive to cope with the consequences and horror of nuclear war and at the same time prevent the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons. If humanity is to survive, mankind must renounce war and practice reciprocal tolerance. Moral order must be restored to the political situation by the creation of a supranational authority imbued with a moral obligation to work for peace. Weapons for war should be condemned and outlawed while a concerted effort is made to use nuclear energy peacefully. The scientists who gave these weapons to the world bear a heavy moral responsibility. They must subordinate their work and their discoveries to a moral plan and seek to preserve mankind rather than destroy it.

238
Linden, Ian. CHURCH, STATE AND THE VIETNAM WAR. New Blackfriars, v. 48, Aug. 1967: 592-599. BX801.N35, v. 48

The incongruity between the moral principles enunciated by the Catholic Church and its uncritical attitude toward the Vietnam War has resulted in confusion regarding Christian responsibility during wartime. In contrast to the vigorous peace efforts of the Catholic Worker Movement and interdenominational clergy groups, the Catholic hierarchy has not engaged in any form of public protest against the war. The official silence was first broken in July 1966 when Cardinal Shehan of Baltimore issued a pastoral letter urging the citizens to "look to the welfare of the whole human family" when judging the morality of war. Unfortunately, a statement by the National Conference of Bishops in November 1966 implied that moral judgments cannot cover socio-political issues; thus asking for a halt to the bombing in North Vietnam--a political not a moral activity--would be beyond the Church's competence. However, the American Catholic Church has always been deeply involved in social and political issues, particularly when matters of public morality or its own interests are at stake. One cannot claim that a government's decision to use a military strategy that involves the killing of innocents is devoid of moral content. The illogical assumption by the Church that "the individual personal realm is the sole area of moral decision" can most plausibly be explained by the identification of the American Catholic hierarchy with the "establishment." In its attempts to maintain solidarity in wartime, the Church has stifled its teachings on individual conscience and avoided clarifying the role of the Church as an international institution in American society.

239
Trainor, James L. WHAT BUSINESS DOES THE MILITARY HAVE IN PACIFICATION/NATION BUILDING? Armed Forces management, v. 13, Aug. 1967: 32-33, 71-72. illus.
UB153.A65, v. 13

Continuous local security is the indispensable factor for effective pacification in Vietnam. Revolutionary Development teams that go into the hamlets to live and eat with the villagers and try to win them over must be protected by the Army. Although security is the sine qua non of pacification, its chief objectives are to "win the hearts and minds" of the people, to encourage political development, to realize the economic and social needs of the people, and to develop the country's infrastructure by construction of roads, bridges, and power systems. To facilitate these aspects of pacification the program has been put under General Westmoreland in a single military managership. The overall designation of the program is Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support [CORDS]. CORDS sees to it that the civilian will not be submerged in the military part of the organization and that the program will reach from the Saigon level all the way down to the district. It also supervises Chieu Hoi ("Open Arms"), New Life Development, and psychological operations and refugee programs, all designed to help the Vietcong defector and South Vietnamese peasent become loyal and worthy citizens of South Vietnam.

240
Wharton, John F. EN ROUTE TO A MASSACRE? Saturday review, v. 50, Nov. 4, 1967: 19-21.
Z1219.S25, v. 50

Mankind's capacity for self-delusion and its propensity to bully or torture defenseless victims strongly affect its behavior regarding war and peace. In history massacres of conquered cities have often followed military victory as an accepted practice or have been isolated incidents, as in pogroms. In the early 1900's many believed man was conquering his propensity toward violence and that massacre of civilians by armed forces had become unacceptable. Yet in World War II the United States showered bombs on enemy cities, denouncing as "tear jerkers" those who challenged the propriety of such actions. There is little difference between the old-fashioned massacre and slaughter by bombs except that in the former leaders do not see the killing but the force-wielders do, and in the latter neither the leaders nor the bomb droppers have contact with the victims. The popular concept of man as an immortal soul, capable of purification and eternal bliss, is flattering but unrealistic. Many physical scientists believe that life began from a chance combination of molecules, a theory as fantastic as the biblical story of creation. These concepts are relevant to man's behavior, for if war is sinful, as the first concept holds, then the problem is to stop man from sinning. If man is a creature of evolution driven by instincts, then one must change man's nature or live forever with torture and massacre. Thus peace-seekers who call for rationality are "pathetic voices crying in a wilderness of ignorance." A new and more workable concept of man is needed as a basis for observing how human beings actually behave and determining how changes can be effected. Until then it will be "almost impossible to restrain the moral fanatic who can convince his followers that the torture and slaughter of helpless victims is necessary for the peace and good of mankind."

4. Other

241
ANTI-WHO MISSILES [editorial] Nature (London) v. 215, Sept. 30, 1967: 1428-1429.
Q1.N2, v. 215

Why the United States has altered its previous stand on the deployment of an antiballistic missile [ABM] system at this time is not certain. Mr. McNamara has long been aware of the domestic pressures in favor of deployment without being unduly influenced by them. Is his reason then, as stated, really the increased provocation of a nuclear China? Or is the United States perhaps responding to continuing ABM deployment in the Soviet Union? Neither of these factors is sufficient reason for U.S. deployment not to have been delayed another year, and, indeed, many compelling arguments favor delay. The system announced for deployment may well be less durable or effective than those coming up in the relatively near future. Even more significant, however, are the international consequences of the American decision. Although American and Soviet ABM deployment will not really set off a new arms race throughout the world, their obvious abandonment of the "tacit agreement that plausible mutual deterrence is some kind of assurance of stability" is dismaying. Moreover Soviet-American attempts to persuade the lesser powers of the advantages of a nonproliferation agreement certainly lose credibility at a time when the superpowers are developing yet another generation of nuclear weapons. The American decision will give De Gaulle a further exhibit for his case against U.S. protestations that it will defend the European nations because ABM systems will not be practical in Europe. Mr. McNamara's change of mind can do nothing to convince the Chinese of the dangers of nuclear weapons--the only possible way to ensure that they will conduct themselves rationally as a nuclear power. In acting immediately the Americans had "a lot to lose for such a little gain."

242
Bailey, J. W. OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: POST-ATTACK PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURES. In Canada. Emergency Measures Organization, Ottawa. EMO national digest, v. 7, Apr. 1967: 1-9.
UA929.C2A3, v. 7

A nuclear attack would render the public utilities of Canada inoperative as they are presently set up. However recommendations on preparation for emergencies can be formulated, along with suggestions for post-attack procedures designed to restore services with minimum delay. The utilities under study are water, sewage, electricity, and gas. Means to protect waterworks from thermal radiation include alternate water sources, auxiliary power and communications systems, automatic and remote-control systems for plant opcrations, and underground piping, reservoirs, and submersible pumps. Provisions for waterworks personnel operating in fallout areas and for water conservation in radiation areas range from radiac instruments that read dose rates to protective clothing for plant operators, from advance dispersal of stores and equipment to key locations to personnel exposure-control system. If sewage operations are to continue after a blast, emergency procedures such as the use of excreta bags, chemical toilets, and underground injection wells must be invoked. Construction of massive shields, "between operating galleries and the vessels or equipment containing radioactive contamination" along with a controlled-exposure system can ensure protection of sewage operators against gamma radiation. After an attack thermoelectric generating plants can be shut down, rationing systems can be worked out, and manual operations can be converted to automatic. The postattack problems that plague water, sewage, and electrical utilities also frustrate gas utilities. They are especially vulnerable to nuclear attack--aboveground gas stations have little or no protection against thermal blast. In 1963 a comprehensive study was made by the Ontario Natural Gas Industry and the Bell Telephone Company of blast effect on the gas industry. The study recommended that the gas industry be allowed to maintain control of its specialized equipment and that it consider locating certain facilities outside probable target areas.

243
Baldwin, Hanson W. THE GREAT MISSILE DEBATE. Reporter, v. 36, June 29, 1967: 23-26.
D839.R385, v. 36

Today's controversy over the deployment of an American antiballistic missile [ABM] system is no less bitter than that of 20 years ago over the decision to build a hydrogen bomb. The Nation's top military leaders violently oppose the decision of their civilian chief, Robert S. McNamara, to eschew development of an ABM despite the information that the Soviet Union is going ahead with deployment of its own

system. Many experts feel the Russians are narrowing the strategic gap in all areas, in the production of offensive as well as defensive weapons. Communist China is also growing as a strategic military power and is expected to possess intercontinental ballistic missiles by 1970. American military leaders blame McNamara's emphasis on cost-effectiveness for holding back innovation, while he has stated that there is enough time to spare to make a decision without haste. The scientific community is also divided on the issue. The so-called "California group," represented by Dr. Harold Agnew of Los Alamos among others, rejects strategic parity as the only basis for international stability. The "Cambridge group" (Jerome Wiesner et al), on the other hand, apparently are felt by Agnew to be "deliberately trying to restrain technological weapons progress." To the Cambridge scientists innovation or changes in the military balance would be highly destabilizing. The Cambridge group has received a great deal of influential support from the State Department and other Government agencies, the academic community, and the "think factories," as well as from Secretary McNamara himself. However unless proposed Soviet-American talks on limiting ABM development go beyond the preliminary stages the Cambridge group "will doubtless lose by default." By virtue of a last-ditch pressure campaign and of the Administration's placating Congress with the inclusion in the budget of Nike-X funds, the Wiesner group may be able to hold off a deployment decision another year, but clearly by the end of that year "time and the Russians" will have forced the issue.

244
Erickson, John. 'THE FLY IN OUTER SPACE': THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE. World today, v. 23, Mar. 1967: 106-114.
D410.W63, v. 23

In spite of Russia's partial deployment of antiballistic missile [ABM] defenses, Soviet military strategy remains essentially the same. It is based on combined offensive and defense capabilities (compared to U.S. reliance on overwhelming offensive capability) and in the post-Khrushchev era has been gradually moving away from "massive retaliation" and toward a form of "flexible response" that lends credibility to its deterrent posture and prepares Russia for local conflicts of the Vietnam variety. ABM deployment is part of this move toward a flexible response posture. The ABM was introduced in an attempt to equalize the Soviet-U.S. strategic balance. The Soviets believe their ABM system increases world stability by making their forces less inferior and contributing to counter-deterrence. The Soviet ABM program is part of an overall defense design that includes the "Blue strip" system, which involves missile-firing submarines and extensive civil defense efforts. ABM deployment conforms to Soviet deterrence policy and augments Russia's survivability. Soviet expectations of the ABM's military efficiency and political utility appear to be high, although the Soviet press has given it little coverage. Western observers should not see ABM deployment as a prelude to some ambitious political strategy, but as "a very much Russian decision, deeply embedded in caution, even pessimism, and constructed as an elaborate compromise."

245
Farber, Irving J. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF MASS DISASTERS. In National Medical Association. Journal, v. 59, Sept. 1967: 340-345.

Available at the National Library of Medicine.
"Read at the MEND Symposium 'The Role of the Community Physician in Mass Disaster,' Washington, D. C., November 9, 1966."

Study based on accounts of such disasters as the sinking of the Andrea Doria and the bombings of London in World War II. Farber discusses the psychological effects of a community-wide disaster, the countermeasures that can be taken by physicians, and such longer lasting effects as traumatic neuroses of war.

246
Huizinga, J. H. A GIGGLE ON DOOMSDAY EVE. Contemporary review, v. 211, Aug. 1967: 57-63.
AP4.C7, v. 211

The nature of military power has changed so radically while diplomacy has remained the same that the international situation begins to seem almost ludicrous. The world's statesmen are forced to make threats so at variance with the power they wield that the observer can do little more than stifle a giggle. Such was not the case in the late 1930's. Hitler's and Chamberlain's threats and counterthreats made sense--there were real reasons for carrying them out, and thus there was every reason to believe that they would be carried out. Today what real difference do troop size and strategic positions make when overkill can be achieved if one has a few scientists and the wherewithal to set them working on bombs and missiles? Even conventional forces no longer matter so long as a nation and its enemies have the absolute power to kill one another off. The only value of strategic positions beyond a nation's own frontiers is that of hastening the warning of an enemy attack by a few minutes. Both the Soviet Union and the United States apparently interpret change in the status quo as having the kind of dire results that would justify self-destruction, as indeed such change did have 30 years ago. But today, if West Berlin were abandoned to the Communists, it would have no effect on America's ability to protect the West Germans; they would be just as safe or unsafe as before. Even if West Germany were so upset by this hypothetical abandonment as to change sides, the balance of terror, maintained by absolute destruction power, would be affected not one iota. The disproportion between the potential consequences of losing Berlin or Vietnam and the price the West declares itself ready to pay in the defense of these places is extraordinary. The situation is farcical, and both Soviet and American leaders know it. Nations must threaten one another with preventive suicide simply to hold the line. Only by convincing their opponents that they are crazy enough to carry out their insane threats can each nation avoid having to do so. "The more widespread and evident the antiquated belief that territorial changes still matter vitally, the greater the maniacal readiness to destroy oneself in order to forestall or undo them, the less likely the other side is to embark on them and thus put this readiness to the test." One can only laugh, albeit somewhat hysterically.

247
John, F. I., and T. O. Passell. EVALUATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON THERMAL THREAT. Menlo Park, Calif., Stanford Research Institute, 1966. 86 p. (Stanford Research Institute. SRI 4949-360)
Sci RR

AD 640626.
L.C. copy on microfiche.

United States Office of Civil Defense. Final technical report OCD-PS-64-201.

Studies the vulnerability of urban areas to fires resulting from the detonation of a nuclear weapon. The basis for measurement of damage depends on "the variable of interest in the damage assessment program." The criterion for assessing damage depends on "the use to be made of the structure" after the attack. The use of commercial or industrial structures affects the estimates of damage to structural members.

248
Johnsen, Katherine. ATOMIC COMMITTEE REPORT SPURS RENEWED ABM DEPLOYMENT DRIVE. Aviation week & space technology, v. 87, Aug. 7, 1967: 23-24. TL501.A8, v. 87

Although the administration has minimized the Chinese Communist nuclear threat in order to lessen pressure for U.S. deployment of an antimissile defense system, a report issued by the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee reveals rapid progress in nuclear capabilities by Red China. According to the report, China could now design a thermonuclear device with a multimegaton yield suitable for aircraft delivery and by the early 1970's should be able to develop thermonuclear warheads with a yield in the megaton range for intercontinental and medium-range ballistic missiles. China's rate of progress in nuclear achievements, as demonstrated by its advance from the first test of a low-yield nuclear device in October 1964 to its latest test of a multimegaton thermonuclear device in June 1967, is well ahead of France's. In over 7 years of testing the French have achieved higher yield fission weapons than the Chinese but have yet to explode a thermonuclear device. In issuing the report the committee stressed the significance of Chinese nuclear capabilities for U.S. foreign policy, a nonproliferation treaty, and Chinese influence in Southeast Asia.

249
Lall, Betty (Goetz) CONGRESS DEBATES THE ABM. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 23, Sept. 1967: 28-33. TK9145.A84, v. 23

Relates the history of the interest shown by the U.S. Congress since 1955 in the antiballistic missile [ABM] problem. Mrs. Lall describes some of the issues discussed in congressional debates, such as the size and cost on the economy, and the possibility of negotiations with the Soviet Union on mutual renunciation of ABM defense.

250
McGeehan, Robert. THE POLITICS OF THE ABM. War/peace report, v. 7, June/July 1967: 7-8. P&GP RR

If the Soviet Union extends its antiballistic missile [ABM] system, the United States could respond by: developing an ABM program, increasing strategic capabilities to penetrate Soviet defenses, continuing to negotiate for a U.S.-Soviet agreement while reserving the option to adopt one or both of the first two alternatives, or postponing a missile defense system indefinitely. According to a report by Amitai Etzioni, a member of Columbia University's Institute of War and Peace Studies, the Russians relate their need for an increased ABM program to American aggressiveness in Vietnam. If this information is accurate, chances are slight for a Soviet-U.S. accord to limit ABM deployment. But one cannot assume that the United States will decide to deploy an ABM program solely because of congressional pressures, complaints regarding the missile gap, allies' fears of a weakened deterrence, or the Chinese threat. The administration has resisted congressional pressures in the past, the public is not particularly concerned about an antimissile gap and the danger of a major war, and U.S. allies have not revealed any fears that the Soviet ABM system will weaken the U.S. deterrent. It also seems highly unlikely that China would risk self-destruction by attacking the United States in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the President may not want to jeopardize international stability by following the Russian example but would choose to ease cold war tensions and promote progress toward arms control by avoiding ABM deployment.

251
McNamara, Robert S. MCNAMARA EXPLAINS NUCLEAR ARMS POSITION. Armed Forces management, v. 13, Apr. 1967: 51. UB153.A65, v. 13

Quote from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's "Posture Statement" before a joint session of Congress' Armed Service Committees.

The U.S. general nuclear war forces are designed to deter a nuclear attack by maintaining the capability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon the aggressor during or after an attack (assured destruction capability) and to limit the damage to population and industrial centers (damage limitation capability). Since the principal objective of U.S. strategic forces is to deter a nuclear attack, they emphasize assured destruction programs. However, it is important to keep in mind the possible interaction of U.S. strategic forces programs with those of the Soviet Union. The concept of assured destruction implies a second strike capability, so defense planners on both sides must design strategic offensive forces capable of surviving an attack by the enemy's forces. Since any improvements in the damage-limiting capability of either side would require the other to improve its penetration capability, the mutual deployment of antimissile systmes would only increase defense expenditures with no real gain for either side.

252
Melman, Seymour. ALTERNATIVE POLICIES FOR PEACE. Sane world, v. 6, Sept. 1967: 3-6. P&GP RR

The political situation that now influences movements to end the Vietnam War differs greatly from the situation under which the test ban treaty was ratified. The key difference appears to be in the role of the executive branch, whose backing of the Vietnam War is caused in large part by the post-Kennedy growth of the Defense Department into a force wielding "an unprecedented combination of economic, political, and military decision-power." More than $40 billion a year is controlled by the top management of the Defense Department, and it thus possesses fantastic political leverage over Members of Congress. As is normal for any such group, Defense Department top management feels a professional motivation to extend its power and control over decisionmaking at home and abroad. To this end the Department of Defense has set up complicated worldwide machinery for political-military intervention, of which the Vietnam War is only one manifestation. Policies for peace, then, must include a funda-

mental reconstitution of the Defense Department. As a first basic element such a policy change would require a noninterventionist American foreign policy, with a goal of ending not merely the Vietnam War but also the program that can duplicate the war many times over. Also basic to a peace policy is a return to the principles of international law and morality. The U.S. Government currently provides an example of lawlessness and immorality which the lesser countries of the world will not be slow to follow. To seek peace America must also alter its economic priorities from military to civilian values. For two generations the bulk of Federal funds has gone for hot and cold wars, leaving other areas of public responsibility in a state of disrepair. Some measure of decisionmaking power may have to be given back to cities and States, which, significantly, have no constitutional power to raise armed forces or conduct interventionist wars abroad. "Bring Our Boys Home From Vietnam" will not suffice as a program for the peace movement, which has a clear obligation to tell the truth to the American people. Those interested in policy change must work toward a wide understanding of the ingredients of a peace policy for America, and they must do so by reaching to the core of the community, not by committing acts that by their nature offend, thereby closing off the peace movement to many who are vital to it. The issue of Lyndon Johnson's personal candidacy should be secondary to the policy-change strategy, for the first order of business is the election of propeace legislators.

253
Montgomery, James T. ORGANIZING A COMMUNITY FOR MAJOR DISASTER. In National Medical Association. Journal, v. 59, Sept. 1967: 346-349.
Available at the National Library of Medicine.
"Read at the M. E. N. D. Symposium on 'The Role of the Community Physician in Mass Disaster,' Washington, D. C., November 9, 1966."

Proposes the plans and procedures developed by the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Public Health Service as means by which communities can maximize the survival rate in the event of nuclear war or a catastrophe of any sort. In the face of the "ever present threat of a natural disaster or a nuclear holocaust" emergency medical care must be planned for in every community.

254
NOTES AND COMMENT. New Yorker, v. 43, Sept. 30, 1967: 33-35. AP2.N6763, v. 43

The illogical decision to deploy a "thin" antiballistic missile [ABM] system is a consequence of the military-industrial complex's "increasing leverage to assert its primacy over civilian control," which is largely a result of the Vietnamese War. The United States has rejected a full-scale defense against Russia, yet it is heading in that direction by constructing a "limited" ABM system against China. Since there is no way to build a missile defense system that cannot be overwhelmed, a "thin" ABM system will be useless against the Chinese the moment they acquire a large-scale nuclear force. The Chinese hope, at most, to hold a few cities hostage to nuclear destruction. Therefore, the system would have a negligible effect on Chinese policy, because some missiles would still be able to penetrate U.S. defenses. Consequently America, in an all-out war with China, must be prepared to pay the price of destruction of an American city. Should the United States decide to launch a surprise attack against China, defense will be unnecessary, as Chinese missiles could be destroyed on the ground. There is even less justification for a "light" system considering the probability that nuclear war between China and the United States would involve Russia. Since there is no missile defense that can guarantee protection, the race between offense and defense can never end. The construction of ABM bases encircling American cities would have ominous consequences for the national psyche, and the constant strain caused by the nuclear threat may lead to a wish to "get it all over with."

255
NOW, CIVIL DEFENSE FOR PEOPLE ON THE MOVE. National business woman, v. 46, Nov. 1967: 4-9. illus. HD6050.N3, v. 46

According to Mrs. Jane F. Hanna, Deputy Director of the Office of Civil Defense, the country's civil defense program has advanced considerably since the passage of the Civil Defense Act of 1950. The program is no longer centered around plans for elaborate private and public blast shelters and mass evacuation. Instead, it is "designed to make wise, dual use of resources and work skills already available or that can be developed in communities" and to provide shelter for the population in the event of a nuclear attack or other major disaster. It is administered by volunteers and officials of the Office of Civil Defense and its 17,000 state and local subdivisions. The planning officials have located shelter space in existing structures for over 161 million Americans and are currently exploring the methods for utilizing this space to suit the needs of each community. Volunteers are vital to the success of the program and can aid the local civil defense director in many ways, which include making sure that shelter space is incorporated in all major new buildings and supporting adult education courses in civil defense procedures.

256
Onigkeit, Dietmar. [EMERGENCY NUTRITION PLANNING IN SWITZERLAND] Ernährungsplanung für Notzeiten in der Schweiz. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 5, May/June 1967: 185-191. illus. P&GP RR

Discusses Switzerland's current plans of securing adequate nutrition for its population and armed forces in time of war, when the nation will be cut off from food imports essential for its survival. Onigkeit considers various official models for sustaining the populace's nutrition. These involve, among other things, the intensification of domestic food production and a careful selection of food to be produced, stored, or conserved.

257
Pay, Rex. ROCKETS DEVELOPED IN CASE NUCLEAR TESTS ARE RESUMED. Technology week, v. 20, Apr. 17, 1967: 26-29. illus. UG630.M54, v. 20

Surveys development by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Defense Department's Defense Atomic Support Agency of sophisticated diagnostic instruments and mobile facilities for use if international conditions justify resumption of U.S. atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. The tests would be aimed primarily at developing an operational antiballistic missile [ABM] system. While the facilities and instruments detailed are in readiness, there are still severe limitations on measuring, recording, and retrieving data on the effects of an ABM detonation on an operational warhead.

258
SENATE GROUP TO EVALUATE NIKE-X DECISION. Aviation week & space technology, v. 87, Sept. 25, 1967: 18-19. TL501. A8, v. 87

In contrast to the generally sparse congressional reaction to the administration announcement about deployment of a "thin" antiballistic missile [ABM] system, Chairman Henry M. Jackson of the Joint Atomic Energy Military Applications Subcommittee scheduled hearings for October on missile defense and general problems of deterrence. Congress is on record as having approved deployment of the Nike-X ABM system through resolutions attached to the FY 1968 defense authorization and appropriation bills, which were passed by wide majorities. Along with Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee Senator J. William Fulbright, Senators Stephen Young and Joseph Clark voiced disapproval of the ABM move. Administration supporters within Congress who felt the ABM was a necessary addition to the American deterrent included Senator John Stennis, chairman of the Armed Service Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee; Senator Clinton P. Anderson, chairman of the Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee; Senator John Tower, member of the Armed Services Committee; and Representative Craig Hosmer.

259
Stannard, A. F. B. MULTIPLE FIRES FROM A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. In Canada. Emergency Measures Organization, Ottawa, EMO national digest, v. 7, Apr. 1967: 14. UA929. C2A3, v. 7

Although everything within several miles of a nuclear explosion will be destroyed, blast damage to homes located at somewhat greater distances will not be severe enough to make them uninhabitable. In fact, many homes outside the blast radius can be saved if they are adequately prepared and efficiently organized. Because the heat from a nuclear explosion is so intense these homes will burn down unless they are equipped with fire extinguishers. Research shows that in 10 minutes 50 percent of room fires pass the self-help (a team of two people equipped with fire extinguishers) stage, and in 20 minutes this proportion rises to more than 70 percent. After a blast has taken effect a family will have 2 to 5 minutes to put out the fire. This is a powerful argument for each homeowner to become familiar with firefighting techniques and equipment.

260
Winston, Donald C. U.S. MAY REVISE TIMING ON ABM. Aviation week & space technology, v. 86, May 15, 1967: 22-23. TL501. A8, v. 86

Administration witnesses, including Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus R. Vance, testified before the February-March 1967 hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Disarmament Subcommittee that the United States may begin developing a $4 billion "austere" anti-Chinese antiballistic missile [ABM] defense in FY 1968. Since subcommittee chairman Senator Albert Gore felt that the Department of Defense had underestimated Chinese nuclear potential in the past, he challenged Vance's contention that the "austere" system (based principally on long-range Spartan missiles armed with warheads equipped to destroy enemy missiles with high intensity X-rays) could eliminate damage from a Chinese attack almost entirely through the 1970's. According to John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, technological advances would soon make a more complete and costly ABM system obsolete. However, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, favors the immediate deployment of a $20 billion ABM system to enforce the deterrent against Soviet attack. The administration intends to negotiate with the Soviets over limitations on deployment of the ABM before a making a final decision on U.S. deployment of an ABM defense system.

III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

A. INTERNATIONAL LAW

B. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

261
Burgelin, Henri. [THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE] Die Bedeutung der internationalen Strukturen im Atomzeitalter. Junge Kirche, v. 28, Aug. 10, 1967: 430-434. BX8001.J8, v. 28

Explains that regional and specialized organizations can contribute more to the cause of peace than does the "United Nations forum," because their competence and authority in particular areas may surpass far the United Nations'. The European Economic Community for instance, can become much more independent from its member states than the United Nations, which is dominated by spokesmen for individual states.

262
Claude, Inis L. THE CHANGING UNITED NATIONS. New York, Random House [1967] 140 p. (Studies in political science, PS 58)
JX1977.C5542

Partial contents.--Introduction: The changingness of the United Nations.--The thermonuclear revolution and the United Nations.--The cold war and the United Nations.--Decolonization and the United Nations.--Collective legitimization as a political function of the United Nations.--The future of the United Nations.

Argues that the realities of the nuclear age and the mutual deterrence between the nuclear powers make an international organization such as the United Nations unfit for effecting collective security. In its role of fostering the peace it neutralizes rather than controls the aggressive designs of the Great Powers.

263
Combs, James J. FRANCE AND UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING. International organization, v. 21, spring 1967: 306-325. JX1901.I55, v. 21

France's foreign policy in the 1960's has been preoccupied with attempts to free Europe from the Atlantic alliance, establish itself as the continental leader, and become a neutral arbiter between East and West. Within the context of this policy, France's position on United Nations peacekeeping operations has vacillated more than that of any other member of the Security Council. Its voting record in this matter has reflected its attempt to drive a wedge into the bipolar world. French advocation of a genuine United Nations that would supersede the bipolar world began in optimism with the Uniting for Peace Resolution in 1950 and ended in disenchantment with the Organization during the Congo crisis of 1960. The Uniting for Peace Resolution, which was passed as a result of the outbreak of the Korean War, was supported by France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and four other countries in the Security Council. During the Suez crisis 6 years later, France vetoed plans to set up a United Nations Emergency Force [UNEF] in accordance with the Uniting for Peace Resolution. After Suez, France realized that the United Nations could operate only when the two superpowers were in agreement and became convinced that the General Assembly "could not be used against one of the superpowers" but also became painfully aware of the General Assembly's ability to act against France. French resentment toward the United Nations increased when in 1957 attacks in the General Assembly against its Algerian policy were resumed. The Congo crisis in 1960 nearly disrupted the whole U.N. peacekeeping operation. France and the Soviet Union emerged from the crisis on the same side but for different reasons. France's growing distrust of the United Nations led to a more restrictive interpretation by its delegation of the Uniting for Peace Resolution. It voted against or abstained from all resolutions that would have infringed upon the rights of Belgium in its effort to protect national property in the Congo. The French explained that their voting record was based on three principles: the sovereignty of the Congo, its unity, and noninterference in internal affairs. When several states announced that they would refuse to contribute to the peacekeeping operation in the Congo, France concluded that "the General Assembly [was] unable to produce a just and equitable method of financing the costs incurred by the Organization in the Congo." France's reservations on the question of financing U.N. peacekeeping operations stem from the belief that the balance of terror, rather than U.N. peacekeeping, ensures world peace and that its own obligations for safeguarding the peace are minimal since it is not a superpower.

264
Jack, Homer A. CONFRONTATION IN STOCKHOLM. War/peace report, v. 7, Aug./Sept. 1967: 7-9.
P&GP RR

Delegates from 62 countries and 22 international organizations attended the World Conference on Vietnam held in Stockholm, July 10-12, and sponsored principally by the World Council of Peace [WCP] and the International Confederation for Disarmament and Peace [ICDP]. Vocational work groups composed of parliamentarians, housewives, students, teachers, and religionists plus eight commissions organized along subject lines carried out most of the work of the Conference. The Conference provided an opportunity for discussions among representatives of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the United States. It marked the beginning of functional cooperation between the WCP and the ICDP and served to promote coordination among the various antiwar organizations represented at the meeting. However, its exclusion of the militant Buddhists embittered a few delegates, its revolutionary emphasis kept away the moderate antiwar representatives, and its failure to produce explicit procedural rules hampered the inclusion of minority dissent. Nevertheless the Conference afforded great insight into

the Vietnamese War and a new awareness of the "militant confident nationalism, for good or ill, of the Vietnamese people."

265
Maheu, René. TO BUILD A NEW ORDER IN THE WORLD. UNESCO courier, no. 8, Aug./Sept. 1967: 36-39. P&GP RR

Response by the Director General of UNESCO, René Maheu, to Pope Paul VI's Encyclical Letter on the Development of Peoples. Maheu expressed appreciation for the Pope's support of UNESCO activities and pointed out the similarity "between the views of the Holy Father concerning the problems, aims and methods of development and those which UNESCO has constantly promoted." They both advocate "assistance to the weak within the context of a just and rational organization of mankind as a whole." They also, agree that man must work in a spirit of solidarity to cultivate the human mind. The Director General hoped that UNESCO could act quickly in response to the Pope's appeals. He suggested that every citizen be made aware of his personal responsibility to serve the development cause and proposed an intergovernmental conference to consider world problems of development.

266
Millionshchikov, M. TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF PUGWASH MOVEMENT. Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 13, July 7, 1967: pt. 1, [item] 4, 1-2. Slav Rm
Translated from Pravda, July 7, 1967. Slav Rm

Describes trends of discussion of the Pugwash movement since its first conference held in 1957: nuclear disarmament, ending imperialist aggression, international security, and scientific cooperation. Although the scientists of the 50 participating countries differ in their scientific and political views, an overwhelming majority of them are united in achieving the goals of the movement. Of the issues examined during the 16 Pugwash Conferences, most attention has been paid to efforts towards achieving nuclear disarmament, the nonproliferation of atomic weapons, and the complete banning of nuclear tests as first steps toward saving mankind from thermonuclear war.

267
Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. 16th, Sopot, Poland, 1966. PROCEEDINGS; DISARMAMENT AND WORLD SECURITY, ESPECIALLY IN EUROPE. [London, 1967?] 343 p. JX1974.P8, 1966

Contains reports from the working groups, proceedings of the plenary sessions, and papers from members of the conference. They discussed European security problems, the progress toward general and complete disarmament, biological warfare, arms supplies to developing nations, Vietnam, U.N. peacekeeping procedures, nuclear nonproliferation, and the prospects for enacting a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons tests. As in past Pugwash Conferences participants from the East and West attempted to analyze "problems by the scientific approach rather than [to find] complete solutions."

268
RECORD OF THE MONTH: POLITICAL AND SECURITY. UN monthly chronicle, v. 4, Apr. 1967: 3-43. JX1977.A1U564, v. 4

Evaluates U.N. endeavors in April (1967) including peacekeeping operations, efforts pertaining to apartheid in South Africa, and the Conference of Non-nuclear Weapon States; and discusses progress reports of the Special Committee of 24 on the referendum in French Somaliland and independence in Aden and 6 Caribbean territories. The Preparatory Committee for the Conference of Non-nuclear Weapon States (to be held no later than July 1968) is considering a liaison with the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament and inviting both nonnuclear and nuclear states to give their views to the Committee.

269
Taylor, George E., and Ben Cashman. THE NEW UNITED NATIONS: A REAPPRAISAL OF UNITED STATES POLICIES. Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1965. 117 p. JX1977.2.U5T35

Partial contents.--The United States perspective on the United Nations.--The peace-keeping function.--The problems of membership.--The problem of military power.--The Secretariat: Administrative or executive?--Economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian function.--United States policy.--Bibliography.

Argues that the "United States should regard the United Nations as one instrument among several for the prosecution of American foreign policy." The authors record the various achievements of the United Nations, from the Uniting for Peace Resolution to the achievements in economic, cultural, social, and humanitarian fields. But Congress is tiring of the idea that the United States has to contribute the bulk of the financial support for these projects. The Senate, for example, has not supported humanitarian conventions approved by the General Assembly. The authors conclude that a successful U.S. policy in the United Nations does not depend on charter revisions, but rather on the "cultivation of a consensus based on as large a measure as possible of political and economic homogeneity among those states that have no commitment to the Communist powers."

270
UNESCO AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE. UNESCO courier, no. 8, Aug./Sept. 1967: 64-66. P&GP RR

Surveys UNESCO's contribution to world peace and disarmament including the support of national and international institutions for peace research and the promotion of education in world affairs to increase the understanding of basic human rights. The principle behind UNESCO's efforts to strengthen peaceful relations between peoples is that "peace cannot be based exclusively on political and economic arrangements between governments, but must be founded upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind."

271
THE UNITED NATIONS UNDER FIRE. War/peace report, v. 7, Aug./Sept. 1967: 3-7. P&GP RR

A discussion led by the editor of War/Peace Report, Richard Hudson, on the operation of power politics within the United Nations and the problems and prospects facing the world body. Veteran news correspondents Pauline Frederick, Drew Middleton, and Ann

Weill-Tuckerman participated in the discussion. They supported the thesis that the United Nations was a "mirror of the world" insofar as it can act most effectively when the interests of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, coincide and when it receives the support of the growing third power bloc composed of the underdeveloped countries. They expressed concern that small nations have the same vote as large nations, which often results in the bartering of votes by the former; that the United Nations seemed unable to go beyond ceasefire arrangements in the settlement of disputes; and that Communist Chinese membership would upset the power structure of the world assembly. They also discussed the role assigned to the United Nations by America in the conduct of its foreign policy and the great usefulness of the United Nations as a sounding board for world opinion. Although they did not consider the United Nations to be a dying institution in spite of its inadequacies in combating international economic and political difficulties, the correspondents felt that the balance of terror, not the United Nations, could continue to serve as a guarantee against a nuclear war.

C. INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES

272
Bleicher, Samuel A. FINANCING PEACEKEEPING FROM IMF AND IBRD INCOME. University of Washington law review, v. 42, June 1967: 1017-1064.
LL

Professor Bleicher asserts that the present method of financing United Nations peacekeeping operations through annual contributions by members is unsatisfactory. Not only can it cause a financial crisis when certain members refuse to pay, but also it may impair the United Nations peacekeeping function. After exploring several alternatives for providing stable income for peacekeeping operations, Professor Bleicher concludes that portions of the substantial net income of the International Monetary Fund and the Bank for Reconstruction and Development should be transferred to a United Nations peacekeeping fund. He then analyzes the various methods of achieving the transfers and suggests that the three organizations concerned should enter into an agreement providing for fixed flow of funds from IMF and IBRD to the United Nations. (Abstract supplied)

273
Greenfield, Meg. A STORY OF FORTY-EIGHT HOURS. Reporter, v. 36, June 15, 1967: 19-23.
D839.R385, v. 36

The withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force [UNEF] from Sinai by the Secretary General demonstrated a lack of any sense of the United Nations as an entity with objectives to pursue and interests to protect. However, events during the 2 days before UNEF's withdrawal indicated that U Thant was waging a losing battle to maintain the UNEF presence in Sinai. The Secretary General resisted informal demands from United Arab Republic officers in the field to withdraw UNEF from its OP's [occupation posts]. It was at the official request of the Cairo government and from fear of bloodshed that Thant removed the peacekeeping forces. The Secretary General knew that UNEF did not possess enforcement procedures and that any resistance to its removal would have violated the original mandate. It was also becoming increasingly difficult to convince the Arab people that UNEF was not part of a "Western intervention" effort or "big power front," allegations made by Soviet propagandists to weaken UNEF control. It was also very unlikely that the governments represented in UNEF would have allowed their contingents to stay and face possible annihilation. Despite these positive arguments U Thant failed to express in clear terms what the prerogatives of the United Nations were.

274
Horn, Carl C. von. SOLDIERING FOR PEACE. New York, McKay [1967] 402 p. illus.
JX1981.P7H68, 1967

Partial contents.--A military career.--Officer of the International Red Cross.--Mission in Jerusalem.--Security problems.--Intrigue and infiltration.--Israeli-Syrian border clashes.--C'est le Congo.--Maintaining order.--Civil war politics.--Financing field operations.--Return to Sweden.--The Security Council.--False accusations.--Yemen observer mission.--The Egyptians and the Saudi Arabians.--A closed world.--Looking ahead.--Index.

An autobiography of Carl von Horn, former commander in chief of the United Nations Emergency Force [UNEF]. The author tells about his missions to North Africa, Southern Arabia, and the Congo, and the problems of language, command, and ordnance within UNEF, and reappraises the whole sector of U.N. peacekeeping operations, "where hard-won lessons seem to have become forgotten." Von Horn claims that interference with the communications between him and the Secretary General created misunderstandings--UNEF reports to U Thant would first be put into carefully prepared news summaries by the Secretariat--and added to an already frustrating situation that eventually forced him to resign his post.

275
Smith, Gordon S. A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON PEACE-KEEPING. Rev. (U) Ottawa, 1966. 35 p. (Canada. Dept. of National Defence. Operational Research Division. ORD report no. 66/R14)
UA600.C28 no. 66/R14

An annotated bibliography of materials on peacekeeping compiled from journals, books, and research reports.

276
Waern, Jonas. DIARY OF A U.N. PEACEKEEPER. Saturday review, v. 50, Nov. 18, 1967: 19-21, 55-56.
Z1219.S25, v. 50

Personal reminiscences of a Swedish commander of United Nations peacekeeping forces in the Congo and on Cyprus. Waern feels his experiences clearly indicate the need for several organizational changes if U.N. forces are to achieve the maximum benefit. It is critical that an effective military command be attached to U.N. headquarters in New York and that military commanders, negotiators, and experts be specially trained, possibly in a U.N. university. The author continually emphasizes his belief in the importance of U.N. forces for easing local conflicts until opposing sides can agree on a compromise.

277
Wechsler, James A. THE ORDEAL OF A PEACEMAKER. Progressive, v. 31, Aug. 1967: 15-19.
AP2.P8655, v. 31

Since taking office in 1961 U.N. Secretary General U Thant has been alternately condemned as a tool of U.S. imperialism and as a Soviet collaborator. But none of the criticisms matches the fury directed at Thant after the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force [UNEF] from Egypt during the recent Middle Eastern crisis. Most of the anti-Thant sentiment seems to be nurtured by American sources, many on the highest official levels in Washington. This "get-Thant" campaign is understandable only as reprisal for his refusal to condone U.S. actions in Vietnam and his disagreement with the Johnson view of Asian events. Thant has never subscribed to the "domino" theory and finds the U.S. belief in defeating communism with arms misguided. He has long been convinced that peace and the success of the United Nations depend on growing accommodation between the United States and the Soviet Union, and he sees the war in Vietnam as a threat to this. Thant has devoted considerable attention to bringing about a negotiated settlement to the war, but for the most part has been rebuffed by the American Government. Those who feel that Thant acted capriciously in withdrawing the UNEF should read the United Nations document, released June 26, "Report of the Secretary-General on the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force." American reporters failed to publicize Thant's request that Israel counter Nasser's move by accepting the force on their side of the demarcation line, and Israel's refusal to do so. Thant's withdrawal of the UNEF exemplified his blend of principle and pragmatism, which any man with so diverse a constituency must possess. He once admitted that often he must suppress his own convictions to approach his tasks with impartiality and keep the interests of the organization in the forefront. Thant saw no alternative to withdrawal but armed conflict between Egypt and the UNEF troops for whom he was responsible. And while American sympathy was with Israel, public opinion would never have condoned intervention. As events evolved the United Nations retrieved a measure of prestige with its achievement of a cease-fire and some semblance of order.

278
Williams, Howard Y. WORLD FEDERALISTS CALL FOR REAL PEACEKEEPING. Christian century, v. 84, Sept. 27, 1967: 1236-1238.
BR1.C45, v. 84

On January 1 the World Association of World Federalists will issue a manifesto calling for international observance of World Law Day and appealing to nations to support a limited world government with the power to prevent future wars. When the goal of 1.5 million signatures is reached, the document will be submitted to the U.N. General Assembly. At its August meeting in Oslo the Association urged establishment of a directorate for peacekeeping within the U.N. Secretariat that would be responsible for advance planning and evaluation of all peacekeeping needs and designation of special U.N. forces, which would be trained in advance and easily dispatched. The Declaration of Oslo adopted at the end of the meeting expresses regret at the growing lack of confidence in international institutions to solve world problems and asserts that only by restoring the status of the United Nations can man prevent war. Before the August meeting a group of 25 world leaders met in Geneva to consider world problems. They urged the strengthening of U.S. peacekeeping machinery, U.S. acceptance of U Thant's proposals for a settlement in Vietnam, and a halt in the arms race and the use of resources thus freed from military programs for the economic development of nations.

279
Wythe, A. R. SOME THOUGHTS OF A UNITED NATIONS SOLDIER. In Royal United Service Institution, London. Journal, v. 112, May 1967: 150-152.
U1.R8, v. 112

"For what does the U.N. soldier fight, and how must he go about it?" The United Nations now enjoys some success in persuading nations to share their economic wealth with one another but finds it more difficult to get the support it needs to fulfill its role in guaranteeing the right of peace to all men. The U.N. soldier struggles to impose the will of humanity in enforcing world peace, and to carry out his responsibilities he must be trained in political as well as military skills. The United Nations should provide a central planning staff for organizing and deploying the permanent or semipermanent forces required to meet its commitments.

D. OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, AND PROPOSALS

280
Borgese, Elisabeth M. WORLD WEB OF CRISES. Nation, v. 205, July 31, 1967: 74-79.
AP2.N2, v. 205

Describes the proceedings of Pacem in Terris II, a conference sponsored by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions and held in Geneva May 28-31, 1967. Among the topics discussed by the conference were coexistence, the Middle East crisis, Vietnam, Germany and Europe, economic development, and international law. The author notes that as the conference drew to a close war broke out in the Middle East. Suddenly international law was ignored, human rights ceased to exist, ideology yielded to power politics, and the world moved one step closer to Armageddon.

281
Bühring, Günter. WHO IS IN FAVOUR OF A CONFERENCE FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY? German foreign policy, v. 6, no. 1, 1967: 15-21.
P&GP RR

Although the United States and West Germany oppose the European Socialist states' proposal for an all-Europe conference to discuss the problems of European security, the conference is gaining support among some of the NATO states. Following the initial conference proposal in 1964 by the Polish U.N. representative, the German Democratic Republic not only agreed to the conference but also suggested that topics for discussion could include the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Europe, a realization of peace terms between both German states, conclusion of a nonaggression treaty between the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO, and greater cooperation between European states. The concepts expressed by the Warsaw Pact nations in the Bucharest Declaration on the "Consolidation of Peace and Security in Europe" intensified interest in the conference among the Governments of Finland, Denmark, Norway, and Belgium, as well as the Communist and Worker's Parties in Western Europe. Plans for the all-European conference have been impeded by Bonn's claim to be the exclusive representative of Germany and its refusal to share a conference

table with the Democratic Republic. In an atmosphere of West German opposition and uncertainty over the degree of participation of the United States, whose aggressive policies are currently "directed toward the subjugation of Western Europe," the German Democratic Republic is struggling with the other socialist European states to organize a European security conference.

282
Clemens, Walter C. ARMS CONTROL IN 1975: THE UTILITY OF A MODERNIST APPROACH. Review of international affairs, v. 18, Sept. 5, 1967: 19-20; Sept. 20: 16-19. D839.R4, v. 18

If the world wants to move toward a better life in the next decade, a "modernist" approach to the arms control problem has to be devised. This approach, designed to contain and control the arms race, must start from the following axioms: adversaries may have overlapping interests; preventive arms control is more feasible than corrective therapy; power connotes responsibility; the concept of noblesse oblige; and the necessity of looking to the future. Since the stronger nations possess a margin of security and the means to rebuild their power if an initial arms control effort aborts, it must be their responsibility to start the progress toward peace. Two important and urgent arms control problems clearly demonstrate the possibilities. The first problem concerns the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. If the United States adopts the axioms suggested for a modernist arms control policy, it could carry out the following three-stage strategy. During the first stage it might rely on its own strength and superiority and presume that the world, especially the Communist camp, is not ready for cooperation. In the second stage, when it feels that military and political containment and internal evolution have made Moscow realize that "world politics need not to be a zero sum game," it might try to establish a condominium with Russia in a group of Northern countries. When these countries learn to cooperate within this bloc, the United States might take the initiative to establish a world community based on cooperation rather than on exploitation and resentment. A world government could then replace national or bipolar power and thus ensure peace and prosperity. A similar conclusion can be drawn from an analysis of the second case, concerning the attitude of the potential nuclear-weapons countries to the spread of atomic weapons. If these powers continue to rely on traditional power politics, they will certainly acquire nuclear weapons. If they accept modernist arms control strategy and emphasize the common interests between allies and adversaries, they will develop a sense of collective security. Realization of the relative ease of preventive arms control will induce them to make the concessions essential for the conclusion of a viable treaty. Then the two superpowers will feel their responsibility to humanity and their duty to rise above small issues to prevent the spread of military power and thus make global war less likely. The modernist approach is not a panacea. Its success depends on its skillful application by politicians and decisionmakers. The responsibility of the Great Powers in this development should not be minimized.

283
Holcombe, Arthur N. A STRATEGY OF PEACE IN A CHANGING WORLD. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967. 332 p. JX1950.H68

A series of papers relating to three major steps in the struggle for world peace. The first group deals with the developing demand in the United States for a better world order. The second assesses the American experience with the organization of interstate peace in a federal union. The last group deals with problems in the organization of peace, and with Edwin Ginn's [founder of the World Peace Foundation] vision of world order.

284
Hollins, Elizabeth J., ed. PEACE IS POSSIBLE: A READER FOR LAYMEN. New York, Grossman, 1966. 339 p. JX1963.H634

A collection of readings, some original and some reprinted from other sources, which are divided into four categories: "Where We Are," various aspects of the unprecedented world situation today; "Change--to What," various views of world order and comments on the need for change; "Doubts, Dilemmas, Problems and Arguments," a list of areas in which clarification of world goals and values is needed; and "Transition Steps--and an Arrow Toward the Future," examples of steps to further the creation of world institutions to prevent war and alleviate other ills of mankind. The underlying theme is "system change." The articles are designed to show how solution of man's pressing problems, including the population explosion, poverty and illiteracy, and civil and human rights, is critically related to his most important goal--prevention of war.

285
Hope, Marjorie. IS NONVIOLENCE DEAD? War/peace report, v. 7, Aug./Sept. 1967: 12-15. P&GP RR

The concept of nonviolence, which is based on achieving political goals by peaceful yet honorable means, appears to be receiving increasing international attention. Around the world such nonviolent activities as sit-ins, teach-ins, strikes, boycotts, and fasting are employed in struggles for national freedom, civil rights, and disarmament. In the United States members of peace and civil rights movements generally view nonviolence as a useful tactic rather than a way of life. Although the philosophy of nonviolence is considered alien to the Japanese culture, which is so concerned with duty and honor, the influence of an apolitical Japanese peace group, the Beheiren, is growing, and the student peace group, Zengakuren, has become increasingly active. Now that Buddhist passive resistance in Vietnam has been almost suppressed, some Vietnamese believe that the only effective protest can come from American peace groups. In spite of the patriotic fervor aroused by skirmishes with China and Pakistan, Indians are still strongly influenced by the Gandhian tradition of nonviolence in social protest. However, few nationalist African leaders have found passive resistance helpful to their movements. Most of the many nonviolent movements in Europe link the issues of peace and social change. Latin Americans are just becoming aware of war-peace issues other than those exploited by the Communists. Today's leaders in nonviolence are for the most part practical men well aware of the problems they face and interested in improving the effectiveness of nonviolent techniques.

286
THE KEYNOTE APPEAL OF THE WORLD CONFERENCE AGAINST A-AND-H BOMBS FOR THE 22ND

285-218 O-68—5

ANNIVERSARY OF THE SUFFERING OF BOMBS (THE FIRST DRAFT). Japan Socialist review, no. 136, July 15, 1967: 34-52.
HX9.J3, 1967

Presents the text of the keynote appeal prepared by the World Conference Preparatory Committee for meetings scheduled in August. The appeal calls for an end to the war in Vietnam, a nonproliferation treaty and comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing, a nuclear nonarmament declaration by Japan, unity of the world peace movement, and enactment of a bomb victims' relief law.

287
Paul VI. Pope. DEVELOPMENT--NEW NAME FOR PEACE. UNESCO courier, no. 8, Aug./Sept. 1967: 28-36. P&GP RR

Passages from Pope Paul VI's Encyclical Letter on the Development of Peoples issued March 26, 1967, in which he stressed that "development is the new name for peace." He urged all men to cooperate in promoting economic progress and high moral ideals, emphasizing that "this international collaboration on a world-wide scale requires institutions that will prepare, co-ordinate and direct it, until finally there is established an order of justice which is universally recognized."

288
Strong, Katherine S. PEACE AND WORLD COMMUNITY. The Christian, v. 105, Sept. 24, 1967: 4-6.
BX730l.C45, v. 105

Responsibility for peace rests on individuals as well as governments. The world can survive only if men work actively and cooperatively to build a true world community in which each nation works for the good of all. Each Christian must know his faith, and clarify for himself and those around him its relevance to world problems. The relevance is obvious, for God commands man to love his neighbor and to consider all persons of equal value. He must also recognize the interdependence of the world community, and take every opportunity to overcome national and racial barriers. He must accept revolution as a fact of life and attempt to understand in each instance what is creative and what is destructive. Men must continually evaluate their governments' policies in the light of the Christian gospel and God's purpose. Today's world problems can be met only by governments, but individuals can use their power as citizens to influence government policies, for there is ample proof that public opinion is often a decisive factor in government decisions. Christians must rise up with one voice and declare, "There must be peace."

IV. GENERAL ANALYSES AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

A. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

289
[THE U.S.S.R.'S 50-YEAR FIGHT FOR DISARMAMENT, 1917-1967: A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS] Piat'desiat let boy'by SSSR za razoruzhenie, 1917-1967: sbornik dokumentov. Moskva, Nauka, 1967. 690 p.
JX1974. P485

A chronological collection of 201 documents on disarmament. Included are documents of Socialist and Western governments and resolutions and addresses read at the United Nations and other international organizations, congresses, and conferences. The purpose of the book is to familiarize the reader with the basic Soviet documents on disarmament.

B. GENERAL ANALYSES

290
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL. In its Issues before the 21st General Assembly. New York, 1966. (International conciliation. Sept. 1966, no. 559) p. 20-36.
JX1907.A8, no. 559

Limited disarmament proposals--the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, the nonproliferation treaty, and nuclear-free zones--are running into difficult problems. When the partial test ban treaty was signed pressure was generated to extend it to underground testing, but inspection and safeguards questions have stalemated negotiations. The Soviet Union refuses to allow inspectors on its territory, while the United States and Great Britain refuse to agree to a prohibition of explosions without verification. Current hopes for a comprehensive test ban treaty center on the "threshold treaty" and "verification by challenge" concepts but inspection and safeguards issues have made the negotiations for a nonproliferation treaty difficult. The Soviet Union has flatly rejected the U.S. proposal on the grounds that it permits participation of West Germany in a multilateral nuclear force, and the nonnuclear powers insist on nuclear guarantees (a freeze or stockpile reductions) that will prevent the great powers from employing nuclear blackmail. Despite disappointment in disarmament negotiations, nuclear-free zone proposals are making progress. Already, Latin American and African countries have drawn up draft treaties that are expected to be ratified in early 1967.

291
Deutsch, Karl. ARMS CONTROL AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: EUROPE FACES COMING POLICY DECISIONS. New York, Wiley [1967] 167 p.
JX1974.7.D478

Contents. --Policy choices on European security and arms control. --The halting of European integration since the mid-1950's. --Proposals for arms control in Europe and their press reception. --Changing images of danger: cold war versus relaxation. --The common fear of nuclear proliferation and the general support for disarmament and arms control. --Who wants the MLF: the lack of support for national nuclear deterrents. --Outlook for a decade: the stability of trends. --Prospects for policy.

A discussion of present and future national attitudes in Europe toward arms control and disarmament. Most of the book is based on a study conducted at Yale during 1963-65 that examined European attitudes toward arms control and disarmament. The study proposes two hypotheses: that France and Germany are the key countries in the success or failure of political integration and of arms control and disarmament, and that the rest of the West European community will go along with French and German decisions. The study concludes that a majority of people in France and Germany desire arms control and disarmament, that there is opposition to Germany's acquiring nuclear weapons, that the most reasonable approach to arms control and disarmament would be to limit the possession of nuclear weapons to the five nuclear powers, and that alliances (particularly with the United States) and supranational organizations and institutions are popular.

292
Dirks, Walter. [DEPARTURE FROM "THE JUST WAR"] Abschied vom "gerechten Krieg." Frankfurter Hefte, v. 22, July 1967: 489-496.
AP30.F555, v. 22

Discusses the evolution of the Catholic doctrine of peace and war. Dirks points out the Roman Catholic Church's deemphasis in recent decades of its classical doctrine of just and unjust war and its growing emphasis on war as a moral evil in the modern age.

293
[PAX BIBLIOGRAPHY] Peace, v. 3, spring/summer 1967: 3-38. P&GP RR

Contains an index to articles and book reviews that appeared in Peace, v. 1 and v. 2, 1963-66, and an annotated bibliography of books, pamphlets, anthologies, and encyclicals on war and peace. The items in the bibliography range "from theory and theology to practice and reportage; from classic texts to contemporary accounts; from histories of war and peacemaking in the past to such present situations as Vietnam, nuclear deterrence, and nonviolent resistance to the warfare state."

294
Reyhl, Erich. [THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE ON A NEW COURSE] Die Abrüstungskonferenz auf neuen Wegen. Die Weltwoche, no. 1767, Sept. 22, 1967: 5.
AP32.W4, 1967

Discusses the growing discontent with the work of the Disarmament Committee and possibilities for improving the structure and methods of the organization. Reyhl supports Jerome B. Wiesner's recommendation at the 17th Pugwash Conference to replace

the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament with a more efficient organization under a Deputy United Nations General Secretary. Both ways of achieving disarmament, by an agreement on general and complete disarmament or by a step-by-step program, are impossible; therefore, any disarmament agreement should be provisional for 3 years and then should be revised, before it becomes permanent.

C. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

295
Ardatovsky, Vadim. THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE. UNESCO courier, no. 8, Aug./Sept. 1967: 22-26. P&GP RR

If the world could look forward to an era of peace, "mankind could fulfil its destiny at a much more rapid pace." Because wars involve tremendous destruction of lives and property, they impede the advancement of civilization. General disarmament is the only means of guaranteeing a lasting peace and eliminating the "material" basis for fear and distrust between nations. Disarmament negotiations since World War II have been complicated by the debate over the control of nuclear weapons. While continuing their efforts to resolve this problem, the major nations should lay the groundwork for general disarmament by limiting the arms race. Some progress has already been made in this direction as demonstrated by the 1959 treaty guaranteeing the demilitarization of the Antarctic; the 1963 agreement to ban nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater; and the 1967 agreement banning nuclear or other mass destructive weapons from outer space. Since the danger of war increases with the spread of nuclear weapons, the conclusion of a nuclear nonproliferation treaty is particularly urgent as a step toward banning atomic weapons everywhere in the world. Until arms control measures are enacted, nations will continue to expend tremendous sums for armaments that could be used to improve the living conditions of the people.

296
Sheikh, Mujib A. DISARMAMENT AND THE IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT. Pakistan horizon, v. 20, no. 1, 1967: 48-52. DS376.P32, v. 20

Politics among nations has become a struggle for power, and expansion of national power the immediate aim of nations engaged in conflict. Ideology acts as moral and ethical justification of national actions and as a means to persuade individuals to sacrifice their interests for the larger benefit. National power consists of many elements, but military strength is currently the most important. The arms race creates political tensions but at the same time is caused by these tensions. Expansion of military power by either side is almost impossible now due to fear of mutual destruction; the only alternative is its elimination. General and complete disarmament as envisioned here would establish nation states with defined territorial limits as the basic unit of world order. No state would have sufficient power to conduct physical aggression against another. An international agency would have sufficient force to ensure compliance with the agreement and enforce its decisions but would have no authority over the internal affairs of the nation states, except where they impinge on the terms of the agreement. Disarmament would release enormous economic resources that could bear the cost of the international agency and be used for economic and welfare activities. These resources could also be used for continuing, in a new form, the present world ideological struggle. When disarmament has eliminated national destructive forces, ideological conflict--as it affects our physical existence--will become harmless, but propaganda, subversion, and economic exploitation and maneuvering will increase. Perhaps ultimately a world government based on universal principles might evolve, which would tone down the conflict of ideologies.

V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

A. NEGOTIATION

297
Aboltin, V. IA., ed. [NATIONAL POLICY AND DISARMAMENT] Politika gosudarstv i razoruzhenie. [Book 1] [THE USSR, THE USA, AND DISARMAMENT] SSSR, SShA i razoruzhenie. Moskva, Nauka, 1967. 190 p. JX1974.A34

Partial contents.--The struggle for peace and the problem of disarmament, by V. IA. Aboltin, I. S. Glagolev, and I. I. Orlik.--The Soviet Union's fight for disarmament, by L. I. Ignat'ev.--United States military policy and disarmament, by I. S. Glagolev.

An analysis of the political orientations of the United States and the Soviet Union as they bear on disarmament negotiations. Aboltin discusses the different arms control programs proposed by the Soviet Union and the United States; he claims the United States makes its proposals only in order to assume first place in the world forum. The Soviet Union proposes a general and complete disarmament plan, supports the Rapacki and Gomułka plans, offers defense cutbacks and reduction of its Armed Forces. But the U.S. "military-industrial complex" opposes these plans, because defense expenditures bring great profits, which prevent economic crises, expedite economic development, and ensure employment. The anti-Hitler coalition between the Soviet and capitalist countries has demonstrated that an agreement on important problems is possible. In order to save life on earth, nuclear test ban treaties in all three spheres can be concluded: the necessity creates the possibility.

298
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. DISARMAMENT. In its Issues before the 22nd General Assembly. New York, 1967. (International conciliation. Sept. 1967, no. 564) p. 33-43. JX1907.A8, no. 564

Enumerates the arms control and disarmament issues before the 22nd General Assembly of the United Nations. They include nuclear proliferation, arms traffic, a comprehensive test ban treaty, and a nonproliferation treaty. Despite many setbacks the General Assembly has made real progress in disarmament by endorsing a treaty on the principles governing the activities of states in outer space and by drawing up a treaty to create a nuclear-free zone in Latin America.

299
Deutsch, Morton, and others. STRATEGIES OF INDUCING COOPERATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 11, Sept. 1967: 345-360. graphs. JX1901.J6, v. 11

The experiment reported in this paper studies five behavioral strategies to see which is most effective in eliciting cooperation from someone whose behavior is not initially or persistently cooperative. The effectiveness of the strategies was investigated in a two-person laboratory game. One of the players was an accomplice of the experimenter who followed a predetermined strategy in response to the S's behavior in the game. Results indicate that S's tend to exploit an accomplice who follows a Turn the Other Cheek strategy unless this strategy represents a reform or change from previous aggressive behavior. The Nonpunitive strategy elicited considerably more cooperativeness than the Deterrent strategy. (Abstract supplied)

B. REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR

1. Escalation

2. Conventional Arms Transfers

300
ARMS FOR LAGOS. West Africa, no. 2620, Aug. 19, 1967: 1093-1094. DT491.W4, 1967

Traces arms shipments from Great Britain to the Federal Government of Nigeria. In addition France, West Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Russia--which is alleged to have concluded an agreement to send 50 Soviet military experts--have all contributed to beefing up the Federal Government by selling it arms.

301
ARMS SALES AND FOREIGN POLICY. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 23, Sept. 1967: 44-48. TK9145.A84, v. 23

"Excerpted from . . . the United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 'Arms Sales and Foreign Policy,' January 25, 1967."

Considers the dimensions of the United States arms sales program in the framework of its total military export market. The study discussess the financing of military exports, the policy control of arms sales, and the implications of both for U.S. relations with its European allies. It recommends that Congress "examine the decisionmaking process of the military sales program to determine whether the Arms Control Agency and Agency for International Development are meeting their responsibilities as defined by law" and that the United States "take the initiative in organizing" zones that would be free of sophisticated weapons.

302
CHUCKING GUNS AROUND. Economist, v. 225, July 8, 1967: 93-94. HG11.E2, v. 225

Both the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 and, more recently, the third major conflict between Israel and the Arab nations have caused the world's chief arms suppliers to feel somewhat uneasy. Not, however, uneasy enough to curb a profitable trade that is mutually advantageous to supplier and receiver. Massive indifference was the U.N. reaction to a 1965 Maltese proposal that information be collected on the traffic in arms. These conventional weapons, though useful economically and for defense, can also create illusions. Arms supplied to India and Pakistan were intended for

protection from their Communist neighbors, and were not to be used against each other. Despite the fact that the United States supported Israel in its war, it had previously been disclosed that American military aid to Jordan was twice that given to Israel; and Washington must have been quite surprised to find its Sabre jets involved in the harassing of British airliners by Spain. Still, no one is rushing to do anything to limit the conventional-arms traffic. If concern over the war has in fact created conditions for a Middle East settlement, then arms limitation should be included. More than one region would benefit from a curb on that arms race.

303
[EIGHT HAWKER SIDDELEY H.S. 748'S FOR THE GERMAN AIR FORCE?] Acht Hawker Siddeley H.S. 748 für die Luftwaffe? by H. Sch. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, Sept. 1, 1967: 469-471. illus.
U3.W38, v. 11

The author of the present report describes the technical design of the aerial survey version of Britain's Hawker Siddeley HS. 748 turboprop aircraft. The German Air Force is also considering the purchase of up-to-date survey aircraft. At present the Luftwaffe's aerial survey squadron at Lechfeld is using Douglas C-47 Ds equipped for TACAN [tactical air navigation] survey work, but these aircraft are now very aged and no longer really meet requirements, so must be replaced by a suitable successor. To this end several types have already been considered. It has also been suggested that a number of the Noratlas due to be taken out of service should be equipped with a pressure cabin and receive certain other necessary modifications. However, the cost of this conversion, excluding the actual survey equipment, would run to some 1,7 million DM. What is more, the Noratlas is a high-wing design, and propeller modulations would make it almost impossible to find a suitable arrangement for the antennas required for survey work. Since the Federal Air Traffic Control Establishment has ordered a HS. 748 for survey duties, this type is reportedly also under discussion for the Luftwaffe. Present thinking envisages an initial order for eight aircraft, to be delivered within the next two years, as the four C-47 Ds are to be withdrawn from service by then. (Abstract supplied)

304
Hasan, K. Sarwar. THE BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN ARMS AID TO PAKISTAN. Pakistan horizon, v. 20, 2d quarter 1967: 120-126.
DS376.P32, v. 20

Since Pakistan has neither the funds to purchase military equipment nor the indigenous resources for the manufacture of arms, it has been forced to seek foreign military assistance for defense against the Indian threat. The United States recognizes the strategic importance of Pakistan for its policy aimed at the containment of communism in Asia and for this reason signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with Pakistan in May 1954. In accepting American military aid, the Pakistani leaders made it clear that the arms were intended only to protect the country against attack and were not to be used for aggressive purposes. Pakistan could not have held its own against India in the September 1965 war without the help of the $1.5 billion of American military assistance. However, it has paid heavily in many ways for its alliance with the United States. Pakistan lost prestige at the United Nations, where it followed the American line and where India assumed leadership of the nonalined world; it also lost favor with China, the Arab States, and the Soviet Union, who distrust Pakistani military ties with the United States.

305
Hasan, Zubeida. UNITED STATES ARMS POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA, 1965-1967. Pakistan horizon, v. 20, 2d quarter 1967: 127-136. DS376.P32, v. 20

The U.S. decision to discontinue military assistance to India and Pakistan in the hopes of avoiding an arms race between the two countries is bound to have far-reaching repercussions in South Asia. Although the new policy was announced in April 1967, arms shipments to both countries had been suspended since the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan war in September 1965. Even though officials in New Delhi at first voiced anger and resentment over the U.S. announcement, they quickly realized it would more adversely affect Pakistan than it would India. Until 1965 Pakistan Armed Forces were equipped entirely with American weapons whereas India had two other major suppliers--Britain and the Soviet Union. India also has a greater capacity for indigenous production of arms than Pakistan. The spare parts arrangement was no concession since most of the equipment serviced under this arrangement is obsolete and Pakistan would be required to submit an inventory of its military possessions to the U.S. Government. Since the basic cause for animosity between India and Pakistan, the dispute over Kashmir and Jammu, continues to exist, the revised arms policy of the United States has not succeeded in stopping the arms race in that region. The possibility that India may increase its military capability against China may also thwart any efforts to bring about a reduction in armaments. The withdrawal of American military aid indicates that U.S. policymakers were wrong to assume "first, that South Asia is threatened by Chinese expansionism, and secondly, that India and Pakistan will act as a single element of power in American global strategy."

306
Kemp, Geoffrey. REARMAMENT IN LATIN AMERICA. World today, v. 23, Sept. 1967: 375-384.
D410.W63, v. 23

The recent purchases of military equipment, particularly jet combat aircraft, by Latin American countries has led to speculation that the participants are engaging in a dangerous arms race. However, an analysis of the criteria for the reequipment programs does not substantiate these fears. Since most of their military equipment is antiquated and obsolete, it is not surprising that Latin American countries have negotiated with the United States and Europe for modern aircraft purchases. The Latin American countries obviously required new equipment to maintain some air- and sea-power, but an examination of the arguments against the recent purchases will determine whether or not the particular aircraft and warships ordered meet the area's strategic requirements. U.S. officials of the Departments of State and Defense stress that the Latin American countries need to improve their capabilities to deal with local insurgency, but the former believe that the sophisticated weapons ordered by these countries are unsuitable for this purpose. However, the U.S. review ignores the Latin American desire to be independent from the United States and the prestige value sophisticated weapons systems have for countries with historical traditions of military professionalism. Critics in

both the United States and Europe "argue that the present rearmament spree is wasteful, encourages arms races and border disputes, and strengthens the influence of the military in Latin America." Actually modernization of military forces could have a long-term economic advantage for a country by creating knowledge of and interest in certain aspects of modern technology, and the purchase of a few pieces of outdated equipment will not lead to an arms race in an area that has never seen a military balance of power. Furthermore, the military establishment in a Latin American country is often supported by a broad spectrum of the public, and its various service branches sometimes reflect both liberal and progressive attitudes to social changes. Others argue that the Latin American rearmament program gives a commercial advantage to European manufacturers since they can trade freely with these countries whereas the sales of heavy military equipment to Latin America by U.S. manufacturers are closely regulated by the Government.

307
McCarthy, Eugene J. ARMS AND THE MAN WHO SELLS THEM. Atlantic, v. 220, Oct. 1967: 82-86.
AP2.A8, v. 220

The U.S. military assistance program was inaugurated in response to the military challenge of the cold war in Europe, but its continued existence gives American foreign policy a military orientation at times when a political response would be preferable. The United States is now the world's leading supplier of arms, with a program of grants and sales that runs about $3 billion per year. It provides arms, equipment, and training to virtually all nations throughout the world judged to have "free world orientation." In many nations these arms expenditures consume money badly needed for economic and social development. In others, as with the recent war between India and Pakistan, U.S. arms are used on both sides of a conflict. Officially the Secretary of State is responsible for military assistance and arms sales, but recent studies show that the State Department is rarely consulted, and then only with the option of overturning an agreement already made. Yet the program has serious implications for U.S. foreign policy, because aid is invariably accompanied by the stationing of military personnel to supervise, assist, and advise. Defense Secretary McNamara recently suggested that the military assistance program supports "some 5 million men . . . who help us hold the line against aggression." The most obvious challenge to this contention is the South Vietnamese Army, which despite U.S. aid has proved unable and unwilling to fight and incapable of maintaining even minimum security. Supporters insist that the military assistance program in Latin America is more justifiable because it emphasizes the use of local military forces for nonmilitary projects. However, civic action is part of the Defense Department's counterinsurgency program, which also seeks to improve the image of a nation's government and military among its citizens. Quite apart from the program's questionable efficacy, one might wonder if the strengthening and support of the military faction within these nations is in the best interests of the United States. The disparity is growing between the stated and real aims of U.S. military assistance, which has turned from one-shot or short-term arrangements to relatively long-term and continuing commitments with a high degree of institutionalization. Military assistance does not, as is claimed, add to the strength of the free world. Its primary aim is to develop clients, erect military-political bastions, preserve or upset regional balances of power, and maintain favored regimes against internal subversion.

308
MASSIVE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW COULD CAUSE ARMS EXPORT CUTS. Aviation week and space technology, v. 87, July 31, 1967: 22.
TL501.A8, v. 87

Discusses congressional displeasure with the United States arms export program. The chief criticism is of the secrecy of the Defense Department concerning use of the Export-Import Bank to finance arms purchases by foreign countries. If Congress refuses to raise the loan authorization ceiling, overseas civilian aircraft sales will be threatened.

309
NOW RUSSIA ESCALATES THE WAR. U.S. news & world report, v. 63, Oct. 9, 1967: 39-41. illus.
JK1.U65, v. 63

Vietnam increasingly finds itself a Soviet-American battlefield. With its newest and biggest pledge of arms shipments to North Vietnam the Soviet Union has dropped all pretense of being a peace-seeker in this war. North Vietnam's Prime Minister has declared openly, "We will defeat the Americans with Soviet weapons." Until 1965 the Soviets supplied the North Vietnamese with only $35 million of arms per year; now Soviet aid is a billion dollars or more yearly. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Earle Wheeler estimates that the war cannot be ended unless the Russian war supplies are cut off from Vietnam. Soviet aid in 1968 will consist of artillery and antiaircraft guns primarily, with little increase in surface-to-air missiles. With these supplies Hanoi will be able to intensify its attacks and raise the American casualties caused "by guns and bullets coming straight out of Soviet Russia."

310
Qureshi, Khalida. ARMS AID TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN. Pakistan horizon, v. 20, 2d quarter 1967: 137-150. DS376.P32, v. 20

Discusses the military programs pursued by foreign powers in India and Pakistan. Because of the vast resources and the strategic location of these two countries, both Communist and non-Communist countries bid for influence in this region by supplying arms. Next to the United States, Britain plays the most important non-Communist role in the defense of India and Pakistan. Along with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand it has provided both countries with military equipment through Commonwealth programs, military alliances, and bilateral sales agreements. In spite of Pakistani protests, Britain gave massive military assistance to India to combat the Chinese threat following the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict. France and West Germany have supplied arms to India and Pakistan, probably motivated more by commercial objectives than the British, who have strategic interests in the area "East of the Suez." Iran, Turkey, and Indonesia overcame Indian pressures and provided military aid to Pakistan during its confrontation with India in 1965. Among the Communist countries, the Soviet Union and several East European countries have supplied military equipment to India, and China has given arms to Pakistan.

311
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian

Affairs. ARMS SALES TO THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES. Hearings, 90th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1967. 102 p. HD9743.U6A5425

Investigates arms sales and military assistance to Iran, India, and Pakistan. The subcommittee was disturbed that the Soviet Union had sold $110 million worth of light armaments to Iran since the United States had just sold Iran one of its most sophisticated fighter interceptors. It was also disclosed that a West German firm, the Merex Corp. (an agent for Interarmco, of Virginia) was supplying Pakistan with arms. Merex is being used as an outlet for the sale of surplus American military equipment. The report recommends that the United States take definite steps to limit the arms race, especially in tension areas.

312
WINSTON, Donald C. WHITE HOUSE BATTLES TO BLOCK EXPORT BAN. Aviation week & space technology, v. 87, August 21, 1967: 21. TL501.A8, v. 87

In moving toward tighter congressional control of arms exports, the Senate voted to prohibit secret credit transactions that allow the Export-Import Bank to finance arms purchases by foreign countries and is debating the proposal of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to cut $205 million from the FY 1968 foreign aid military assistance funds. Since the House Foreign Affairs Committee did not recommend abolition of secret arms sales and cut only $30 million from the military assistance budget, a conference session will probably be needed to reach a compromise on the House and Senate bills. Administration forces are attempting to block the cut in funds and to combat the report of the Senate committee that criticized foreign aid policies and Pentagon secrecy in allocating public funds.

3. Nuclear Proliferation

313
Ahmed, Samir. THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: "PROS AND CONS." Disarmament, no. 14, June 1967: 18-20. JX1961.P7D5, 1967

A nonproliferation treaty could strengthen the division between nuclear and conventional weapons, making it politically difficult for nuclear aspirants to acquire weapons and helping to dissipate the halo surrounding nuclear-power status. For almost 20 years such a treaty has been discussed, but now that the nuclear powers are close to agreement the nonnuclear nations have expressed objections. They contend that the treaty should embody an acceptable balance of obligations between nuclear and nonnuclear powers, provide concrete steps toward general and complete disarmament, contain adequate inspection provisions, and not interfere with the establishment of nuclear-free zones. Germany, Italy, and various other Euratom [European Atomic Energy Community] members have united with the eight nonalined nations in opposing the proposed treaty. Germany, unwilling to play the lone advocate of the defeated multilateral nuclear force, has shifted to technological arguments, i.e., that the ban on nuclear weapons production denies nonnuclear nations the advantage of technological "spin-off." Experts claim this is a spurious argument and consider it evidence of German nuclear aspirations. The Euratom powers have objected to the treaty's provision for International Atomic Energy Agency inspection on grounds of industrial espionage, despite arguments that Euratom inspection is far more dangerous in this respect. Since nuclear powers stand to gain as much as, or even more than, the nonnuclear nations from the treaty, they might offer certain concessions such as superpower agreement on a comprehensive test ban, a cutoff on the production of fissionable materials, a no-first-use pledge, and a halt in production and a reduction in stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The nonnuclear nations have voiced valid objections and challenges to the treaty. Whether their requirements will be met is hard to predict, but without valid security provisions no nation will relinquish its nuclear options.

314
Albonetti, Achille. THE NPT DRAFT UNDER SCRUTINY. Survival, v. 9, July 1967: 223-226. U162.S9, v. 9

Translated from an article in L'Industria Lombardia, Apr. 22, 1967. HC301.IC

Serious political and technical consequences of the nonproliferation treaty will hinder the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The treaty's system of control and inspection would prohibit the military nonnuclear powers from carrying out peaceful atomic explosions, and the instrument of control, the International Atomic Energy Agency would supervise all signatories except the nuclear powers. By preventing the formation of a European nuclear force the treaty would infringe upon an agreement between the United States and Euratom [European Atomic Energy Community] and compromise the chances for European political federation or unity. Politically the treaty cannot be considered a disarmament measure because it would not reduce or effectively control existing armaments. For this treaty to be effective in the reduction of international tensions it must be based on a real sharing of obligations between the nuclear and nonnuclear powers.

315
Beaufre, André. POLITICAL ASPECTS OF BMD. Survival, v. 9, July 1967: 222-223. U162.S9, v. 9

Developments in the East-West détente are leading to a nuclear moratorium between the United States and the Soviet Union. The antiballistic missile [ABM] crisis has made a U.S.-Russian accord imperative, despite the Vietnam War. The nonproliferation treaty--a first step in the moratorium--will have to be amended to allow the nonnuclear countries to sign. Some American officials are not in favor of a moratorium; they fear that Russia's ABM system will upset the strategic balance and that the only answer is a U.S. missile defense system. Nevertheless, even though a nuclear moratorium may resolve Soviet-American problems, it will not solve other problems of world security, especially in Asia and the Middle East.

316
Bechert, K. [THE QUESTION OF THE TREATY ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION] Zur Frage des Atomsperrvertrages. In Atomsperrvertrag oder nicht? Physikalische Blätter, v. 23, May 1967: 213-215. QC1.D415, v. 23

A nuclear nonproliferation treaty should, among other things, prevent Europe from becoming a nuclear power. Any third nuclear superpower, especially if it

had a united Europe's potential for acquiring antiballistic missiles in quantity, could easily offset the existing balance of power and thus cause a new world war. The United States and the Soviet Union are probably in agreement that the nonproliferation treaty would obviate such danger. Fears that the treaty would permanently bar the nonnuclear nations from full utilization for peaceful purposes of technological advances made as a byproduct of military nuclear projects are ungrounded. For years no essential advances of this nature have been made. Ordinary communications in the world of science also keep any important scientific secret from lasting long. Since France, a European Atomic Energy Community [EURATOM] member, will not sign the nonproliferation treaty, Euratom can hardly qualify as an effective agent for international control under the treaty. The International Atomic Energy Agency would be best suited for that purpose.

317
THE BONN-PRETORIA ATOM AXIS. Democratic German report, v. 16, July 14, 1967: 105-108. DD261.D3, v. 16

Attempts to prove with the help of excerpts from the German and South African press that the Federal Republic of Germany is cooperating with South Africa in the development of nuclear weapons and rockets.

318
Chalfont, Arthur Gwynne Jones, baron. ARMS CONTROL OR NUCLEAR ANARCHY? Review of international affairs, v. 18, May 5, 1967: 3-6. D839.R4, v. 18

Unless nuclear weapons are brought under some sort of international control there will almost certainly be a nuclear holocaust. The nuclear nonproliferation treaty is a significant step toward such control, but the treaty's success will depend upon the resolution of several complex problems. The solutions to the problems of inspection and safeguards, industrial espionage, the balance of obligations, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must begin with the Great Powers' efforts to put a stop to their own arms race. Second, certain provisions must be injected into the treaty that would allow the nonnuclear powers to withdraw if the Great Powers do not fulfill their part of the bargain. Third, the treaty must be designed solely to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and not to keep nations from gaining access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Finally, the safeguards system must be above all suspicion and must not disrupt any existing arrangements for the exchange of civil nuclear technology.

319
Chopra, M. K. [INDIA IN A NUCLEAR DILEMMA] Indien im Atom-Dilemma. Wehrkunde, v. 16, June 1967: 289-292. U3.W396, v. 16

Underlines India's potential capability--in terms of scientific know-now and existing natural resources--to embark on a nuclear arms program. Chopra lists the pros and cons of such a program and summarizes the nations's reservations with regard to the proposed treaty on nuclear nonproliferation.

320
Douglas, R. N. UNITED STATES ANTI-PROLIFERATION POLICIES IN THE 60'S. Australian outlook, v. 21, Aug. 1967: 179-197. DU80.A9479, v. 21

Examines the various policies that the United States has pursued in its efforts to curb nuclear proliferation. The United States has avoided giving assistance for national nuclear weapons programs, sought to ensure that civilian nuclear installations will not be used for nonpeaceful purposes, and attempted to negotiate a nonproliferation treaty. The United States Atoms for Peace program and its ratification of the test ban treaty are further aspects of its policy of nonproliferation. Douglas concludes that the main reason nations wish to achieve nuclear status is the desire for independence, security, and prestige.

321
Evans, Medford. THE H-BOMB: BULL IN CHINA SHOPTALK. American opinion, v. 10, Oct. 1967: 73-85. AP2.O4732, v. 10

Contends that the technology involved in building nuclear weapons is far too complex for Communist China to master. Evans speculates that the nuclear explosion reported in June in Sinkiang Province may have been a Russian test on Chinese soil, or perhaps some elaborate fakery to fool the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. He does not deny that China possesses a small nuclear arsenal, but feels these weapons were either stolen or leaked from the West, particularly the United States. The Chinese Communists have an established tradition of getting their weapons and equipment from their enemy, Evans notes, and the United States has an established tradition of managing its uranium and plutonium in such a way that other nations can obtain it.

322
Frank, Lewis A. ABM AND NONPROLIFERATION: RELATED ISSUES. Orbis, v. 11, spring 1967: 67-79. D839.O68, v. 11

A limited U.S. antiballistic missile [ABM] deployment would be the most effective way to check China's nuclear arms potential, even if this means providing India and Japan with antiballistic missiles. A nuclear guarantee or the United States massive retaliation capabilities would do little to calm the fears of these countries. Indeed possession by nonnuclear third powers of antimissile defenses coupled with a nonproliferation agreement would deter them from constructing their own nuclear offensive systems. If the United States chooses to retain a passive defense (i.e., no ABM) it would have to "bribe" the nonnuclear countries with increased foreign aid and strategic offensive missile capabilities to prevent proliferation. In all probability such a decision would reduce the chances of the nonnuclear powers' accepting a nonproliferation treaty. The possibilities of a full active defense coupled with a nonproliferation treaty are remote. A full-scale escalation program would be inconsistent with the period of relaxed tension needed for negotiations. Such a deployment would increase the Great Powers' deterrent capability but would "reduce the credibility of their commitment to wage nuclear war on behalf of their alliance partners." This would mean that within NATO, for example, Great Britain would assume a greater role as a nuclear deterrent force; there might even be a renewed campaign for a NATO nuclear force. Should both Russia and America construct large ABM defenses "it would decrease the ability of other powers to exact a high price, through bargaining for security guarantees, for staying out of the nuclear club." As a result the advantage from not signing a nonproliferation treaty would be lost. But despite

certain benefits "full" ABM deployment would not in the end constrain proliferation; for that the best policy seems to be "thin" or "middle way" and less expensive deployment.

323
Higatsberger, Michael J. [SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY] Einige Gedanken zum Atomsperrvertrag. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 5, May/June 1967: 220-222. P&GP RR

The news about the U.S. and Soviet stands on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty drawing closer has evoked mixed reaction in the world. A thirty-fifth part of the American or a ninth part of the Soviet nuclear arsenal could destroy all life on earth. This alone makes for a common Soviet-American interest in the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Practically every country that has a nuclear-power production capacity of a few thousand MW could become "a serious producer of atomic weapons." Today about 2 dozen states in addition to the five nuclear powers have this capacity. The proposed nonproliferation treaty would apply different rules to nuclear and nonnuclear states. The reservations of the latter about the treaty concern, among other things, the possibility of industrial espionage by the proposed international inspectors. Chances of such espionage in nonnuclear countries would be limited however. Eighty percent of the world's achievements in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy fall to four of the nuclear powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France. And, the espionage theory would hold only if nuclear power plants were for the most part where plutonium is produced, which is not the case. A further argument against the treaty is that this would hinder research and development in the nonnuclear countries and, in effect, harm their economies. Thus far, the monopoly of the nuclear powers on nuclear arms production has not really hampered research and development in other nations. Neither does the proposed inspection under the treaty need to encroach on the sovereignty of its signatories. In 1965 the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Tokyo adopted an inspection system for big power reactors. Almost 100 nations accepted that system without feeling their sovereignty was being impaired.

324
Hosmer, Craig. THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. In American Security Council. Washington report, Sept. 11, 1967: 1-4. P&GP RR

While on the surface the nonproliferation treaty proposed by the United States and the Soviet Union may appear desirable, its risks and costs should be carefully weighed against its potential values. The treaty is useless without the signatures of France and Communist China, but both have boycotted the very idea of a treaty. Even without a treaty the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain are unlikely to give nuclear weapons to irresponsible troublemakers. The vast majority of nonnuclear nations lack the technological and industrial base to go nuclear, and so their promises not to build bombs and not to accept bombs from nations like China are meaningless. Those few nonnuclear nations that will eventually have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons are unlikely to be deterred by the treaty's useless security promises. Nuclear weapons in the hands of some prospective producers could be troublesome, but how much so and whether the treaty could effectively prevent their acquisition are debatable issues. When survival is at stake, nations do what they must to stay alive. Furthermore the nuclear capabilities of potential nuclear powers are limited and pose little threat to the superpowers. Those concerned with the escalation of regional conflicts should concentrate on eliminating the causes of the conflicts rather than the weapons with which they are conducted. A nuclear-armed China among nonnuclear nations can be more destabilizing than the arming of China's neighbors with nuclear weapons. At today's levels of technology the United States could devise a control to permit it to supply to its allies nuclear warheads that cannot be fired except for defense. The treaty would deny this valuable option of selective proliferation. In addition, the International Atomic Energy Agency would probably have responsibility for inspection under the treaty, yet at the beginning of 1967 this organization employed only 11 inspectors, was inadequately financed, and was headed by a "Communist Czechoslovakian." Instead of supporting such a farce the United States should drop the treaty as unenforceable, or should eliminate article 3 and rely on universal suspicion among nations to protect against cheating.

325
[HOW THE PHYSICISTS FEEL ABOUT SIGNING THE TREATY] Wie Physiker über die Unterzeichnung denken. In Atomsperrvertrag oder nicht? Physikalische Blätter, v. 23, May 1967: 215-217. QC1.D415, v. 23

Statements by West German physicists who want the German Federal Republic to support the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. M. Born, W. Gerlach, O. Hahn, [O.] Haxel, W. Heisenberg, W. Kliefoth, H. Maier-Leibnitz, F. Strassmann, W. Walcher, and C. F. Weizsäcker each give their reasons why West Germany should sign the treaty.

326
Johnson, Lyndon B., Pres. U.S., and William C. Foster. DRAFT TREATY ON NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUBMITTED TO GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 57, Sept. 11, 1967: 315-320. JX232.A33, v. 57

Statements by the President and by the U.S. Ambassador to the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee on the occasion of the presentation of the draft treaty on nuclear nonproliferation. The text of the treaty itself is appended.

327
Lang, Daniel. LETTER FROM GENEVA. New Yorker, v. 43, Aug. 5, 1967: 70, 72, 74, 77-79. AP2.N6763, v. 43

An eyewitness account of the 18-Nation Disarmament Commission's work on a nonproliferation treaty. In an interview format Lang analyzes the positions of opponents and proponents of the proposed treaty.

328
Larson, Arthur. LAST CHANCE ON NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION? Saturday review, v. 50, Oct. 7, 1967: 21-24. Z1219.S25, v. 50

Unless effective controls are imposed in the near future, nuclear weapons could fall into the hands not only of quarreling states but even of revolutionary

factions, guerrillas, gangsters, and various extremist groups. On the basis of industrial capacity, wealth, technical experience, and access to fissionable materials it has been surmised that at least 25 nations are capable of producing nuclear weapons in the next 10 years. Civilian reactors outside the United States already produce enough plutonium to manufacture 500 bombs per year, and will produce enough for 5,000 per year by 1980. Most of the objections of the nonnuclear states to the proposed nonproliferation treaty recently tabled by the United States and the Soviet Union are clearly "phony." Many argue, for example, that the treaty prevents their use of peaceful nuclear explosions in such activities as building and excavation. However, the technology for such explosions without excessive radiation hazard is so sophisticated that even the more advanced nations have not solved the problem. And when they have, international controls could be designed so that all nations could share the "atomic dynamite." Nonnuclear states also argue that they will be denied the technological "spinoff" from nuclear development, but the scientific value of weapons programs is negligible, and the power reactors, where the real progress is made, will still be open to them. Many nonnuclear states feel that the nuclear states should make some sacrifices such as a reduction of armaments, comparable to their renunciation of nuclear weapons. While the value of such a reduction is beyond doubt, this question involves different problems and requires negotiations separate from those on the nonproliferation treaty. Finally, European arguments against International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] inspection and for Euratom are "phony," for IAEA inspectors are capable of handling the job and have a record of competence and integrity. Only one real obstacle to nonproliferation exists and that is the matter of security guarantees to nonnuclear states. The only workable and acceptable guarantee is through the United Nations. The nonnuclear nations may accept the treaty on the provision that guarantees will be worked out, and if the guarantees are not forthcoming the treaty will disintegrate. However if a U.N. security system is achieved, the double advantage of the treaty and a strengthened United Nations will result.

329
Martin, Laurence W. NON-PROLIFERATION: WHO'LL KILL COCK ROBIN? Spectator, v. 219, Aug. 18, 1967: 183-184. AP4.S7, v. 219

The draft nonproliferation treaty tabled by the United States and Soviet Union fails to specify verification arrangements, an omission that diminishes its significance. The Soviet Union still wants to replace Euratom [European Atomic Energy Community] controls in Europe with inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency, thereby attempting to use the treaty to suppress German nuclear aspirations. The United States would go along with the Russian inspection proposal were it not for the fierce reaction from the European Six. Their objection is a valid one, for disruption of the Euratom system would leave France, unwilling to sign the proposed treaty, completely free of constraint on its nuclear activities. The inspection issue is only one indication that potential nuclear powers may resist the treaty. In return for considerable sacrifice and inconvenience, the treaty rewards them merely with a pledge by three of the five existing nuclear powers that they will not give nuclear weapons to others--something they have no intention of doing in any event. Nonnuclear powers are expected to accept this inequality in an "unprovable but not implausible" belief in the danger of increasing the number of nuclear powers, in the hope that the treaty will inhibit a potential enemy, and in the belief that it may be a step toward disarmament. The intensity of the criticism directed at the treaty is clear evidence of "latent military anxieties," for their purported objections on civil grounds are both exaggerated and easy to remedy. The danger of industrial espionage, for example, is negligible with modern accounting devices and the prospect of ultimate automation of inspections. Prevention of proliferation primarily depends on persuading the nonnuclear powers that they will not profit from acquiring nuclear weapons, and that they will be adequately protected by the nuclear nations. However to devise a system with sufficient certainty to satisfy those guaranteed and yet with sufficient discretion to protect the guarantor will grow increasingly difficult. The proposed nonproliferation treaty can serve as a stopgap measure, but it will have prolonged success only as part of a more intensive and sustained nonproliferation strategy. Meanwhile, one hopes that someone somewhere is working out a postproliferation strategy, planning for stable dissemination of nuclear weapons, and helping those committed to a nuclear force to have as safe a one as possible.

330
MOSCOW'S NEW TREACHERY DENOUNCED BY JEN-MIN JIH-PAO. Survey of China mainland press, no. 4019, Sept. 12, 1967: 34-35.
P&GP RR
Translated from Jen-min Jih-pao, Sept. 8, 1967.
Chi Kor

By cooperating with the U.S. imperialists in drafting a nuclear nonproliferation treaty, "the Soviet revisionist ruling clique has committed another monstrous act of betrayal against the people of the world." The Soviet renegades have sold out the Vietnamese and Arab peoples by capitulating to the enemy. They have also endangered the East European countries since the treaty "enables West Germany to have a finger in the nuclear pie." The Soviet claim that the draft treaty will lead to general disarmament is a hoax. Actually it only "deprives all non-nuclear countries subject to threat and aggression of their right to develop nuclear weapons to resist U.S. and Soviet nuclear blackmail." However, the revolutionary people of the world must not despair but must join together in a people's war against all reactionaries.

331
Murata, Kiyoaki. JAPAN AND NON-PROLIFERATION. Survival, v. 9, Aug. 1967: 267-268.
U162.S9, v. 9
An article from the Japan Times Weekly.
DS889.J36

The Japanese reaction to the nonproliferation treaty is twofold--based on military and industrial considerations. Since the treaty proposes that nuclear weapons not be possessed by any more countries than those which already have them it would ensure a perpetuation of the present nuclear monopoly. Japanese critics, therefore, insist on a nuclear powers' pledge to eliminate nuclear stockpiles as a condition for Japan's acceptance of the treaty. Japan's growing industrial capacity necessitates a peaceful nuclear energy program. Current plans for more efficient reactors for power generation in Japan are being realized. A treaty that would deprive the Japanese of peaceful nuclear devices, such as underground explosions for mining, could never be accepted. Whether

Japan develops neclear weapons or not, it must first get rid of the "nuclear taboo"--the fear of openly discussing nuclear armament for Japan--as a first step toward a rational discussion of the issues involved.

332
Nagchaudhuri, B. D. NUCLEAR TREATY MAY INHIBIT PEACEFUL USES: HAVE-NOTS RESENT EXCESSIVE RESTRICTIONS. Indian Marxist, v. 3, June 1967: 9-10. HX3.N2515, v. 3

India's policy is to develop atomic energy for peaceful uses only, but this policy was established before other nations threatened to acquire nuclear arsenals. Some of India's hesitance in signing the proposed nonproliferation treaty stems from defense considerations, but equally important are its fears that the treaty will seriously impair its peaceful nuclear programs. Such programs include conversion of nuclear energy to electric power, development of reactors for use in ship and submarine propulsion systems, and use of controlled nuclear explosions for excavations. Radioactive materials when processed can be used in industry, agriculture, and medicine, and many of the new materials developed have uses outside the nuclear field. The superpowers are suspicious of any nation having its own sources of fissile material, which they equate with the potential to make a bomb. As fissile material production becomes easier pressure from the superpowers alone will be insufficient to halt these programs. Moreover, clandestine production of fissile material cannot be detected as can nuclear explosions. The proposed nonproliferation treaty divides the world into nuclear haves and have-nots and places unequal obligations upon them. Many have-not nations feel the treaty deprives them of new and important technology and will affect their future economic growth. Furthermore the treaty contains no realistic steps toward disarming the nuclear powers. The Indian Government has serious misgivings concerning the treaty, but it is under great pressure from the superpowers and Great Britain because of its dependence on foreign aid. Since many nations object to the treaty in its present form, the Soviet Union and the United States are unlikely to attempt to push it through.

333
ONE STEP ON. Nature (London) v. 215, Sept. 2, 1967: 1016. Q1.N2, v. 215

Geneva's 18-Nation Disarmament Committee [ENDC] sessions have dragged on so long and lost so much credibility that the recent announcement that Russia and America have jointly offered a draft nonproliferation treaty is merely a small, albeit hopeful, step forward. The two superpowers have been unable to reach firm agreement on the inspecting body, with the Soviet Union quite rightly insisting that Euratom inspection is unsuitable. More importantly, however, the nonnuclear powers can hardly be expected to permanently confirm the nuclear nations "in their present grandeur." Before making any concessions they will demand some from the nuclear haves. The ENDC could usefully go back to the early days of nonproliferation discussions, when a rigid inspection system seemed less urgent. Safeguards have only recently become a central stumblingblock. A workable compromise might be for all the signatories to publicly and honestly describe their nuclear activities at regular intervals. Under such a system the nuclear powers would now and again state how much "uranium they had converted into a fissile form, and how much of this they had committed to the manufacture of explosives." Not only would this compromise salve the pride of the smaller nations without sacrificing much security, but it also would provide a more flexible springboard for further disarmament than would a more cumbersome treaty. Certainly a less rigid system would be better than sacrificing the treaty on the altar of inspection.

334
REFLECTIONS ON THE QUARTER: THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY AND THE NONNUCLEAR NATIONS. Orbis, v. 11, spring 1967: 7-11. D839.O68, v. 11

The mood of optimism about the nonproliferation treaty generated by Soviet-American discussions in 1966 has been dispelled by the persistence of old problems and the burgeoning of newer ones that had been muted in the 1966 negotiations. The issues of a balance of obligations, industrial espionage, and European security are familiar to the negotiators, while ballistic missile defense, the future development of peaceful atomic technology, and a control system for the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] have cropped up recently and blended with the older problems "producing a chorus of attacks on some of the treaty's specific provisions." The loudest criticism comes from India and West Germany. India, fearful of China's growing nuclear capability, is strengthening its position in the nuclear energy field; it has concluded an agreement with Canada to enlarge the Rajasthan atomic power plant. Despite hints by the United States that it might link India's support of the treaty to the Food for Peace program, India has been busy gathering support in other Asian capitals for a cautious approach to the treaty. Another nonnuclear country, West Germany, views the treaty as a means for American investment companies to exclude West German contracts for nuclear reactors in foreign countries. West German statesmen are also uneasy about replacing European Atomic Energy Community [Euratom] inspection with IAEA controls--Euratom would play an important part in a European nuclear force. These problems along with the possibility that NATO might lose an opportunity to acquire antimissile defenses if European countries sign the nonproliferation treaty makes them wonder whether the treaty is desirable, necessary, or feasible.

335
Schlosser, François. WEST GERMANY'S NO TO NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION. Réalités [Eng. ed.] no. 203, Oct. 1967: 27-29. AP4.R2164, 1967

An interview with Gerhard Stoltenberg, West German Minister for Scientific Research, regarding Germany's reaction to the proposed nuclear nonproliferation treaty. He expressed German fears that the treaty would jeopardize the security of its technical and industrial secrets in the nuclear field, limit its freedom for scientific and technical research into the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and favor the military nuclear powers in the commercial and economic competition for building and selling nuclear power plants. He also objected to the discrimination inherent in requiring inspection only for nonnuclear powers.

336
Schwarz, Urs. INDIA AS A PEACEFUL NUCLEAR POWER. Swiss review of world affairs, v. 16, Jan. 1967: 5-8. D839.S9, v. 16

The classification of a nation as a "nuclear power" is an overestimation of atomic military technique. If production of nuclear weapons were not the primary yardstick, Canada, Sweden, Italy, Belgium, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, and India would have to be counted as nuclear powers. India's Trombay Center with three critical reactors is the planning center for nuclear power plants that will supply nationwide electrical energy for the poor. However the pursuit of peaceful nuclear alternatives may become secondary to developing an atom bomb. The threat from China and Pakistan may require India to develop a strategic deterrent. Unless the Great Powers are prepared to prohibit underground as well as atmospheric testing, it seems reasonable to suggest that India will produce the bomb.

337
Spinelli, Altiero. NOTES ON NON-PROLIFERATION. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 5, summer 1967: 223-233. D839. A85, v. 5
"Reprinted . . . from Lo Spettatore Internazionale, Rome, March-April, 1967."
P&GP RR

The Soviet and American draft nonproliferation treaties are similar. The fundamental point of disagreement between the two relates to control over nuclear weapons by associations or groupings of nations. Apparently the Americans are now willing to compromise on this point--which has great bearing on European unity--and join the Soviets in presenting a draft treaty. Yet the treaty requires nothing of the two superpowers but rather obligates third powers. These "quasi-nuclear powers"--Sweden, Germany, Italy, Israel, Czechoslovakia, and others--must know all the implications of the treaty before they will sign. Since they would be required to sacrifice by the treaty, they might request the superpowers to give up something, such as deployment of antiballistic missile systems. Clearly proliferation endangers mankind. Controlling crises is already difficult, with nuclear weapons in the hands of only a few countries. A treaty would also check the tendency toward "nuclear chain reaction," whereby nations acquire nuclear weapons in order to balance their acquisition by a neighbor. The proposed treaty stands as a signpost marking an important area in which the United States and Soviet Union can agree, thus demonstrating the feasibility of peaceful coexistence. Washington and Moscow are also motivated by individual desires to maintain strategic supremacy, and herein lies the major flaw of the draft treaty. Outlawing joint control of nuclear forces necessitates dividing the world into hegemonic systems, which are basically unstable. On the other hand the supranational institutions now extant are themselves in bad shape, rendering the desire to "keep the door open" for them a trifle quixotic. The draft treaty as it now stands will probably be ratified.

338
Strategy for Peace Conference, Washington, D.C., 1966. PROLIFERATION UNLIMITED: A STRATEGY FOR PEACE CONFERENCE. Muscatine, Iowa, Stanley Foundation [1966] 30 p.
JX1977.7.S8

Reports of five groups on the nuclear proliferation problem in Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, East Asia, and South Asia. The 15 participants joined in a discussion following the area reports, which is also reprinted here. The participants included such distinguished experts in the field of international affairs and strategy as Morton H. Halperin, Donald G. Brennan, Oran Young, and Jeremy J. Stone.

339
UNDERSHAFT OVER GENEVA. Economist, v. 224, Aug. 19, 1967: 632-633.
HG11.E2, v. 224

Andrew Undershaft, arms king and apologist in Shaw's Major Barbara, would have been most gratified by the recent progress of the arms race. All over the world the traffic in conventional arms has been booming. Moreover the big business, nuclear proliferation, looked better than ever at the end of August. The hinted-at Soviet-American talks on limiting antiballistic missile deployment never turned up, and the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee session at Geneva gave every indication of winding up with no joint presentation of a draft nonproliferation treaty. When at last a joint draft was revealed it had numerous deficiencies. Washington was apparently not yet prepared to commit itself on the inspection article, with its European allies still holding out for a Euratom inspection system. Article 4, dealing with review and revision of the treaty, is also a bone of contention. The controversy around it points up the fact "that most of the near-nuclear powers will not long observe, and probably will not even be induced to sign and ratify, a treaty that maintains the present nuclear club's privileges indefinitely." Although the United States has shown itself willing to concede this point, the Soviet Union remains adamant. Neither superpower will long be able to ignore the demands of such countries as India, Germany, and Sweden that the nuclear nations make arrangements to guarantee others' security, allow inspection of their own facilities, and begin reducing their nuclear arsenals. Without a treaty the world will slide into a nuclear anarchy of a magnitude that might frighten even Andrew Undershaft.

340
Walsh, John. NUCLEAR SPREAD: QUEST FOR A TREATY IS RECEIVING NEW ATTENTION. Science, v. 157, July 21, 1967: 288-290.
Q1.S35, v. 157

The 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva is renewing its efforts to reach an agreement on a nonproliferation treaty [NPT]. In order to speed acceptance for an NPT, Secretary of State Dean Rusk has suggested leaving blank the section on inspection, which has been the major problem blocking agreement. Dissension centers not so much on the technological methods of monitoring the production and use of nuclear materials as on the selection of an agency to carry out the inspection. Although the members of the European Atomic Energy Community might accept a cooperative agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], they feel that if the IAEA were given total inspection responsibility the development of industrial nuclear capabilities by nonnuclear nations would suffer, and France would receive unequal treatment, since its nuclear facilities would be off-limits to inspectors. West Germany was particularly concerned about the technological considerations of the NPT. Before giving the United States the go-ahead for further negotiations the Bonn Government won assurances that nonnuclear powers would receive the profit from spin-off from nuclear military research, the United States would help set up a service for peaceful nuclear explosions and would continue to supply nuclear fuel to Western Europe, and all the signatory nations could continue their

nuclear research activities. Both Russia and the United States appear to be working earnestly to reach an agreement on a draft treaty. Such an agreement between the superpowers would be a great impetus toward world acceptance of the NPT.

341
Zhukov, IUrii. BONN-PRETORIA ATOMIC AXIS? Daily review, translations from the Soviet press, v. 13, Aug. 29, 1967: pt. 2, [item] 1, 1-5.
Slav Rm
Translated from Pravda, Aug. 29, 1967.
Slav Rm

While West German diplomats were opposing the completion of the nonproliferation treaty on nuclear weapons, Bonn's representatives were negotiating with South African leaders, former Nazi collaborators, on producing and testing nuclear weapons and toxic gases on South African territory. South Africa contributes uranium, thorium, etc., as well as nuclear physicists, carrier rockets, and desert testing sites; West Germany contributes the money, steel, and electrical products and engineering skill. According to the Paris agreements of 1955, West Germany renounced the right to manufacture atomic weapons on its own territory. However, for years West Germany has been preparing the climate and the facilities for reinterpretation of this legal renunciation; the Bundeswehr has been built up and a number of atomic reactors for "peaceful uses" developed. These reactors vary in capacity, but they are able to produce from five to 50 bombs annually. Since September 1966, the press, industrial monopolies, and Cabinet members have made statements claiming that, although West Germany cannot produce atomic weapons on its own soil, nothing can prevent it from manufacturing them abroad or with some other country. The utilization of South African uranium ore sent to West Germany for atomic reactors is not controlled; even the United States and Canada impose controls on nuclear materials they sell to West Germany. Proving grounds near Pretoria are being used for testing the long-range missile Harp-3; gases discovered by I. G. Farbenindustrie at the end of World War II will be improved and produced in South Africa.

4. Other (accidental war, command and control of weapons, etc.)

342
Brennan, Donald G. MISSILE DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL. Disarmament, no. 14, June 1967: 1-4. illus. JX1981.P7D5, 1967

The Russian idea of a ceiling on strategic offensive forces combined with unrestrained deployment of ballistic missile defenses [BMD] makes far more sense than the American alternative that leaves strategic offensive forces unrestrained and calls for a complete moratorium on BMD. The relationship between the cost of the offensive forces needed to offset a defense system and the cost of the defense system is the "cost exchange ratio." A ratio of 100:1 indicates a highly effective defense and of 1:100 indicates the possibility of easily offset BMD expenditures. If the ratio were 1:100 or even 1:10 it is unlikely that anyone would seriously consider BMD, and if the ratio were reversed, nations would stop investing in long-range missiles. Only at ratios of 1:4 or 1:5 do strategic postures become less predictable. At the ratio of 1:1, known as unity, a fixed sum spent on strategic forces by one side will have the same immediate effect on the nuclear balance whether spent on offense or defense. The offense-defense mix in unconstrained situations would probably stabilize at damage levels for which the exchange ratios are near unity. Opponents of BMD argue that deployment by one nation would interfere with the assured-destruction capability of another. But if the opponent's attack were itself less lethal, the response could be correspondingly less massive. Under the Russian-advocated freeze the United States could maintain its offensive superiority, for the BMD would provide the levels of deterrence needed at various levels of force. Some arms controllers argue that the American defense establishment would never accept the Russian freeze, but indications are strong that the Joint Chiefs of Staff may be more sympathetic to a defense-oriented posture than one based on deterrence and strategic superiority. The United States and the Soviet Union could stabilize their strategic-force postures through informal understandings reached at private bilateral meetings and regulated by unilateral estimates of strategic budgets. In this situation each nation could explore the best offense-defense mix, deciding within a given limit whether it preferred to add to the fatalities inflicted on the enemy or subtract from the number of fatalities that the enemy could inflict.

343
Meyer, Richard J. STRATCOM LOOKS TO THE FUTURE. Signal, v. 21, May 1967: 72-73, 82. UGl.M65, v. 21

Discusses the relocation of the headquarters of the U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command [STRATCOM] from Washington, D.C., to Fort Huachuca, Ariz. The move will bring about a more effective staff interrelation that will result in more efficient management of the command's global communications responsibilities. The smooth terrain and ideal electronic environment were the chief reasons for selecting the new site. Future STRATCOM tasks will include the evaluation of communications interface and the development of improved interconnecting methods and facilities to meet the urgent requirements for improved communications in Southeast Asia. Meyer describes the integrated wide-band communications system [IWCS], which is designed to overcome Vietnam's communication problems.

C. REGIONAL

1. Tension Areas

344
Achminow, Herman F. [THE SOVIETS IN THE NEAR EAST: A MASTERPIECE OF POLITICAL STRATEGY] Die Sowjets im Nahen Osten. Ein Meisterstück der politischen Strategie. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 11, July 10, 1967: 377. U3.W38, v. 11

The Arab defeat in the recent Middle East war has potentially increased Moscow's influence in the Arab world, especially the "licensed infiltration" by the Soviet Union in the area. The Soviets actually wanted this outcome of the war, the outbreak of which they had planned according to their own timetable. They hoped the war would speed up the downfall of the remaining conservative governments in Arab countries and that Israeli territorial gains would give them an excellent chance to douse or intensify local tensions, their main objective being elimination of U.S. influence in the Mediterranean. Their "brilliantly thought-out

strategy" can fail only if the West prevents Moscow from establishing Soviet monopoly by its good offices to the Arabs in settling local crises--a fact quickly recognized by De Gaulle. Soviet strategy will be totally impotent in the face of an Arab-Israeli accommodation achieved with Western help. Much depends on the political acumen and talents of Western statesmen.

345
Barnett, A. Doak. TENSION ON THE CHINA-SOVIET BORDER. Look, v. 31, Oct. 3, 1967: 40-42, 46.
AP2. L79, v. 31

The split between the Soviet Union and Communist China has created considerable tension along their common border, and both have strengthened their defense forces in key frontier areas. At first the border incidents and territorial disputes were more a symptom than a cause of the growing hostility, but today they have become incendiary issues that intensify the bitter controversy. Particularly in Manchuria, Mongolia, and Sinkiang, historical rivalries and apprehensions have been revived. The controversy broke into the open in early 1963 when Peking denounced the "unequal treaties" that China had been forced to sign in the 19th and 20th centuries, including three with czarist Russia in which they ceded considerable territory. The Chinese charges were met by Russian allegations that China was engineering frontier provocations and claims on Soviet territory and was embarked on a reckless policy of expansionism at Soviet expense. It is unlikely that China is serious about reclaiming lost territory as most of it is unsuited to agriculture and has only a small Chinese population. China is also fully aware of its military inferiority in the face of Russia's nuclear weapons and missile strength. China probably raises these territorial issues as part of a general political campaign against the Soviet Union designed to deter any further Russian claims on Chinese territory and to exert pressures against present Soviet leaders and policies. Under the present circumstances Soviet provocation of military conflict with China is likewise improbable. The attitude of Russia is defensive--it is protecting itself and defending its existing territory--and there are no indications of renewed Soviet expansion. However, there are no signs that tensions will abate, and potentially explosive situations can easily erupt into conflict. Much will depend on the outcome of the present leadership struggle within China.

346
Berner, Wolfgang. [THE SOVIET UNION AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE NEAR EAST CONFLICT] Die Sowjetunion und die Entstehung des Nahost-Konflikts. Europa-Archiv, v. 22, July 25, 1967: 493-504.
D839.E86, v. 22

Moscow could have instigated the latest Arab-Israeli conflict, and certain public utterances by Soviet and Arab leaders in recent months seem to confirm this. But analysis of the broader objectives of Soviet foreign policy indicates that Moscow had no interest in producing an acute Arab-Israeli crisis. The main objective of Soviet policy in Europe is the removal of American forces, especially through the disintegration of NATO. Liquidation of Israel by Nasser, with the Soviet Union threatening to intervene on his side, would have radically reduced chances for East-West détente and contributed to the consolidation of NATO as well as to its defense alertness. The American 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean constitutes a NATO force and its withdrawal from the area could hardly be effected by a policy which would encourage consolidation of NATO. Moscow's longstanding objective in the Mediterranean is the establishment of Soviet operational naval bases at various points along the shore--a tedious task, requiring a prolonged period of political calm, both locally and in Europe. Furthermore the resemblance of the Aqaba question to the Bosporus and Hellespont problem must automatically make Moscow opposed to the idea of blocking international seaways such as the Strait of Tiran. For reasons related to its own long-range plans for the Near East, Moscow has repeatedly shown that it has no use for pan-Arabism, which is revived by each Arab-Israeli crisis. There is then strong evidence that the Soviet Union did not instigate and mastermind the crisis. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union failed in its role as a Great Power by not being able to prevent the war or not trying to do so.

347
Binder, Leonard. THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS: A TRIAL BALANCE. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 23, Sept. 1967: 2-7, 33-37.
TK9145. A84, v. 23

Considers the development of the Near East crisis in the context of American-Sino-Soviet relations as well as those of the United States and the Soviet Union with Egypt. Binder also discusses inter-Arab relations and the problems of Jerusalem and of Arab refugees. He points out that neither demilitarized zones, the United Nations Truce Supervision, mixed armistice commissions, nor the United Nations Emergency Force were able to prevent Arab-Israeli hostilities but that "they did prevent things from getting worse." The role of the United Nations in the tedious task of establishing conditions conducive to permanent settlement of the crisis should not be underestimated.

348
Brezhnev, Leonid. EUROPEAN SECURITY: SOVIET VIEW. Survival, v. 9, June 1967: 174-176.
U162. S9, v. 9

An excerpt from the "Election Address" delivered by Leonid Brezhnev, First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, on May 10, 1967.

Discusses the objectives of Russia's European policy and notes that the main obstacle to European unity and security is the aggressive policy of West German imperialism. If it is to gain the confidence of the peoples of Europe, West Germany must abandon the infamous "Hallstein Doctrine," acknowledge the fact of the existence of two German states, renounce the claim for access to nuclear weapons, and give up all territorial claims in the East.

349
Brown, Neville. CYPRUS: A STUDY IN UNRESOLVED CONFLICT. World today, v. 23, Sept. 1967: 396-396-405.
D410. W63, v. 23

Interest in a Cyprus settlement has been revived partly by the apprehension that the United Nations Force in Cyprus [UNFICYP]--like the U.N. Emergency Force in the Sinai--has merely postponed and perhaps aggravated a major conflict. Although the UNFICYP has succeeded in reducing the communal violence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, the political deadlock continues between the Government (now entirely Greek Cypriot) and Turkish Cypriot leaders.

Each group has imposed severe restrictions on the movement of goods and people in order to harrass its opponent and maintain a cohesive spirit within its own community. The strategic situation on the island is far from stable, with the Turkish Cypriot Armed Forces relying upon the threat of intervention from Ankara against the pressures of the large and well-equipped Greek military element (composed of Greek mainland troops, the Cyprus police, and the National Guard). The present equilibrium is also threatened by the insecurity of the UNFICYP position, which is strained by tremendous expenses and internal disagreement over the proper solution to the island's political problems. In order to avoid outbreaks of large-scale violence, the Athens and Cyprus Governments have renewed their efforts to seek a formula for a political settlement. A solution is not easy, for not only must the Turkish community be convinced that its minority rights will not be violated but the Greeks must reach a consensus between those who favor complete integration with Greece and those who favor a type of commonwealth relationship with Athens.

350
Conolly, Violet. THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT AND THE SOVIET FAR EASTERN REGION. In Royal Central Asian Society, London. Journal, v. 54, June 1967: 146-150. DSI.R6, v. 54

Describes the land, resources, industry, and population of the Far Eastern regions of the Soviet Union in terms of the Chinese territorial claims in that area. The author concludes that, although the Far Eastern areas have great potential wealth, the development of them would be little to the liking of the Chinese, who are not fond of cold and wilderness. Moreover, she goes on, "it seems most unlikely that any responsible Chinese statesman would risk a head-on collision with Soviet armed might" over the Amur frontier.

351
Eichelgrün, Helmut. [OUR AND EUROPE'S SECURITY, AND NATO] Unsere und Europas Sicherheit und die NATO. Marxistische Blätter, v. 5, July/Aug. 1967: 7-12. P&GP RR

Emphasizes that the German Federal Republic's ties with NATO, which secure the presence of American forces--including nuclear ones--in West Germany, expose the nation to nuclear attack and adversely affect its economy. Eichelgrün suggests that a bilateral agreement between the two German states that respects the political systems of both would pave the way for a viable European security system, especially if both Germanies gradually reduce their military forces, sign a nuclear nonproliferation treaty, and form a pact creating an atom-free zone in Europe.

352
EUROPEAN SECURITY DISCUSSED. New times, no. 39, Sept. 27, 1967: 4-8; no. 40, Oct. 4: 4-6; no. 42, Oct. 18: 7-10. D839.N483, 1967

Contents.--Today's realities-the starting point, by Otto Klicka.--Five proposals, by Johannes Dieckmann.--The United States must get out of Europe, by Bernard Lavergne.--"Security community," by Göran von Bonsdorff.--Alternative to the Atlantic bloc, by Ferruccio Parri.--Some thoughts on ways and means, by Bruno Kreisky.--Austria's contribution, by Franz Muhri.--Lessons of history, by Josef Hromádka.--Relations between the two Germanys: the key issue, by Lorenz Knorr.--Security for all, by Ib Norlund.--Why waste money on arms, by Frank Allaun.--Wanted: a non-aggression pact, by Martin Niemöller.--There are two German States!, by Joachim Herrmann--Action now!, Stanisław Brodzki.

Replies to a questionnaire by the New Times from European scholars, political leaders and journalists. Nearly all the articles affirm that and emphasize the necessity for confirmation of the existing boundaries, recognition of the two German states, establishment of a nuclear-free zone, and an agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

353
Fitzgerald, C. P. TENSION ON THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER. Foreign affairs, v. 45, July 1967: 683-693. map. D410.F6, v. 45

The Sino-Soviet dispute over ideological issues is further inflamed by territorial ambitions. Russia and China have a common frontier extending eastward from Mongolia 1500 miles to the sea and westward from Mongolia 1200 miles to the Wakh panhandle of the Afghan frontier. The Russian czar took advantage of the weakness of the Manchu dynasty 100 years ago to acquire the upper half of the Ili River valley in the West and the Maritime Province in the East. China also has grounds for complaint in the deportation to Siberia during World War II of the large Chinese labor force occupying the Vladivostok region. On the other hand, Russia has never lost territory to China. In spite of its historical wrongs, China is not likely to provoke a border conflict which could escalate and cause Russia to attack Chinese industrial centers and military bases. Possibly Russia could successfully drive the Chinese out of the Sinkiang Province, which is populated only partially by Han (Chinese) peoples and which is separated from the rest of China by a vast desert. However, neither side is likely to risk the consequences of enforcing its claims, and the "Chinese motive in calling the Soviet border into question is to carry on a polemical war against Russian revisionism rather than actively to press claims for lost territory."

354
Gallois, Pierre M. [THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF NATO STRATEGY AND THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF EUROPE] Die Wandlungen der NATO-Strategie und das Sicherheitsinteresse Europas. Europa-Archiv, v. 22, Aug. 10, 1967: 558-564. D839.E86, v. 22

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is now in the fourth phase of its development. The first, which lasted until 1954, was marked by reliance on a purely conventional defense system. However, financial reasons prevented the alliance from raising its armed forces to the required level of strength and, more importantly, the Soviet Union's steadily growing nuclear arsenal sealed the fate of a conventional system. The second phase began in 1954 with the unanimous acceptance by NATO members of a new defense concept worked out by General Gruenther and Field Marshal Montgomery. They advised that any large-scale attack by the enemy be instantly repelled with nuclear weapons and called for the employment of short- and medium-range atomic weapons "as deep as possible behind the NATO line of resistance." In American military opinion, the nuclear and conventional defenses of Western Europe were contradictory in terms of strategic doctrines, number of troops needed, and composition of forces and their operations. In 1956 nuclear defense became the alliance's

official doctrine, aimed at making Western Europe a virtual sanctuary from combat activities. Yet the new doctrine "was never translated into praxis" because of the later change in Washington's attitude toward the entire idea--a change induced by the Soviet acquisition of intercontinental ballistic missiles that would make it possible for Moscow to retaliate directly against the United States for any nuclear attack on Soviet territory. The third phase of NATO development (1961-1966) was thus marked by makeshift American measures to convince its NATO allies that conventional defense was in their own interest. During this entire phase the strategy of nuclear defense nonetheless remained NATO's official doctrine. With French withdrawal from the NATO military structure the alliance's fourth phase began. By its emphasis on conventional forces NATO's present strategic concept increases the chances of the Soviet Union's breaking NATO defense with nuclear arms, but it does not provide an adequate remedy.

355
Gittins, P. G. THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER DISPUTE. Australian Army journal, no. 218, July 1967: 38-51.
Ul.A92, 1967

Traces the history of Soviet-Chinese relations that culminates in the present Sino-Soviet border dispute. Gittins concludes that, although Red China is no match for Russia and neither China nor Russia desires war, Red China's leaders are seen in Moscow as irrational and prone to commit acts of desperation. They show distrust for Communist Party leaders by using the army to carry out purges and instead of employing the Communist Youth League to guide the young they encourage Red Guard rampages. Mao Tse-tung is concentrating on foreign adventures like the determined struggle to retain irredentist territory along the Sino-Soviet border in order to turn his country's attention away from domestic turmoil. The adamant Russian refusal to relinquish any territory in these border adventures could lead to war. For the West the Sino-Soviet border dispute has its dividends. With tension in Asia Russia wants no trouble in Europe, while Soviet troops along the Chinese border could put a stop to any Chinese plans to join the Vietnam War.

356
Grabowski, Z. A. THE MOOD OF EUROPE, 1967. Quarterly review (London) no. 653, July 1967: 237-250. AP4.Q2, 1967

Sketches Europe's 1967 political image stressing the importance to Europe of the fragmentation of communism. Grabowski considers De Gaulle's European policy disruptive to the consolidation of Western Europe and his Eastern policy futile, owing to France's inability to emancipate the East European nations from Soviet influence. He sees in the growing European, especially West German, fears of a technological gap in relation to the United States a reason for Western Europe's cool attitude toward the proposed treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

357
Harrigan, Anthony. ADEN: STRATEGIC CROSSROADS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 47, Oct. 1967: 42-47. Z6723.U35, v. 47

"The 75 square miles of volcanic rock and sand which constitute the state of Aden form one of the most strategic pieces of territory in the world today." Great Britain is planning to withdraw its troops from the area when the Federation of South Arabia achieves independence in 1968, leaving Aden and other members of the Federation exposed to United Arab Republic terrorism of the sort that has been plaguing neighboring Yemen. Egypt views Aden as a backdoor to Yemen and eventually to the whole of Saudi Arabia. The struggle for control of Aden and South Arabia has been underway for some time, led by two powerful terrorist groups that Nasser will probably support once the British have left. Peacekeeping in the area will be very difficult in the months ahead and may require British cooperation with other interested nations such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and possibly the United States. Even with strict control of the Aden border to reduce arms smuggling, containing terrorists in an almost impossible task. In Palestine the insurgents were united in wanting the British to leave, but at least in Aden the Arabs are deeply divided over the British security arrangements. Aden's "tough, well-trained and equipped" Federal Regular Army, commanded by Arabs and supported by the British, is the ultimate hope for holding the Federation together. At the same time the Army is a potential political power, and already sometimes dominates the civilian government. The struggle for power in the area is more than a local problem. Aden is at the strategic crossroads to the oil-rich Persian Gulf states, West Africa, and the Red Sea, and is essential to the protection of European oil sources. The Red Sea has strategic importance for both Nasser and the Soviet Union. Aden's plight is further complicated by the deteriorating situation in the surrounding areas of French Somaliland, Somalia, and the Arabian Peninsula. The whole region is likely to become a major storm center in the cold war.

358
Hottelet, Richard C. SOVIET STRATEGY AND THE UN. New leader, v. 50, Oct. 9, 1967: 3-5.
HXl.N37, v. 50

That patience and good humor are the best posture in adversity and may even lead to success probably does not apply to the U.N. 22nd General Assembly. Vietnam is not on the 1967 agenda, for the Soviet Union opposes and will block any U.N. action on the conflict. American politicians urge that the Vietnam problem be handled by the United Nations, but only a drastic alteration in the world situation would permit constructive U.N. intervention. The Middle East by contrast is very much part of the General Assembly agenda, for while the Soviet Union and the United States disagree on the causes of and solutions to the crisis, they do agree it is a subject for U.N. concern. The Soviets would like to put a damper on the situation, for their prestige was only slightly less battered than that of the Arabs, and would like to see the Suez Canal reopened. They do not favor the annihilation of Israel since that nation serves as a focus of Arab passion and a lever for Soviet influence in the area. The Arab world is a dazzling potential prize for Moscow that could enable it to extend its influence southward, outflanking NATO and CENTO in the direction of the open sea and Africa. Since the June war proved the impossibility of a frontal assault the Soviets are laying the groundwork for a different approach to their goal--organizing systematic propaganda efforts, exerting economic pressure on Israel's friends, exploiting national liberation struggles, and forcing Israel to maintain a permanent state of costly mobilization. The issue of Communist Chinese

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V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

representation in the General Assembly has fallen flat this year. The United Nations remains in serious financial trouble because of peacekeeping debts. The only new item on the agenda is Malta's proposal for a treaty reserving the ocean floor and its resources for the use of all mankind.

359
Hottinger, Arnold. [THE ARAB FIGHT AGAINST ISRAEL: RISE OF THE NEAR EAST CONFLICT FROM THE FLUCTUATION OF INTER-ARABIC POLITICS] Der Kampf der Araber gegen Israel: Die Entstehung des Nahost-Konflikts aus dem Wechselspiel interarabischer Politik. Europa-Archiv, v. 22, June 25, 1967: 415-426. D839.E86, v. 22

Traces the development of the latest Arab-Israeli dispute through May 1967. Hottinger sees inter-Arab rivalries as the direct cause of the crisis.

360
[INQUIRY: GERMANY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY] Umfrage: Deutschland und die europäische Sicherheit. Marxistische Blätter, v. 5, July/Aug. 1967: 13-17. P&GP RR

Poses questions on the effects of military alliances on European security and the interrelationships between that security, the territorial status quo, and the reality of the two German states. Answers are given by Prof. Renate Riemeck, Chairman Willi Max Rademacher of the Free Democratic Party in Hamburg, East German Foreign Minister Otto Winzer, French expert on disarmament Jules Moch, and an Izvestiia staff member, Nikolai Polianov, who also suggest ways of establishing a collective security system in Europe.

361
Ispahani, M. A. H. THE ALTERNATIVE TO THE INDIA-PAKISTAN ARMS RACE. Pakistan horizon, v. 20, 2d quarter 1967: 109-119. DS376.P32, v. 20

Once India is ready to "settle all disputes with Pakistan in a just and peaceful manner," the two countries may be able to agree to terms for limiting their arms competition. Although India has been hostile to Pakistan since the time the subcontinent was partitioned, Pakistan has never had any aggressive designs on India. Why, then, does India persist in its large-scale military buildup? Since no one seriously believes that China will attempt to annex Indian territory and India would not dare fight China again, the Indian arms program is not directed against the so-called China threat. India's attack on Pakistan in September 1965 showed that its acquisition of military hardware was intended to subvert the sovereignty of Pakistan. Pakistan successfully repulsed the attack and was forced to continue to strengthen its defense forces. The only alternative to the Indo-Pakistani arms race is the improvement of relations between the two countries by settlement of their basic disputes, particularly the Kashmir dispute "which lies at the root of the whole trouble." So far Indian leaders have refused to negotiate a solution to the dispute in their attempts to promote friendly relations with Pakistan. Pakistan hopes that India will recognize the benefits of diverting military funds to domestic development and will take the first step in reducing tensions between the two countries by showing a willingness to discuss the Kashmir problem.

362
Kemp, Geoffrey. CONTROLLING ARMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS. World today, v. 23, July 1967: 285-292. D410.W63, v. 23

The present strategic equation resulting from the Arab-Israeli War is a complex puzzle whose ramifications prevent the regulation of international arms shipments. Before the war the pattern of arms deliveries was riddled with idiosyncrasies reflecting the changing alinements in the Middle East. By the time war broke out, British mercenary pilots were flying in the Saudi Arabian Air Force, Jordanian and Israeli pilots were simultaneously training in the United States, and Egypt was receiving arms from Russia, while the Shah of Iran was concluding arms agreements with both the United States and the Soviet Union. The complexity of the Middle East situation has cast an ominous shadow on the question of whether the big powers can prevent a renewed arms influx. An arms embargo or quadripartite agreement to regulate weapons sales in the Middle East is impractical: any war fought with small arms would result in enormous casualties, and a regulation agreement would be inimical to Russia's political interests. An alternative would be for the big powers to refrain from selling offensive-type weapons. The introduction of defensive weapons could upset the balance of power in the Middle East and create a defensive umbrella under which Arab nations could plan aggressive strategies. It can also be argued that defensive weapons such as the V/STOL in both Egypt and Israel would create stability by reducing the effectiveness of a preemptive air strike. The behavior of the Great Powers and the United Nations in the recent crisis will reinforce pressures within Israel to develop a nuclear capability. The price now of Israel's signature on a nonproliferation treaty is a U.S. guarantee--in effect a bilateral defense treaty. Whether the Soviet Union could afford to allow a U.S. guarantee and at the same time avoid being drawn into a formal alliance with Egypt and Syria remains doubtful. So long as the Great Powers continue to pour arms into the Middle East it seems unlikely that Israel or its neighbors will reduce their conventional weapons expenditures. A fourth Middle East war seems inevitable, and the possibility of a negotiated settlement appears unlikely. Furthermore, the precious time needed for a cooling of heads may be shortened by capricious interference by the Great Powers.

363
Kęplicz, Klemens. [POLAND'S VISION OF EUROPE] Polens Europa-Vision. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 12, July 1967: 719-725. D839.B57, v. 12

Across Europe runs a line "where the two superpowers confront each other, armed." Any European conflict would "automatically and instantly" become world nuclear war, speculations about the paralyzing effect of a nuclear deadlock notwithstanding. No solution to the problem of European security can be viable that does not unequivocally guarantee the territorial integrity of all existing European states or that excludes any European state from participation in the settlement. Such a solution would only encourage development of conflicts fraught with the danger of world nuclear war. There are parallels between the post-Versailles European security system with its cordon sanitaire, aimed at keeping the Soviet Union outside the "concert of European states," and

present West German plans (e.g., Franz Josef Strauss') for changing the status quo in Europe. Equally unrealistic is Chancellor Kiesinger's suggestion of bilateral declarations between Bonn and other individual states renouncing the use of force in settling "questions in dispute" (e.g., the Polish-German boundary). Declarations of this sort would, in fact, create a false feeling of security similar to that which arose immediately before World War II after the Polish-German nonaggression declaration of 1934. The most realistic approach to the problem is the recognition of the status quo. This is the precept on which rests the "Program for Europe" formulated by the Karlovy Vary conference. The Rapacki and Gomułka plans of former years, one proposing an atom-free zone in central Europe and the other a freeze on nuclear armaments there are still relevant. Currently Władysław Gomułka has put forward the idea of a general European agreement renouncing the use of force. In Gomułka's proposal preservation of the integrity of the existing boundaries of all European states, as well as nonintervention in the internal affairs of the signatory states, is the raison d'être of this renunciation.

364
Komitis, A. BACK TO THE LEMNITZER PLAN: LETTER FROM NICOSIA. New times, no. 33, Aug. 16, 1967: 15. D839.N483, 1967

Crimes committed recently against Greek Cypriots indicate, according to E. Papaioannou, General Secretary of the AKEL [Greek Progressive Labor Party], that the Americans have revived the Lemnitzer plan in their attempts to settle the Cyprus question. The Lemnitzer plan requires the engineering of clashes between Greeks and Turks in order to justify foreign military intervention, including the landing of U.S. Marines. Another plan, the Astrapi plan, drawn up in Athens, is also based on engineered clashes between Greeks and Turks. The NATO powers want to give the false impression that the two groups cannot live side by side in peace and that the Cyprus Government is unable to maintain law and order. The Christian Science Monitor (July 17, 1967) reported that an American solution of the Cyprus question is in the making; and the Journal de Genève predicted that the Cyprus situation will become more critical, since the Athens junta intends to establish a government in Nicosia. These reports give the Cypriots further cause for anxiety, because they know that the recent incidents are part of a NATO-Athens conspiracy, backed by the United States.

365
Kruczkowski, Adam. FOR A PEACEFUL EUROPE. World Marxist review, v. 10, May 1967: 15-21. HX8.P723, v. 10

Europe is still an area of tension and insecurity. Postwar Europe, influenced by the United States and other capitalist powers, adopted an aggressive attitude towards the Soviet Union and the Socialist bloc that led to the division of Europe into two opposed military-political alliances: the offensive NATO alliances in 1949 and the defensive Warsaw Treaty organization in 1955. A confrontation between the two camps would bring disaster to the area. Imperialist Federal Germany wants access to nuclear weapons and the inclusion of the whole of Germany in NATO. The German Democratic Republic pursues a policy of peaceful coexistence and rejects nuclear armaments. Without the German Democratic Republic durable security in Europe would be illusory and unification of the two Germanies would be impossible. However, there are signs that some Western circles want to normalize relations between East and West despite their different systems--the legend of "Communist aggression" is evaporating, and NATO allies seem to want to end the U.S. hegemony. For the normalization of Europe, the German Democratic Republic, as well as the territorial status quo in Europe, must be recognized; West Germany has to be prevented from gaining possession of nuclear weapons; and a collective security system must be created. The first step toward this goal could be an all-European conference on security and cooperation as proposed by the Polish Government in 1964 and endorsed by the Bucharest Declaration in 1966.

366
London. Institute for Strategic Studies. WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE: THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP. London, 1967. 57 p. (Its Adelphi papers, no. 33) P&GP RR

Contents.--Prospects and limits of East-West relations, by Jean Laloy.--East and West in Europe: an American view, by Carl Kaysen.--China's impact on the evolution of the alliances in Europe, by Richard Löwenthal.--West European integration and East-West relations, by Edward Heath.--Small countries and European security, by Antonin Snejdarek. --The future of Germany in a changing European context, by Helmut Schmidt.--Non-alignment and East-West relations, by Leo Mates.

Papers selected from those delivered at the Institute for Strategic Studies' 8th Annual Conference, held in Vienna from September 30 to October 2, 1967.

367
Meir, Golda. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE. Jewish frontier, v. 34, June 1967: 6-10. DS149.A324, v. 34

Indiscriminate terror, arson, blockades (Suez and Aqaba), and organized boycotts perpetrated by the Egyptians have contributed to a perpetual "state of war" in the Middle East between Israel and its neighbors and have forced the Jewish nation to defend itself against these incendiary and brutal measures. Israel's controlled military action is less abhorrent than Egypt's wanton and indiscriminate murder directed against civilians. The Egyptians have been unwilling to negotiate for peace and have categorically rejected every Israeli proposal to ameliorate an unstable situation. Israel wishes only to protect its territorial integrity, cooperate with its neighbors, and be left alone to develop a new and vital society.

368
Meyer-Detring, Wilhelm. [THE NEAR EAST CONFLICT AND THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE] Nahostkonflikt und Verteidigung Europas. Wehrkunde, v. 16, July 1967: 337-339. U3.W396, v. 16

By preventing a direct confrontation of the superpowers the balance of terror has fostered development and application of "indirect strategy"--i.e., the instigation of limited conflicts by proxy, such as the Near East one. Moscow has long aspired to establish a foothold in the Mediterranean. For the last 20 years it has given credits and arms supplies to most of the Arab nations. According to Soviet calculations the Near East conflict would discredit what in the public opinion are American security guarantees in the region

and enhance Soviet prestige. The Soviets felt sure that their cautious policy of avoiding a direct confrontation with the United States would prevent the conflict from becoming a world war. The Near East model of indirect strategy is as a whole inapplicable in Europe, but a conflict along "the demarcation line" partitioning Germany, for instance, with "a Warsaw Pact State" acting as a Soviet proxy is conceivable. Then if NATO is not yet adequately consolidated, Germany's allies would stay out of the conflict and automatically apply "salami tactics"; they would start negotiations allowing faits accomplis to become irreversible at Germany's expense. Crisis management by supranational organizations has thus far proved ineffectual in conflicts by proxy, and crisis management by the superpowers has been effective only when the superpowers' vital interests were at stake, as in the Cuba crisis. It certainly failed in the Near East crisis. That crisis was checked by Israel alone, by conventional means. The German Federal Republic should take a lesson from this and develop its own crisis management methods in case such indirect strategy is applied to it.

369
O'Ballance, Edgar. THE YEMEN. Quarterly review (London) no. 653, July 1967: 261-272.
AP4.Q2, 1967

Considers international implications of the civil war in Yemen. O'Ballance thinks the war is likely to last a long time, owing to the international interests involved, especially Egyptian and Saudi Arabian. The impact of the Yemeni situation on the South Arabian Federation is also discussed. The article "was written before the recent Israel-Egypt war."

370
[PEACE OR ARMED TRUCE?] Paix ou trêve armée? [editorial] Observateur du Moyen-Orient et de l'Afrique, v. 16, July 21, 1967: 2.
DS41.O2, v. 16

Arabs and Jews are experiencing peace in Palestine--an armed peace. In West Jordan, despite local government (the first in 2,000 years) and social and economic intercourse between Arabs and Israelis there are still indications of an uneasy peace. Unfortunately Egypt, leader of the Arab States, refuses to accept peace or defeat and continues to teach and export hate and tragedy--reports from Yemen describe the indiscriminate dropping of gas bombs on villages. It is also unfortunate that none of the big powers has made an effort to promote a peaceful settlement of the crisis--Great Britain and France have supported an unrealistic U.N. resolution that advocates a new division of Jerusalem. Such a resolution refuses to recognize Israel's right to integrate populations under its control. Yet peace will only come when the Arabs desire it and the Jews are left to rebuild what is historically theirs.

371
[REALISM OR HYPOCRISY?] Réalisme ou hypocrisie? [editorial] Observateur du Moyen-Orient et de l'Afrique, v. 16, Aug. 11, 1967: 2.
DS41.O2, v. 16

Nations friendly to the Arab world are advising Arab leaders to compromise with Israel. President Tito's visit to Cairo and his "plan for peace" are part of a policy that is apparently directed at reducing Arab-Israeli tensions. This policy has found favor with many Soviet bloc and nonalined countries: Russia is rejecting Arab chauvinism, while India maintains that it has nothing against the Jews. However these "allies" are suspect since they appear to be more interested in oil than in refugees, and it is these powers, who presume to be the guardians of territorial integrity and independence in the Middle East, that are the real neocolonialists of the Arab world. The Khartoum Conference produced little unity, and Nasser's offer to withdraw his troops from Yemen was made more for effect than out of sincerity. Such circumstances preclude valid negotiations that might culminate in an Arab-Israel rapprochement, but the status quo favors Israel and may enable the Jews to cope with the refugee problem in Palestine.

372
Schmidt, Helmut. THE FUTURE OF GERMANY IN A CHANGING EUROPEAN CONTEXT. In Western and Eastern Europe: the changing relationship. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967. p. 43-49. (Adelphi papers, no. 33) P&GP RR

The restoration of Europe's political identity is a prerequisite for the peaceful reunification of Germany. Europe's future will be decisively influenced by the Soviet-American relationship, but "the most decisive influence will come from the European states themselves." Since the 1962 Cuba crisis both the United States and the Soviet Union have recognized that their interests are partially parallel. Soviet and American nuclear nonproliferation policies are motivated by a common desire to check a loosening process in their respective military alliances, while their "co-operative bipolarity" enhances the increasing polycentric divisions of power in Europe. These developments will give the European states greater freedom of action in the future. There is an inverse ratio between the Federal Republic of Germany's security and chances for German reunification. The West's deterrence capacity is sufficient to assure the Federal Republic's security, but West Germany's strategic problem is to further the cause of détente, which is indispensable for reunification, and maintain the balance of power. The gradual reduction of armaments would promote détente and at the same time sustain the balance of power at progressively lower levels of armament. However, fear of Germany is still the most serious obstacle to reunification. Only by considering the interests of their neighbors along with their own can Germans contribute to a viable solution of central Europe's security problem. This would require sacrifices regarding, among other things, "the eventual definition of the borders of a reunited Germany," and the nation's military status. Under the circumstances, a reexamination of the Rapacki and Gomułka plans for regional arms limitation would be worthwhile. However changes in the status quo of Europe to be conducive to reunification must limit "the weight and the geographic scope of influence" of both sides, the Soviet Union and the Western allies.

373
Schreiner, Egon. [RELATIONS OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC WITH THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND EUROPEAN SECURITY] Die Beziehungen Bundesrepublik-DDR und die europäische Sicherheit. Marxistische Blätter, v. 5, July/Aug. 1967: 1-6. P&GP RR

No significant change has so far occurred in Bonn's German reunification policy, despite official assurances to the contrary. The German Federal Republic's

claim to sole representation of Germany and rejection of the territorial and political status quo in Europe preclude any rapprochement between the two German states. Without rapprochement no reunification policy can ever succeed. The Kiesinger government, as its predecessors did, insists that the German Reich's 1937 boundaries are valid and can be changed only by a peace treaty. This position is as unrealistic as were requests by former West German Governments that German reunification be a prerequisite for East-West détente. And without Bonn's renunciation of its revisionist territorial claims no peace conference with the German Federal Republic is possible. The existence of military alliances has also been an obstacle to European security; NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization could be replaced by an all-European security system, with an atom-free zone and elimination of all foreign military bases and forces in Europe.

374
Shapiro, David. MOSCOW'S DILEMMAS: MIDDLE EAST AND MAO. Socialist commentary, Aug. 1967: 25-27. HX3.S74, 1967

Foreign policy in the wake of the Middle East crisis is as divided in the Soviet Union as it is in the West. Kosygin, many feel, is willing to make an agreement with the United States on policing the area, but a hardline faction within his nation opposes such an action. Although Soviet leaders are disenchanted with the Arab nations and may decrease their activities there, expectation of an end to Soviet-American clashes of interest in the Third World is unrealistic. Wider war was never a real danger in the Middle East, and from the Soviet point of view the conflict was not a total loss. Soviet arms were lost and Soviet prestige suffered some blows, but Egypt is even more dependent on the Soviet Union now than it was before the fighting. The Soviets' Middle Eastern policy must also be seen in relation to their preoccupation with China and their altered military policy designed to meet a continental threat. The United States clearly has no territorial claims on the Soviet nation as China or Germany does, a factor that has encouraged a Soviet cold war policy of wooing the Third World. However, the threat from China may make the Soviets decide to curtail their Third World involvements in order to meet the Eurasian military challenge, although they may hesitate to do so while China actively cultivates these nations. By giving arms to Nasser the Soviet Union is maintaining its sphere of influence against both the United States and China. On the other hand, this Middle Eastern commitment is secondary to protecting Soviet territory on the Eurasian continent. Soviet foreign policy can be expected to swing between these two poles. Although prospects for arms limitation in the Middle East are poor, little danger of escalation of the Arab-Israeli war exists, and Soviet prestige with the Arabs is likely to suffer for the restraint they will be forced to show.

375
THE SINO-SOVIET SITUATION: THREE VIEWS. Contemporary review, v. 210, Feb. 1967: 70-87. AP4.C7, v. 210

Contents.--Sino-Soviet influence on the war in Vietnam, by Edgar O'Ballance.--Racial elements in the Sino-Russian dispute, by Joseph S. Roucek.--The Uighurs, by Edgar Knobloch.

Mentions various aspects of the current strain in relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China. Edgar O'Ballance concludes that the dispute has created significant confusion among the leaders of North Vietnam, where there are two schools of contending military thought. Joseph Roucek, examining the racial aspects of the dispute, sees Soviet exploitation of fears of a "Yellow Peril" at the same time that Chinese leaders have been asserting the superiority of nonwhites over the white population of the world. Knobloch's exposition of the Uighur tribe shows the role of the various border nationalities in the conflict.

376
Tekiner, Süleyman. SINKIANG AND THE SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT. In Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich. Bulletin, v. 14, Aug. 1967: 9-16. DK266.A2I52, v. 14

During its turbulent history mineral-rich Sinkiang has never belonged to Russia but has had the status of a colonial province under China. Sinkiang's population consists of Uighurs, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tatars, and Chinese, with the Chinese in the minority. Sinkiang is a source of friction between Moscow and Peiping because of the flow of refugees from Sinkiang into Soviet territory, Turkic partisans operating in Sinkiang from bases in the Soviet Union, and persecution of the Turkic population in Sinkiang by the Chinese leaders on racial, national, and religious grounds. The Turkic population of Sinkiang has no other choice but to seek asylum across the border or take up arms. In Istanbul, Sinkiang refugees have founded a "National Center for the Liberation of Eastern Turkestan (Sinkiang)." Reportedly an Uighur, a former major general of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, commands a 60,000-man army from Alma-Ata, and a secret school exists in the Soviet Union where Turkic refugees are trained in guerrilla warfare and practical administration. The Chinese are conducting a campaign against the Turkic intellectuals in Sinkiang, accusing them of "revisionism" and "nationalism"; many writers, poets, and journalists have been sent to prison or to labor camps. Sinkiang is of strategic importance to both Communist powers, to China for her facilities for atomic missile development, and to Russia because annexation of the area would allow easier land communication with India via Tibet, circumventing Pakistan.

377
[UNITED STATES: A WAR WITHOUT A SOLUTION] États Unis: Une guerre sans solution [by] F. C. Perspectives, v. 23, Oct. 14, 1967: [item 1] 1-2. HC10.P4, v. 23

The Vietnam War is going badly on both the military and political fronts. The operations in northern South Vietnam around Con Thien have cost the Marines 300 lives and thousands of wounded. The Viet Cong, backed up by regular North Vietnamese troops, are equipped with Russian AK 47 rifles, antitank guns, and deadly rocket launchers and continue to put up stiff resistance against U.S. troops. Communist supplies and men continue to cross over into South Vietnam despite American bombing of the North, which has for all practical purposes cut off Haiphong from the interior. On the domestic front, a Gallup poll has shown that only 28 percent of Americans approve the war while 57 percent are against it. In Congress a group of 48 Republicans and 4 Democrats have demanded more Congressional control over Southeast Asian affairs. President Johnson meanwhile continues to offer peace to North Vietnam. Yet peace appears improbable because of Hanoi's conditions for negotiations: withdrawal of American troops, recognition of

the National Liberation Front, and unconditional cessation of the bombing in North Vietnam.

378
Vernant, Jacques. [ATOMIC RIVALRIES AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS] Des rivalités atomiques à la crise du Proche-Orient. Revue de défense nationale, v. 23, July 1967: 1266-1270.
D410.R45, v. 23

Enumerates several principles, based on Bertrand Goldschmidt's book Les Rivalités Atomiques 1939-1966, that could inspire a reasonable solution to the Middle East crisis. Vernant notes that the existence of Israel is as established as the territorial status of European states after World War II and that this cannot be denied by responsible Arab leaders. The refugee problem must also be recognized as both an economic and political issue, which must be settled not before or after, but during, negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis. For workable negotiations the illusion that one has to negotiate from a position of power by creating faits accomplis must be dispelled--it just perpetuates bitterness. The author concludes that a profound examination of the issues can only take place in an atmosphere of peace.

379
Waterkamp, Rainer. [CHANGES IN COMMUNIST EUROPEAN POLICY] Wandlungen der kommunistischen Europapolitik. Politische Studien, v. 18, Sept./Oct. 1967: 544-554. H35.P66, v. 18

Points out the processes in Eastern and Western Europe conducive to economic cooperation and eventually to political rapport. Waterkamp discusses the centrifugal forces within the Soviet European bloc, its difficulties with economic integration, and the tendencies of East European nations toward greater national independence. He also considers interbloc trade in Europe and the East-West détente's erosion of bloc cohesion in Eastern and Western Europe.

380
Weisl, Wolfgang von. [THE POLITICS OF THE GREAT POWERS IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST] Die Politik der Grossmächte im Nahen und Mittleren Osten. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 5, July/Aug. 1967: 293-307. maps, illus.
P&GP RR

History of European (and occasional American) involvement in the Near and Middle East from the time of Napoleon to the present. Weisl considers, among other things, British, French, Italian, Greek, Turkish, and Russian interests in the area, including the Soviet aims of today. Also discussed are Nasser's ambition to lead the entire Arab world and his aggressive designs against Israel. A detailed account of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War emphasizes the Israeli strategy of "defense through attack," which was conducted in superb fashion.

381
Windsor, Philip. THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE WORLD BALANCE. World today, v. 23, July 1967: 279-285. D410.W63, v. 23

The Great Powers' old pattern of maintaining stability in the Middle East--a "noninvolved involvement" in arming and aiding rival Middle East states--has broken down, and the impossibility of reverting to the prewar situation has forced the superpowers to find solutions to common problems that will overshadow present Arab attempts to play Moscow and Washington off against each other. One issue that may affect Russian-American cooperation in the Middle East is the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The focus of this problem has moved from India to Israel. The side effects on neighbors and potential adversaries of an Indian nuclear program would be small compared to the implications of an Israeli nuclear bomb. If Israel does indeed achieve nuclear status the psychological impact of a small nation manufacturing nuclear weapons would destroy the "protocol of inhibitions" among the larger neutral nations. Unfortunately the price for Israel's signature on a nonproliferation treaty is a cast-iron nuclear guarantee by the two Great Powers--in effect bilateral defense treaties. Should the Great Powers fail to protect Israel from outside attack, other countries, notably India, would interpret this failure as a sign to go ahead with their nuclear programs. Yet a joint guarantee, unless formed as part of greater economic and arms control programs, would only confirm the suspicion that Israel is a "European outpost implanted by force on the shores of Asia." The period of intense competition "in the political, economic, and military fields, which began over the Aswan Dam, needs to be transformed into a series of complementary endeavors." The human misery that has been the main result of the recent war should be alleviated by resettlement and general economic development. The best that can be hoped for is a gradual weakening of the fanatic hostility that has dominated Arab-Israeli relations and precluded realistic solutions concerning boundaries, refugees, and political recognition. The attenuation of the arms race is of prior importance. A freeze on arms is impossible; defeat has left the Arabs bitter, and Israel's capture of huge quantities of military equipment (especially tanks) has created an Arab sense of urgency about procuring new weapons from the Soviet Union. A U.S.-Soviet accord must be reached determining the level and types of arms essential to Middle East countries in order to ensure relative deterrence and security. If the Soviet Union and the United States refuse to act in concert or resist becoming involved in solving Middle East problems, the burden of maintaining peace and security must reside with the United Nations. Unless this organization is given the power to impose its will through the machinery of intervention "it will degenerate into a series of international welfare organizations." The single most important unknown factor in the Middle East imbroglio is Communist China; the great powers cannot fail to appreciate the significance of the Chinese policy of "continuing revolution" in the Middle East.

2. Disengagement, Neutralization, etc.

382
Amme, Carl H. NUCLEAR CONSTRAINTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. Disarmament, no. 14, June 1967: 9-12. illus. JX1981.P7D5, 1967

Increased East-West contacts and a feeling of détente have eroded the rigid confrontation that formerly divided Europe. The need for guarding against surprise attack or for disengagement proposals and nuclear-free zones has waned. A European war is unlikely to occur today except out of a crisis or a serious miscalculation. The possibility that conflict might bring about the use of nuclear weapons is central to current thinking on arms control, which advocates agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons

and their first use. However such agreements would create a commitment to defend Western Europe with conventional forces only, which military experts find impossiole in light of the Soviet conventional superiority, their internal lines of communication, and many other factors. Some analysts argue that no one would expect the United States or any other nation to honor such a pledge if presented with a vital challenge. If a no-first-use pledge lacks credibility no useful purpose is served by making it, and the NATO alliance is better served by U.S. assurance of its willingness to initiate the use of nuclear weapons in important circumstances. One scheme for local nuclear constraints that might increase stability in Europe and prevent the disaster of general nuclear war is the establishment of "firebreaks" or thresholds of violence between the first use of nuclear weapons and general war. To make thresholds distinguishable is a complex problem, for they must be perceived and understood by both sides. It may be valuable to distinguish between "battlefield" nuclear weapons and those that penetrate deep into enemy territory. Another possibility is the establishment of sanctuaries (targets which are not to be attacked), a precedent already established in Korea and Vietnam. A distinguishable threshold between the first use of nuclear weapons and general war depends on three factors: the technical possibility of limiting a nuclear battle to the local battlefield, a doctrine of nuclear constraints compatible with the operations of the armed forces, and a readjustment of the NATO force posture in line with the alliance's avowed peaceful intent.

383
Clunies Ross, Anthony I., and Peter King. AUSTRALIA AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS. [Sydney] Sydney University Press, 1966. 111 p. JX1974.7.C48

Contents.--The beginning of a nuclear debate.--The spread of nuclear weapons--safety or danger?--Is nuclear disarmament possible?--A system to prevent the spread: the United Nations initiatives.--Uses of international non-nuclear agreements.--Prospects for non-nuclear regions.--Should Australia go nuclear?--Proposal for a pact.--The other parties.--An Australian initiative.

Presents the case for Australia's entry into a non-nuclear pact with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and New Zealand. The authors advocate that Australia officially initiate an agreement to establish a nuclear-free region, prohibiting both the possession of nuclear weapons by the six signatories and the stationing of foreign-owned nuclear weapons in their territories. The work includes a proposal by the authors on how such an agreement might operate.

384
García Robles, Alfonso. THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF LATIN AMERICA. [New York] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967. 167 p. JX1974.7.G313

Documents the progress toward a treaty creating a nuclear-free zone in Latin America from the Joint Declaration of April 29, 1963, in which five Latin American Republics agreed to sign a treaty banning nuclear weapons in their countries, to the January 1967 meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, which was established to prepare a draft treaty. Part One contains 11 speeches delivered at international meetings by Dr. García Robles, Chairman of the Preparatory Commission and Mexico's Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Resolutions, declarations, acts, and reports originating from the Preparatory Commission, plus some of the nuclear nations' diplomatic notes relating to the work of the Preparatory Commission, make up the 12 entries in Part Two. Enforcement by Latin America of a treaty banning testing, production, stationing, or use of nuclear weapons in signatory countries would benefit all mankind by providing a regional denuclearization model that may someday lead to global denuclearization.

385
Petrov, M. NON-NUCLEAR ZONES: A PRESSING DEMAND. International affairs (Moscow) no. 6, June 1967: 12-16, 34. D839.I465, 1967

Summary of proposals presented since 1956 by the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries to the Disarmament Commission and at international conferences to set up nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. These proposals include three Polish plans (two by Rapacki and one by Gomułka) on the denuclearization of central Europe, as well as plans for the Mediterranean area, the Balkans, and Northern Europe. The United States and the other Western Powers oppose the idea for Europe because nonnuclear zones would upset the balance of forces in favor of the Soviet Union. The author traces the development of the idea on the African Continent up to the declaration on the denuclearization of Africa in December 1965. The negotiations of the Latin American nations and the 1963 draft resolution declaring Latin America a nonnuclear zone are discussed.

386
Rabinowitch, Eugene. WHAT IS SAUCE FOR THE GOOSE IS SAUCE FOR THE GANDER. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 23, Sept. 1967: 41-43. TK9145.A84, v. 23

Points out that world peace depends on the general recognition of the existing political map of the world rather than on attempts to change the status quo. Unless the West and the East disassociate themselves from revisionist movements in Germany, Vietnam, Korea, or the Arab countries, no viable solution to the security problem of those areas is possible.

D. OUTER SPACE

387
AFTER 10 YEARS--AND 75 BILLION DOLLARS: WHO IS AHEAD IN THE SPACE RACE NOW? U.S. news & world report, v. 63, Oct. 9, 1967: 78-79. illus. JK1.U65, v. 63

In graphic form demonstrates that the United States is currently ahead of the Soviet Union in the race for space. This U.S. News & World Report "pictogram" compares Soviet and American space "firsts," manned space programs, total costs and payloads launched, and the two nations' military programs in space.

388
Christol, Carl Q. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 513 p. illus. (U.S. Naval War College. International law studies: 1962, v. 55) JX1295.U4, v. 55

Bibliographical footnotes.

Partial contents. --pt. 1. Introduction; International law and outer space; The essentials of a minimum public order. --pt. 2. Outer space and the world community; Characteristics and capabilities of space vehicles; Users of space vehicles; Probable and possible uses of outer space. --pt. 3. The development of the law of outer space; Legal principles and rules; The decisional process. --pt. 4. Reasonable uses of outer space; The nature of reasonable use; Instances of reasonable use; The special Soviet view of observational activities; The special Soviet view of communications activities; Restrictions on uses of outer space. --pt. 5. The right to the maintenance of international peace, security, and self-defense in outer space; Legal authority for dealing with certain uses; Competence to deal with certain uses; Processes to insure the reasonable uses of outer space. --pt. 6. Legal problems arising from reasonable uses of outer space.

A study of the international law of outer space on the basis of sources available through 1963. Its development has definitely been influenced by the traditional principles and norms of international law. Christol stresses the importance of elements of "the social complex" for all relational situations under space law along with the influence of science and technology. Appendixes to the book contain full texts of over 20 documents, among them United Nations General Assembly resolutions on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space and the American, Soviet, and British proposals on principles relating to the exploration and use of outer space, as well as a list of bibliographies on the subject.

389
Menter, Martin. THE DEVELOPING LAW FOR OUTER SPACE. In American Bar Association. Journal, v. 53, Aug. 1967: 703-707.
LL

Discusses the United Nations resolutions that preceded the recently accepted treaty banning nuclear weapons in outer space and describes the provisions of the treaty itself. As Menter notes, the treaty does not profess to deal with all of the legal problems emanating from space activities but attempts to provide general guidelines covering a wide variety of problems. Interestingly, the treaty is not limited to U.N. members. To assure safety in future space flights, Menter urges adoption of regulations to register space vehicles and set standards concerning their use. He feels that the treaty does not lessen the necessity for defenses against enemy ICBM's or orbital bombardment illegally employed against the United States, but he hopes that it will eventually provide a steppingstone toward peace on earth and the rule of law among nations.

390
Oliszewski, D. A. SPACE--THE JOINT EFFORT. Data, v. 12, June 1967: 45-46.
P&GP RR

Illustrates the broad cooperation and coordination between U.S. civilian and military agencies and points out specific areas where they interconnect in developing the Nation's space program. "This interchange of ideas, technology, hardware and personnel is making our progress in space possible."

391
Reintanz, Gerhard. THE SPACE TREATY. German foreign policy, v. 6, no. 2, 1967: 147-152.
P&GP RR

The likelihood that man will set foot on the moon in the near future makes it imperative that nations codify human activities in space. Already the United States has begun to militarize space through such military espionage satellites as the MOL [manned orbiting laboratory] in a program announced by President Johnson in August 1965. The purpose of MOL, according to an article in the U.S. journal Newsweek, is "to study Soviet defence installations, to spot aircraft and submarines and to tap radio communications." Such evidence proves that the United States is exploiting space for its own aggressive purposes and against the interest of the Socialist states. Soviet defense experts have the means to foil these efforts, but at the same time they are trying to legally guarantee the demilitarization and peaceful use of space. On Dec. 19, 1966, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the Soviet draft treaty governing the research and use of outer space. Among its chief provisions are a ban on nuclear weapons, military bases, and arms tests in space and a renunciation of claims to sovereignty on celestial bodies. The treaty is of an indefinite duration, with one year's notice being required for withdrawal, and is open to all states. After failing to bar the German Democratic Republic from the treaty, West Germany persuaded London, Paris, and Washington to publicly state that the GDR signature on the treaty did not imply Western recognition. The military significance of the moon is still unknown, but the space treaty assures its reservation for peaceful activities. The nuclear test ban treaty of 1963 and the space treaty of 1966 are important beginnings; the next step on the road to peace must be a ban on all nuclear weapons.

392
U.S. Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, 1962-1965; GOALS AND PURPOSES, ACHIEVEMENTS, PLANS, AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS: STAFF REPORT PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES, UNITED STATES SENATE. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. 920 p.
TL789.8.R9U622, 1966

Surveys Soviet intentions, organizations, plans, capabilities, and programs in space. Discusses certain aspects of Soviet space sciences and technology and analyzes their international, political, and legal implications. Special emphasis is placed on Soviet attitudes toward space law, including studies on the partial test ban treaty, the treaty for partial revision of radio regulations of the International Telecommunication Union, and the status of objects launched into outer space.

393
WHERE WE'RE GOING IN OUR SPACE PROGRAM. Data, v. 12, June 1967: 11, 14-22.
P&GP RR

Broad overview of the missions of the U.S. Gemini, Apollo, Voyager, and military space programs. The military manned space flight program, centered on the Air Force's manned orbiting laboratory [MOL], is still "characterized by ambivalence which has been

with the program since its beginning." Rising costs, uncertain flight dates, possible adverse diplomatic reaction by other governments to such flights, and space treaty considerations are obstacles in the MOL's path. Some critics argue that the MOL program should be integrated with NASA's orbital lab program. Six probable MOL missions--satellite inspection, satellite neutralization, earth surveillance, damage assessment, submarine surveillance, and space assembly--are briefly summarized.

E. VIOLATION OF AGREEMENTS AND RESPONSES

1. Violation, Inspection, Verification

394
Beaton, Leonard. NUCLEAR FUEL-FOR-ALL. Survival, v. 9, Sept. 1967: 287-291.
U162.S9, v. 9
Reprinted from Foreign Affairs, July 1967.
D410.F6

Proposed safeguards systems for the nonproliferation treaty would provide false assurance that no country that signs it will ever be capable of producing a nuclear force. An inspection agreement between a supplying and receiving country does not ensure a perpetual commitment by the latter--if Great Britain had built a nuclear reactor in Egypt in 1952 Egypt today would be producing nuclear weapons in spite of an inspection agreement. Today several countries, with outside help, are producing plutonium: Italy is producing enough to make between 10 and 20 nuclear bombs, and India is accumulating a nuclear stockpile. There are no safeguards systems to prevent such countries from diverting plutonium to weapons. A solution to this problem would be an international arrangement to buy plutonium as it was produced. The best system would be one in which an international agency would own the fuel from the start, lease the uranium for the reactors, and therefore own the fuel throughout the process. An enduring international agency could exist only if the Great Powers agree that they too would limit their military nuclear activities through such an agency.

395
Brandenberger, Arthur J. WHAT CAN PHOTOS TELL US. International science and technology, no. 69, Sept. 1967: 56-62, 65-66. illus.
Q1.I587, 1967

Explains the techniques and some of the uses of photogrammetry--the determination of the size and shape of an object from photographs rather than from the original. Highly accurate measurements of diverse objects on both the micro- and macro-levels can be made utilizing stereo pairs of photographs.

396
Briscoe, H. W., and R. M. Sheppard. A STUDY OF THE CAPABILITY OF A LASA TO AID THE IDENTIFICATION OF A SEISMIC SOURCE. Lexington, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lincoln Laboratory, 1966. 35 p. (Lincoln Laboratory. [Report] 1966-38) Sci RR
AD 637283.
L. C. copy on microfiche.

Investigates the ability of LASA to aid in differentiating between explosions and natural earthquakes from observations of the seismic waves they generate. Results of studies indicate that "the ability to see first motion varies directly with SNR [signal-to-noise ratio] but that the ability to identify pP is apparently improved more than the SNR gain would indicate, probably due to the ability of a large array to measure velocity directly."

397
Chilton, F., J. D. Eisler, and H. G. Heubach. DYNAMICS OF SPALLING OF THE EARTH'S SURFACE CAUSED BY UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. Journal of geophysical research, v. 71, Dec. 15, 1966: 5911-5919. QC811.J6, v. 71

The dynamics of spalling of the near-surface earth layers caused by contained underground explosions was investigated theoretically. Spalling of these layers is a consequence of propagation of compressive and tensile stresses in the subsurface. Tensile stresses are produced by the reflection of compressive stresses from the free surface. At a depth at which the tensile stress exceeds the sum of the compressive stress, the stress due to the overburden and the tensile strength of the rock causes the formations to part, and a spall is created. Analysis demonstrates that the subsurface spalled region has an upper and a lower bound, and the region can be represented by a solid of revolution whose vertical axis passes through the shot point. Analysis of the Rainier data reveals that the average tensile strength of rocks in situ is smaller by a factor of 20 to 50 than the accepted value determined for laboratory sample. (Abstract supplied)

398
Gorove, Stephen. MAINTAINING ORDER THROUGH ON-SITE INSPECTION: FOCUS ON THE IAEA. Western Reserve law review, v. 18, July 1967: 1525-1547. LL

As in other international control arrangements, on-site inspection is the essential feature of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] safeguards system designed to assure the peaceful use of nuclear facilities. The IAEA is by statute given the right and responsibility to send inspectors into states to determine compliance with the required pledge "not to use Agency assistance or safeguarded items in such a way as to further any military purpose." In order for the IAEA to maintain adequate control over inspections, inspectors are designated from its own staff, with the approval of the state concerned. Inspectors are recruited from a wide geographical area and may be accompanied by representatives of the state being inspected. The agency must give at least a week's notice of its intention to conduct an inspection, indicating the names of the inspectors, the time and place of their arrival in the country, and the time of the inspection. When a rapid check is necessary to investigate an incident, a "special inspection" can be arranged within 24 hours. The visits of inspectors must be scheduled so as to ensure both maximum efficiency of the inspection and minimum inconvenience to the facilities inspected. Routine inspections may include the audit of reports and records and the verification of the amount of safeguarded materials by physical inspection, measurement, and sampling. For reasons of practicability, economy, and effectiveness, power reactors having a potential plutonium production in excess of 60 kilograms per year are open to inspection at all times by resident inspectors, who can investigate without advance notice. The agency recently tested a new device in which a distinctive

tape and seal were placed on the core of a reactor, which could not be opened without breaking them. An unbroken tape and seal are evidence that none of the fuel rods containing the byproducts capable of military use have been removed. The advantages and convenience of such a verification technique are obvious. The IAEA experience assumes great importance in view of the expectation that by 1980 nuclear energy production may reach 200,000 megawatts. Today the prospects for the IAEA inspection system look more promising than ever, especially in light of the boost it is expected to receive when a nonproliferation treaty is approved.

399
McBride, James H. THE TEST BAN TREATY: MILITARY, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. Chicago, Regnery [1967] 197 p.
JX1974.7.M22

Partial contents.--Introduction.--Historical background.--The state of the art in the United States and the Soviet Union.--Clandestine testing and its detection.--Some strategic problems.--Military and technological advantages and disadvantages.--The safeguards.--Political aspects.--Conclusions.--Appendices.--Bibliography.--Index.

Concludes that the nuclear test ban treaty was a serious mistake and a threat to the future security of the United States. McBride lists 23 risks or disadvantages of the treaty. He maintains that within the scope of the treaty no matter how vigorously the four safeguards written into the treaty are pursued they serve to "ameliorate, but not eliminate, only three of the 23 military and technological risks". For the Soviet Union the treaty was of significant value in its struggle to overcome the U.S. lead in nuclear technology. The reason that the Soviet Union signed the treaty in 1963 was that by the end of 1962 Russia had completed its second postmoratorium series and by late the following spring had analyzed the results and found that it was at least even with the United States in its testing program.

400
Orr, M., and R. H. Spohn. A MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL MODEL FOR INDIRECT BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT. Operations research, v. 15, July/Aug. 1967: 706-719. tables.
Q175.O63, v. 15

This paper describes a multivariate statistical model for obtaining the best estimate of the point of detonation of a long-range nuclear weapon. It extends previous work by permitting greater generality in the dimensional characterization of such problems. It also introduces a new concept of weapon-system error based upon this concept. Specifically, the model provides a technique for combining the a priori knowledge of weapon-system accuracy with the post-burst reports of sensory devices deployed within measuring range of the target. Formulas are derived for several configurations and an example is given illustrating application of the model to Indirect Bomb Damage Assessment. (Abstract supplied)

2. Enforcement

401
Seaborg, Glenn T. THE PROMISE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. Science, v. 158, Oct. 13, 1967: 226-230.
Q1.S35, v. 158

The success of the International Atomic Energy Agency's [IAEA's] worldwide programs for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy demonstrates that "a widely favored international objective can be achieved even in a climate of controversy between the major powers." Striving to "show that science is one of the powerful forces that we can put to work to build a better world," the IAEA sponsors basic research activities and international meetings to exchange scientific information and prepare recommendations on methods for attacking specific technical problems. IAEA efforts have contributed to the application of nuclear energy to large-scale desalting of seawater, power production, medicine, and agriculture. Additionally, the IAEA attempts to ensure that nuclear energy activities follow adequate health and safety precautions and that civilian nuclear materials are not diverted to military purposes. If the nuclear nonproliferation treaty is adopted, the IAEA could substantially contribute to the maintenance of world peace by developing and applying a safeguards system.

F. CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

402
INQUIRY INTO A DISARMED WORLD. UNESCO courier, no. 8, Aug./Sept. 1967: 5-9.
P&GP RR

The results of an international public opinion poll in which 5,000 persons in France, Norway, and Poland were asked 30 questions on various aspects of disarmament and world affairs. The poll is the first stage of an inquiry into public attitudes toward a future world in which armaments are either limited or discarded. The European Co-ordination Centre for Social Research and Documentation, an independent unit of the International Social Science Council, is carrying out the project with the financial aid of UNESCO. Although it will take several years to complete the second stage of the inquiry, which will cover 13 countries, and to analyze the total findings in detail, the first results already suggest that there is a strikingly similarity of views among peoples of widely different social, economic, and political backgrounds.

403
Ourin, Miriam A. THE POST LAYOFF LABOR MARKET EXPERIENCES OF THE FORMER REPUBLIC AVIATION CORPORATION (LONG ISLAND) WORKERS. Washington, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; [for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1966 [i.e. 1967] 173 p. (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Publication 35)
JX1974.A1U52, no. 35

Considers the experiences of workers laid off from defense industries, in this case Republic Aviation, as they attempt to find new employment. The study notes that in spite of the fact that they were forewarned of the impending layoff, the Republic work force and the community were surprised and unprepared to deal with the problem. It finds that the overwhelming majority of the workers found new jobs; but approximately one-third of the jobs represented a downgrading of skills, and many took a cut in pay. However, compared to mass layoffs in other industries, Republic workers fared well. The study concludes that a smoother transition could have been made if the company had invested more time and money in finding

new civilian production areas, an undertaking that perhaps the Government should encourage. The Federal Government could also help through increasing training and relocation allowances.

G. OTHER PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

404
Anthony, L. J. SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON ATOMIC ENERGY. Oxford, New York, Pergamon Press [1966] 245 p. (International series of monographs in library and information science, v. 2)
Z5160.A46

A guide to documentary and organizational sources of information on atomic energy. In order to assist the nonscientific reader, the introductory chapter describes, "in fairly simple terms the various aspects of atomic energy and [shows] how they are related to each other and to other technologies." Part two lists the activities and publications of the major national atomic energy projects and organizations. Part three describes the publishing activities and organization of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the European Atomic Energy Community, the European Nuclear Energy Agency, the European Organization for Nuclear Research, and the European Atomic Forum. Part four surveys books, journals, conference proceedings, pamphlets, catalogs, and other documents on various subjects related to nuclear energy, including atomic, nuclear, and high energy physics; nuclear power and engineering, ionizing radiations and radioisotopes; and controlled nuclear fusion and plasma physics.

405
DECLARATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SESSION OF THE 22ND ANNIVERSARY WORLD CONFERENCE AGAINST ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN BOMBS. Japan Socialist review, no. 138, Aug. 15, 1967: 1-7.
HX9.J3, 1967

Declaration issued at the conclusion of the Conference, held in Tokyo Aug. 1-3, 1967. The paper by the 24 representatives of international organizations and peace movements in foreign countries and the 49 Japanese delegates discussed "questions of nuclear disarmament, focusing attention on the problems of the Vietnam war and the Middle East war, as well as on the future tasks and roles of the peace movements of the world related to these questions."

406
Eichelberger, Clark M. THE U.N. AND THE SEA [editorial] Saturday review, v. 50, Oct. 14, 1967: 22, 114. Z1219.S25, v. 50

The United Nations has begun a historical debate on the future control of the sea, a monumental problem considering that seven-tenths of the world's surface is covered by water, and most of it is unclaimed by sovereign powers. Certain actions cannot be postponed lest maritime powers begin to extend their claims and initiate a power struggle in these new areas. Some nations have already extended their territorial waters for fishing purposes. The General Assembly should immediately proclaim certain principles concerning the sea until a treaty is worked out. Such principles might include a declaration that waters beyond the territorial sea cannot be appropriated by sovereign powers, that the sea's resources are to be preserved as mankind's common heritage, and perhaps that the financial benefits derived from exploitation of the sea should be used to promote development of the poorer nations. Some opposition to such a course has already developed among U.S. fishing and mining interests and certain members of Congress, but they must be convinced that the interests of the country as well as the world are best served by a rational order maintained by world law.

407
Geis, Robert R. [THE PEACE OF THE JEWS. EXCERPTS FROM AN ADDRESS TO A CHURCH CONVOCATION] Der Friede der Juden. Auszüge aus einer Rede vor dem Kirchentag. Junge Kirche, v. 28, Aug. 10, 1967: 418-425. BX8001.J8, v. 28

Explains the Jewish concept of peace and its development. Rabbi Geis describes the meaning attached to the idea of peace by Old Testament prophets and discusses its various aspects in the context of Jewish encounters with other civilizations. Now, in the nuclear age, the Jewish hope for world peace is "full of charitable skepticism toward man."

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